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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The importance of human resources has received much attention in recent years. At a 
macro level, endogenous growth theories suggest that the accumulation of human capi-
tal constitutes the main engine of macro-economic growth (Lucas, 1988, 1993; Romer, 
1987, 1996; Mankiw et al., 1992). At a micro level, resource-based theory points to the 
human capital of employees as a major source for sustained competitive advantage for 
individual firms (Ferligoj et al., 1997; Koch and McGrath, 1996; Wright et al., 1994). 
Due to the increasing importance of human capital, which to a large extent is related to 
developments in information and communication technologies, current western econo-
mies are described as knowledge-based economies. 
The increased importance of human capital is apparent at both the demand and the sup-
ply side of the labour market. However, an adequate supply of and demand for highly 
qualified labour is in itself not enough to guarantee economic progress; for each indi-
vidual firm, supply of and demand for labour and human capital must be matched. 
Companies in the knowledge-based economy are challenged to meet their demand for 
highly trained employees in labour markets characterized by a shortage of qualified la-
bour (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000, 2001). Human resources are becoming more impor-
tant, and therefore also the management of these resources.  
At the same time, the knowledge-based economy is characterized by an increasing share 
of small and medium-sized enterprises or SMEs (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000; 
Audretsch et al., 2002). Generally speaking, small firms pay less attention to human re-
source management or HRM than their larger counterparts do (Barron et al., 1987; 
Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990). Thus, while on the one hand the rise of the knowledge-
based economy increases the importance of human resource management, the increase 
of the SME sector, which employees roughly half of all employees, is associated with a 
decrease of HRM practices.  
Does the combination of these developments pose a threat to the success of knowledge-
based economies? Our current understanding of HRM practices within SMEs is as yet 
insufficient to provide an answer to this question. As Heneman et al. (2000) conclude 
after a literature review of more than 400 articles, the available literature “appears to be 
rich in prescriptions, limited in sound descriptive surveys, and sparse in analytical re-
search”. Especially quantitative studies, in which hypotheses on HRM within small 
firms are specified and tested empirically, are lacking (Heneman et al., 2000, page 15).  
The aim of this PhD thesis is to increase our understanding of HRM practices within 
SMEs. On the one hand, we shall investigate determinants of HRM practices. Small and 
medium-sized firms differ from each other in their application of HRM practices, and 
we shall examine how these differences may be explained by various organizational 
characteristics. This is examined both for HRM practices in general, and for a specific 
field of HRM practices (precautionary actions to reduce absenteeism). On the other 
hand, the impact of HRM practices will be considered. Again, both the impact of HRM 
practices in general and the impact of specific HRM practices (firm-provided training) 
is examined.  Chapter 1   
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To this end, five studies are presented in this thesis, which share a similar approach and 
methodology. First of all, they all focus on HRM practices rather than policies. Next, 
they assume bounded rational behaviour by the manager or business owner. The con-
cept of bounded rationality is an important aspect of transaction cost theory, which 
plays an important role in three of the five studies. Finally, the studies have a quantita-
tive orientation in common. In the first four studies, hypotheses are derived that specify 
relationships between explanatory variables and dependent variables. These hypotheses 
are tested using available data. The fifth study is based on a simulation model on labour 
flows within individual firms. The model has been calibrated using empirical informa-
tion, and simulation results resemble empirically observed labour flows. This simulation 
model combines elements from various theoretical perspectives, and includes several 
HRM practices. In an indirect way, these HRM practices are part of the explanatory 
variables that explain firm size, which is the dependent variable in this study.  
The next chapter presents an overview of the current knowledge on HRM within SMEs. 
The chapter starts with a literature review on the fields of HRM and SMEs, which is 
subsequently used to derive the theoretical framework, objective and research questions 
for this thesis. This is followed by the main results from the studies that have been per-
formed. Consequently, chapter two is a combination of an introduction into and a sum-
mary of this thesis (a summary chapter is therefore not included, except for the sum-
mary in Dutch). Chapters three to five present the results of the underlying studies on 
determinants of HRM practices, while chapters six and seven contain two studies on the 
impact of HRM practices.  
Chapters three to seven are presented in such a way that they can be read independently 
of each other. Thus, readers who are specifically interested in one of these studies can 
directly turn their attention to the chapter of their interest (although it is recommended 
to read the literature review included in chapter two first). These studies have also been 
published separately: chapters three to seven are based on De Kok and Uhlaner (2001), 
De Kok et al. (2003), De Kok (2001), De Kok (2002) and Den Butter et al. (2001). 
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Chapter 2: Managing personnel within small firms 
2.1 Introduction 
The recognition of the importance of human capital has led to an increasing flow of re-
search on the management of human resources. At the same time, the increased aware-
ness of the pivotal role of SMEs in modern economies is accompanied by a rich flow of 
scientific research on entrepreneurship and small business economics. The overlap be-
tween these strands of research is, however, limited, as is our current understanding of 
HRM practices within SMEs. 
The first sections of this chapter contain an introduction into human resource manage-
ment and in specific characteristics of SMEs, which is followed by a literature review 
on HRM within SMEs in section 2.4
1. Next, the objective and research questions of this 
thesis are presented in section 2.5, within the framework of a general research agenda 
for research on HRM within SMEs. The research questions relate to either determinants 
of HRM practices or their impact within small and medium-sized enterprises.  
The main findings are discussed in sections 2.6 (on determinants of HRM practices) and 
2.7 (on the impact of HRM practices). In the final two sections, we present some gen-
eral conclusions and discuss how our findings relate to the main body of knowledge on 
HRM within SMEs. 
2.2  Human resource management 
2.2.1 Demarcation   
Human resource management is about the management of an organisation’s workforce. 
Managing a workforce first of all requires the presence of a workforce, which calls for 
activities in the fields of recruitment, selection, appraisal and compensation. Next, the 
workforce must be organised: tasks and responsibilities must be determined and com-
municated. To ensure that employees possess required knowledge and skills, training 
and development activities can be carried out. Such activities may influence the work-
ing climate within the organisation, and thus employee commitment and job satisfac-
tion. Organisations may also employ activities that directly aim to improve commitment 
and satisfaction, either because job satisfaction is a goal in itself, or because it is be-
lieved to have a positive impact on organisational performance.  
These activities may demarcate the scope of HRM, but they do not define it. Studies on 
HRM apply different normative models of what HRM should look like. In addition, 
HRM studies differ in their objective and theoretical perspective. This section provides 
 
1  Various parts of sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 have been published in De Kok and Uhlaner (2001) and 
De Kok et al. (2003). Chapter 2 
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a brief introduction into these differences, and ends with the objective and perspectives 
used in the current thesis
2. 
Personnel management and HRM 
Research on personnel management dates back to the early decades of the twentieth 
century (Scott, 1915). Between mid-century and the late 1970’s, research primarily fo-
cused on the development of valid and fair personnel management practices in large or-
ganizations. These studies examine the relationship between various practices and indi-
vidual performance (Asher, 1972; Campbell et al., 1970; Ghiselli, 1966; Guion, 1965) 
and the sources of discrimination bias in hiring and promotion (Cann et al., 1981; Ten-
brunsel et al., 1996).  
The early 1980’s witnessed a shift from personnel management to human resource man-
agement (Boselie, 2002; Legge, 1995). The introduction of human resource manage-
ment started a period of conceptualisation, dominated by questions such as “what is 
human resource management?” and “what is the difference between human resource 
management and personnel management?” (Boselie, 2002). An extensive comparison 
between HRM and personnel management is provided by Legge (1995). Rather than 
providing formal definitions of HRM and personnel management, she presents norma-
tive models that reflect aspirations of what HRM / personnel management ideally 
should look like. Comparing normative models on HRM and personnel management, 
she concludes that HRM and personnel management have much in common, since they 
both:  
-  stress the importance of integrating personnel / HRM practices with organisational 
goals; 
-  identify assigning the right people to the right jobs as an important means of inte-
grating personnel / HRM practice with organisational goals; 
-  emphasise the importance of individuals developing their abilities for their own per-
sonal satisfaction to make their best contribution to organisational success; 
-  vest personnel / HRM firmly in line management. 
Differences between normative models of HRM and personnel management “are more 
those of meaning and emphasis than of substance” (Legge, 1995, page 74). The real dif-
ference between HRM and personnel management may be identified as “not what it is, 
but who is saying it” (Legge, 1995, page 75). Another distinction between HRM and 
personnel management is their appreciation of the role of employees. Where personnel 
management generally assumes that “employees are important to improve perform-
ance”, many studies on HRM hold that “employees are the key to organisational suc-
cess”  (Boselie, 2002, page 13).  
On closer examination of the normative models on HRM, two different groups can be 
distinguished, commonly known as the Harvard approach and the Michigan approach 
(Boselie, 2002; Legge, 1995). The Harvard approach, or “soft” version of HRM, 
stresses the human aspect of human resources. According to this approach, the com-
 
2  More elaborate discussions on definitions and demarcations of HRM can be found in Boselie 
(2002), Guest (1997), Legge (1995), Paauwe and Richardson (1997), Sisson (1994), Storey 
(1992), and specialised journals such as International Journal of Human Resource Management 
and Academy of Management Journal. Managing personnel within small firms 
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mitment of employees offers an important source of competitive advantages, and HRM 
should therefore stress the development of employee commitment. This approach gen-
erally takes the point of view of various stakeholders into consideration, including 
shareholders, employees and trade unions. The Michigan approach, or “hard” version of 
HRM, stresses the resource aspect of human resources. According to this approach, 
HRM should strive for an internal fit of HRM practices and an external fit between 
HRM practices and business strategy. This strategic perspective of HRM has also been 
labelled strategic human resource management or SHRM (Delery and Doty, 1996; 
Snell, 1992). The viewpoint of this approach is mostly limited to that of the sharehold-
ers. 
The co-existence of different normative models allows the HRM label to be applied to 
different approaches to the management of human resources, which adds to the prob-
lematic nature of the concept of HRM itself (Storey, 1998) and contradictions between 
various HRM models (Legge, 1995). 
During the last decade, the focus of HRM research has shifted from conceptual studies 
about the nature of HRM to studies that examine the impact of HRM on organizational 
performance (Boselie, 2002; Guest, 1997). Often cited examples of this shift include 
Delery and Doty (1996), Huselid (1995), Huselid et al. (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1997), 
Koch and McGrath (1996) and MacDuffie (1995). These studies focus on specific 
(combinations of) HRM practices that are believed to improve organisational perform-
ance by improving competences and commitment of employees. These practices are 
usually referred to as high performance or high commitment HRM practices, and in-
clude practices such as testing of applicants, incentive pay systems, increased emphasis 
on workforce training and employee participation, and increased employment security.  
High performance practices are sometimes referred to as sophisticated practices (Golhar 
and Deshpande, 1997; Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990; Goss et al., 1994), innovative prac-
tices (MacDuffie, 1995) or formal practices (Heneman and Berkley, 1999). Especially 
the latter label reflects that these practices are often relatively standardized and formal-
ized. However, standardization and formalization are not necessary conditions. Little 
consensus exists regarding a more specific demarcation of high performance HRM 
practices (Guest, 1997). 
Objectives 
HRM studies not only differ in the underlying normative models, but also in the objec-
tive of their study. Three categories of general-level theories on HRM can be distin-
guished (Guest, 1997; Storey, 1992; Verburg et al., 1997):  
-  normative or prescriptive studies; these studies reflect the view “either that a suffi-
cient body of knowledge exists to provide a basis for prescribed best practice or that 
a set of values indicates best practice” (Guest, 1997, page 265); 
-  descriptive studies; these set out to describe the field in a comprehensive way; 
-  conceptual or strategic studies; these studies focus on the relationship between HRM 
policy and practice and other variables. HRM policy and practices can be treated as 
dependent variables when trying to explain observed HRM patterns. Another option 
is to treat HRM policy and practices as independent variables, and examine the im-
pact of HRM on organizational performance. Chapter 2 
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Theoretical perspectives 
Finally, studies on the management of human resources can be distinguished from each 
other by their theoretical perspective. Normative or descriptive studies can be performed 
without a specific theoretical background (Guest, 1997; Storey, 1992), but especially 
conceptual or strategic studies require a sound theoretical foundation. Two main theo-
retical perspectives of HRM literature are the resource-based perspective and the behav-
ioural perspective (Delery and Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Koch and McGrath, 1996; 
Lado and Wilson, 1994; Paauwe, 1998; Snell, 1992). In addition, some authors pay at-
tention to the role of institutions on the incidence of specific HRM practices (Huselid et 
al., 1997; Jackson et al., 1989; Paauwe, 1998).  
Not all studies on the management of human resources are labelled as studies on HRM 
or personnel management. These labels refer to literature that is mainly grounded in 
theories on management and organizational behaviour. The management of human re-
sources is also being studied from an economic perspective. This approach is known as 
personnel economics (Lazear, 1999). 
Demarcation of this thesis 
Within this study, we want to examine how (and why) small firms manage their em-
ployees. Our focus is, therefore, on HRM practices rather than HRM policies. We will 
not examine to which extent the applied practices qualify to a specific normative model 
of HRM. The studies included in the following chapters are conceptual, where chapters 
three to five focus on HRM practices as the dependent variable, and chapters six and 
seven on HRM practices as independent variables. These studies use elements from 
various theoretical perspectives.  
In the remaining part of this introduction into HRM, we shall discuss the resource-based 
perspective, the behavioural perspective, personnel economics and the institutional per-
spective. This section ends with a discussion of studies that have combined elements 
from various perspectives. 
2.2.2 Resource-based  perspective 
The resource-based theory is based on the assumption that differences in physical, or-
ganizational and human resources between firms cause a fundamental heterogeneity in 
their productive potential. Given this heterogeneity, the long-term competitiveness of a 
company depends upon the resources that not only differentiate it from its competitors, 
but are also durable and difficult to imitate and substitute (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 
1989; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Barney, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Rangone, 
1999).  
Human resources are an important source to generate sustained competitive advantage: 
“human resource systems can contribute to sustained competitive advantage through fa-
cilitating the development of competencies that are firm-specific (...), and generate tacit 
organizational knowledge” (Lado and Wilson, 1994, page 699).  
Maintaining a competitive advantage based on human resources requires a management 
of those human resources that ascertains that these resources stay competitive, difficult 
to imitate and to substitute. This leads to the hypothesis that “certain human resource Managing personnel within small firms 
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strategies - namely, the accurate projection of human capital needs, the identification of 
individuals best suited to meet organizational objectives, and the development of em-
ployees - are expected to be positively associated with superior workforce performance” 
(Koch and McGrath, 1996). 
The resource-based approach stresses the need for a specific HRM strategy which seeks 
to achieve competitive advantage by increasing commitment and competence of the 
workforce. This would require a set of internally consistent HRM practices, or, in other 
words, an internal fit of HRM practices. Obtaining internal fit is often associated with a 
best-practice approach to HRM practices (Huselid, 1995; Legge, 1995). The “best-
practices” or “high-commitment” theory of HRM suggests that universally, certain 
HRM practices are associated with improved organizational performance. For instance, 
well-paid, well-motivated workers, working in an atmosphere of mutuality and trust, 
should generate higher productivity gains and lower unit costs (Boxall, 1996; Lowe and 
Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1994; Walton, 1991).  
Nevertheless, best practices are not a necessary consequence of the resource-based ap-
proach. A specific HRM strategy is suggested, but the strategy discussed by Koch and 
McGrath (1996) can call for different HRM practices for different firms: different needs 
regarding individual employees may result in different hiring, selection, training and 
compensation practices. For example, employee development may include formal train-
ing programmes for some firms, while for other firms training on the job may be a more 
appropriate way to obtain the required skills. 
Some authors assert that the source of sustained competitive advantage lies in the hu-
man resources themselves, and not in the practices used to attract, utilize or retain them 
(Ferligoj et al., 1997; Wright et al., 1994). By contrast, other scholars argue that HRM 
practices themselves can be viewed as organizational competencies, such as the ability 
to motivate employees, handle internal politics and so forth (Barney, 1991; Narasimha, 
2000; Oinas and Van Gils, 2001; Paauwe, 1998). Using either interpretation, human re-
sources are viewed as important contributors to the success of the firm. 
2.2.3 Behavioural  perspective 
The behavioural perspective on HRM can be defined as the use of personnel practices as 
tools for shaping patterns of behaviour that help to achieve organizational goals and ob-
jectives (Naylor et al., 1980). Different goals and objectives require different strategies 
and behaviours, and, therefore, different HRM practices (Snell, 1992). This leads to a 
focus on an external fit, resulting in contingency theories on HRM (Huselid, 1995; 
Legge, 1995)
3. Size, technology, ownership, sector and location are examples of contin-
gency variables that have been included in previous studies (Delery and Doty, 1996).  
Building on this perspective, Schuler and Jackson (1987) test the notion that each of 
Porter’s three generic strategies (Porter, 1985) fits a certain constellation of HRM prac-
tices. They posit that those businesses that select HRM policy and practices appropriate 
 
3  Obtaining an external fit is also relevant for configurational theories. Like contingency theories, 
configurational theories assume that the usefulness of specific HRM practices will depend on the 
context in which they are applied. In contrast with contingency theories, however, configura-
tional theories are usually based on typologies of ideal types of HRM systems, and are concerned 
with specific patterns of HRM practices (Delery and Doty, 1996). Chapter 2 
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to particular generic strategies will also experience higher work performance. Thus, 
they posit that companies pursuing a quality strategy should have explicit job descrip-
tions and high employee participation. Those with a cost minimization strategy should 
use tight narrow policies and those pursuing an innovation strategy should reward 
longer-term goals and broad career paths. In a review of this research, Barney and 
Hesterley (1996) note that empirical support of the hypotheses laid out by the behav-
ioural perspective is relatively weak.  
Nevertheless, the argument of fitting strategy and HRM practices is compelling. Rather 
than look at generic strategies and HRM practices, a different group of researchers posit 
a link between growth-oriented strategies and greater emphasis on HRM development. 
For instance, Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall (1988) posit a reciprocal interdepend-
ence between a firm’s business strategy and its HRM strategy. In their model, demand 
for skilled employees may be dictated by competitive strategy. In turn, organizational 
readiness (the availability of necessary human resources) may affect competitive strat-
egy. They further argue that high corporate growth expectations coupled with 
organizational readiness can lead to expansion. On the other hand, low human resource 
readiness and low growth expectations may lead to redirection of strategy to more at-
tainable goals. Thakur (1998) and Matthews and Scott (1995) find empirical support for 
the proposed linkage between a growth-oriented strategy and HRM strategies to 
improve human resource readiness.  
In sum, although it is not clear that the generic strategies as defined by Porter require 
different sets of HRM practices, there may well be some correlation between aspects of 
strategy such as growth orientation and the HRM practices that evolve. 
2.2.4 Personnel  economics 
Both the resource-based and the behavioural perspective on HRM are grounded in theo-
ries on management and organizational behaviour. In contrast, personnel economics is 
grounded in economic theory, and has been defined as “the use of economics to under-
stand the internal workings of the firm” (Lazear, 1999, page 200). Personnel economics 
applies insights from other economic theories that deal with human capital and the rela-
tionship between employer and employee, such as human capital theory, contract theory 
and principal/agent theory.  
The basic building block of personnel economics is constrained maximisation: both em-
ployers and employees are assumed to be rational maximising agents, who want to 
maximise their profits and utility
4 (where utility depends positively on wages and nega-
tively on effort
5). Given these assumptions, personnel economics focuses on explaining 
the behaviour of firms and employees, and how the interests of employer and employee 
can be aligned through financial incentives and proper contracts.  
The attention for financial incentives has resulted in studies on the advantages and dis-
advantages of various compensation structures (e.g. input-based or output-based), pay 
compression (which occurs if wage differences are smaller than differences in produc-
 
4  Profit and utility functions include monetary equivalents of non-monetary rewards (Lazear, 2000, 
page 613). 
5  The negative relationship between utility and effort is only assumed to exist at the margin. Managing personnel within small firms 
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tivity), work-life incentives and tournament theory. Although non-monetary aspects of 
work, such as teamwork and peer relationships, can also be examined within the per-
sonnel economics framework (Lazear, 1999, page 200), these aspects have not received 
much attention. 
2.2.5 Institutional  perspective 
Institutional theorists view organizations as entities that gain legitimacy and stakeholder 
acceptance by conforming to their stakeholders’ expectations (Huselid et al., 1997; 
Paauwe, 1998). Examples of stakeholders are governmental institutions, professional 
organizations and certifying bodies (Baron et al., 1988; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). In 
many industrialized nations, government institutions frequently play a key role in defin-
ing expectations in HRM practices, such as recruiting, selection, performance measure-
ment, training, and the administration of compensation and benefits (Paauwe, 1998).  
Institutional theorists posit that the need to conform to the requirements or expectations 
of these outside groups may help to explain some of the variation in HRM practices 
(Jackson et al., 1989). For example, in a study of US firms, Jackson et al. (1989) find 
unionisation linked with more formal performance appraisal, higher compensation, 
more training for new hires, and a greater likelihood of bonuses given for company-
wide productivity. In general, a variety of environmental influences are seen to restrict 
management’s room for manoeuvre. Notably, in the Netherlands collective bargaining 
agreements and labour laws prescribe, prohibit, and influence the HRM practices and 
policies of organizations. Paauwe (1998) argued that between ten and twelve of Pfef-
fer’s (1994) 16 “best practices” had been in place in almost every Dutch company from 
the 1970s because of legislation and the role of works councils and trade unions. Firm 
size also matters, since legislation is differentiated by size class. 
2.2.6  Combining perspectives  
HRM perspectives 
At first sight, the suggestions from the resource-based and the behavioural perspective 
seem to be inconsistent with each other: where the resource-based perspective promotes 
an internal fit of HRM practices and provides a list of best practices (Pfeffer, 1994), the 
behavioural approach favours an external fit and a contingency approach, according to 
which different HRM strategies will be optimal for different firms. These two ap-
proaches, however, may not be inconsistent with each other, and could even reinforce 
each other: “all else being equal, the use of high-performance work practices and good 
internal fit should lead to positive outcomes for all types of firms. However, at the mar-
gin, firms that tailor their work practices to their particular strategic and environmental 
contingencies should be able to realize additional performance gains” (Huselid, 1995, 
page 644). Other examples of studies that combine these two perspectives are Delery 
and Doty (1996) and Lado and Wilson (1994).  
Some researchers have attempted to further the understanding of HRM practices by 
combining other theoretical approaches to HRM. For instance, Lepak and Snell (1999) 
provide an interesting blend of theoretical frameworks to explain the heterogeneity of 
HRM practices, drawing from transaction cost economics, human capital theory and the 
resource-based approach. In their model, HRM practices converge on two dimensions: 
value and uniqueness of employee skills. Where required firm skills are valuable and Chapter 2 
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firm-specific, they suggest that the firm should pursue a strategy of internal develop-
ment (including training and career development). Where skills are valuable but not 
firm-specific, the firm may pursue a strategy of acquisition, e.g., hiring a certified public 
accountant to work as the chief financial officer. On the other hand, where human re-
sources are low in value, either simple outsourcing or an alliance with a partner with 
more unique resources may be in order. 
Paauwe (1998) combines elements from the resource-based perspective, the behavioural 
approach and the institutional perspective. In his framework, firms are constrained by 
several factors when developing their HRM policies. These factors are grouped into 
three categories: factors concerning the nature of the product, market, and the technolo-
gies used, factors concerning the organisational configuration and administrative heri-
tage, and social, cultural and legal factors. In addition, an organization’s financial health 
may also constrain the decision-making margin. Within these constraints, the stake-
holders of the firm determine the final choice of HRM policies. This choice depends not 
only on the constraints, but also on the values, expectations and goals of these stake-
holders, as well as on financial resources. Together, differences in constraints and ex-
pectations can explain the heterogeneity of HRM practices (Paauwe, 1998).  
The contingency factors in the framework by Paauwe (1998) closely resemble the or-
ganizational characteristics that are identified by Daft (1998). Daft (1998) distinguishes 
13 different organizational dimensions. In order to understand and evaluate organiza-
tions, a thorough understanding of organizational characteristics belonging to each of 
these 13 dimensions would be required. These 13 dimensions can be grouped into two 
different categories: contextual and structural dimensions. Contextual dimensions char-
acterize the organization as a whole, and include size, goals and strategy, environment, 
organizational culture and organizational technology. Structural dimensions pertain to 
internal characteristics of organizations, for example formalization, specialization, stan-
dardization and centralization
6. 
HRM perspectives and personnel economics 
The behavioural perspective and personnel economics share some basic assumptions, 
for example that firms aim to maximise profits and determine (HRM) strategies accord-
ingly, and that available human resource should be managed in a similar way as other 
resources. HR practices should aim to align the actions of employees with the interests 
of their employers (Snell, 1992). 
Despite these similarities, a wide gap exists between HRM studies and personnel eco-
nomics. There seem to be no studies that explicitly try to combine elements from these 
two strands of literature. Instead, attention focuses on three main differences
7.  
First of all, “Personnel economics is willing to express all compensation in terms of 
money, even if money is not the only or most important factor in compensation” 
 
6  The other structural dimensions are hierarchy of authority, complexity, professionalism and per-
sonnel configuration. 
7  These differences are based on Lazear (2000), who discusses “how economists differ from indus-
trial psychologists and organisational behaviour scholars” (Lazear, 2000, page 613). It is 
interesting to note that Lazear (2000) doesn’t use the label “HRM”. Managing personnel within small firms 
11 
(Lazear, 2000, page 613). Generally speaking, HRM scholars do not seem to be willing 
to do the same. 
Secondly, while HRM research more and more applies quantitative methods to test spe-
cific hypotheses, no such methods are used to derive these hypotheses. Personnel eco-
nomics, on the other hand, mainly consists of formal model building from which hy-
potheses on employer and employee behaviour can be derived
8. According to Lazear 
(2000), this may even be “personnel economics’ main selling point” (Lazear, 2000, 
page 612). 
A third difference concerns the capacity of employers to determine the optimal strategy 
for their organization. Personnel economics assumes that employers behave as rational 
acting agents. The existence of imperfect information, transaction costs and “other in-
tervening variables which make things somewhat more complicated” (Lazear, 2000, 
page 612) is acknowledged, but this doesn’t imply that the assumption of rational be-
haviour is no longer a valid starting-point for analysis. The capacity to determine the 
optimal strategy is assumed to be equally divided amongst all employers. In contrast, 
the resource-based perspective suggests the opposite: “the unique capabilities of the or-
ganization’s strategic leaders to articulate a strategic vision, communicate the vision 
throughout the organization, and empower organizational members to realize that vi-
sion” (Lado and Wilson, 1994, page 703) can constitute a competitive advantage that is 
difficult to imitate.  
2.3  Small and medium-sized enterprises  
The economics of small and medium-sized enterprises is a separate field of research. 
Two main arguments can be made, which together justify the specific attention for this 
subpopulation of private enterprises. The first is a quantitative argument: SMEs form a 
large and vital part of modern economies. The second argument is more qualitative: de-
spite the heterogeneous character of the SME sector (Audretsch et al., 2002), SMEs dif-
fer from large enterprises in many respects. Put more formally, the contextual dimen-
sion “firm size” is related to the other dimensions of organizational characteristics. For 
example, firm size can influence the structural dimensions of organizations. If organiza-
tions become larger, the need to decentralize and communicate between employees and 
departments increases. This requires a certain level of standardization, specialization 
and formalization (Daft, 1988; Nooteboom, 1993). Also, smaller firms have less finan-
cial resources than larger firms have, and often have more difficulties in obtaining ex-
ternal financial resources (Fu et al., 2002).  
This section presents an introduction into characteristics of small and medium-sized en-
terprises, which focuses on contextual differences between small and large firms
9.  
 
8  Empirical testing of these hypotheses has not yet received much attention, mainly due to the un-
availability of suitable data. Since the second half of the 1990s, however, suitable data is becom-
ing more and more available (Lazear, 1999). 
9  More elaborate discussions on characteristics of SMEs can be found in Audretch et al. (2002), 
European Commission (2000), Nooteboom (1993), Storey (1996), You (1995), and specialised 
journals such as the International Small Business Journal, Journal of Small Business Manage-
ment and Small Business Economics. Chapter 2 
12 
2.3.1 Firm  size 
The population of small and medium-sized enterprises may be defined in various ways. 
Most definitions rely on statistical criteria. Turnover is sometimes used, but the most 
common criterion is the size of the workforce. This criterion will also be used in the 
current study. Boundaries that distinguish SMEs from large firms vary between 100 
employees (Statistics Netherlands), 250 employees (Eurostat), and 500 employees (U.S. 
Small Business Administration). Within the group of SMEs, a more detailed classifica-
tion into micro, small and medium-sized enterprises can be made. Again, the boundaries 
between these categories vary between (and within) countries
10.  
Within the European Union, SMEs account for 99.8% of all non-primary private enter-
prises (European Commission, 2000, page 45). In fact, the number of enterprises is 
dominated by the number of micro enterprises (defined has having 0-9 employees), 
which accounts for 93% of the total population. This picture of a very skewed distribu-
tion still arises if micro enterprises are excluded: within the group of enterprises with at 
least 10 employees, small and medium-sized enterprises (defined as having 10-49 and 
50-249 employees, respectively) account for 97% of the total number of enterprises in 
this population. 
For many purposes (especially within the fields of labour economics and human re-
source management), the relative importance of the SME sector can be better judged by 
looking at its share in total employment. Within Europe-19 (which represents all Mem-
ber States of the European Economic Area and Switzerland), the employment share of 
SMEs (0-249 employees) is 66%. In the USA and Japan, the share of SMEs in total em-
ployment is less than half, but still accounts for a considerable part of total employment: 
in the USA, the employment share of SMEs is 42%, and within Japan it is 33%. Further 
details are provided in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1  Employment shares by size class in non-primary enterprises, Europe-19, USA and 
Japan, 1996 








(0-249 empl.)  (≥ 250 empl.) 
Europe-19 34%  19%  13%  66%  34% 
USA 11%  19%  12%  42%  58% 
Japan n/a  n/a  n/a  33%  67% 
Source: European Commission (2000), table 1.2, page 47. 
2.3.2  Goals and strategy 
Within micro-economic theory, labour is often treated as an input in the production 
function, and decisions regarding the optimal allocation of the production factors are 
made independent of the utility that employees derive from their work. The goal is usu-
ally considered to be profit maximisation. Traditionally, management literature assumes 
that large firms apply a rational and deliberate strategy formulation process as a means 
 
10 In addition, boundaries may differ between industries, to take account of sectoral differences in 
scale effects: “a shop is sooner considered “big” than a factory” (Nooteboom, 1993, page 287). Managing personnel within small firms 
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to achieve this goal (Chandler, 1962; Legge, 1995). Methods like SWOT-analyses (an 
analysis of an enterprise’s Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) are used 
to analyse markets and organizations, resulting in formal written strategies. 
Various arguments can be made why this approach is not fruitful for studying the deci-
sion-making process within small and medium-sized organizations. An important dif-
ference between small and large firms is the relationship between ownership and supply 
of labour. Whereas within large firms, ownership and labour supply are generally inde-
pendent of each other, in small firms the owner usually has a dominant position within 
the firm and takes part in the actual production process. Nooteboom (1993, page 287) 
described the dominant role of the business owner or entrepreneur as follows: “The firm 
bears the personal stamp of the entrepreneur in many respects: on the primary goal of 
the firm (profit, growth, stability, job satisfaction); on orientation (technical, commer-
cial, social); on style of internal and external communication, work conditions, etc. 
Some small-firm owners are motivated towards “true” Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, 
others towards maintaining established, traditional ways of doing things (craftsman-
ship), maintaining independence, staying small, having a quiet life. They can afford to 
entertain unorthodox objectives (unorthodox in the view of economic science) to the ex-
tent that they own the firm, which they often do”.  
Given organizational goals, small and large firms will differ in the strategies they (im-
plicitly or explicitly) apply to reach those goals. The assumption of rational strategy 
formulation implies that employers will establish which information they require, obtain 
this information, correctly interpret it, and use it to arrive at an optimal strategy given 
the available information. However, strategy formulation may be more of an emergent 
process than a deliberate one (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Legge, 1995; Whittington, 
1993). Employers’ rationality is bounded: their knowledge of alternatives and conse-
quences is prey to cognitive limitations, and they often suffer from a lack of motivation 
to conduct comprehensive information searches (Legge, 1995, page 100). Small firms 
have less experience and a more limited capacity for the acquisition of knowledge, 
which leads Nooteboom (1993) to conclude that small firms are more bounded in their 
rationality than large firms are.  
An important source for this lack of experience and limited capacity is a lack in man-
power and management time. Most employers are taken up by day-to-day worries, 
which follows from their participation in the production process (Van den Tillaart and 
Warmerdam, 1997). Also, small-firm employers often do not have a formal manage-
ment education, and the possibilities to gain management skills by co-operating with 
other managing employees are limited. As a result, employers are often not able to use 
classical management tools properly (Lee, 1995). Finally, as a consequence of having 
relatively few employees, decisions regarding personnel management have to be made 
less often, causing small firms to have less experience and routine in HRM activities 
(Nooteboom, 1993; WRR, 1987). 
If rationality is bounded, it becomes relevant to know where the limited attention of 
employers is directed at. For small firms, “the perspective from which external scanning 
is performed is often dominated, and thereby restricted, by the personal perspective of 
the entrepreneur” (Nooteboom, 1993, page 289). Bounded rationality thus points to-
wards the importance of theories on entrepreneurship, to explain the heterogeneity in 
organizational strategies within SMEs.  Chapter 2 
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Differences in goals and strategy will, in turn, affect other dimensions of organizational 
characteristics. For example, small-business owners who are oriented towards maintain-
ing independence and keeping full control over their company may favour an informal 
and flexible organization. Formalizing procedures and agreements would not only re-
duce their flexibility, but also strengthen employees’ rights, and thereby reduce the em-
ployers’ control over his or her own company (Koch and Van Straten, 1997). Various 
studies on entrepreneurship support the finding that small organizations are more likely 
to operate in an informal and flexible manner (Chaston, 1997; Gibb, 1997; Hendrickson 
and Psarouthakis, 1998; Lee, 1995; Marlow and Patton, 1993; Pfeffer, 1994; Storey, 
1994; Whittington, 1993). This would apply especially to family businesses (Blais and 
Toulouse, 1990; Bacon et al., 1996). 
2.3.3 Organizational  culture 
The dimension of organizational culture represents the underlying set of key values, be-
liefs, understandings and norms shared by an organization’s workforce. These underly-
ing values relate to ethical behaviour, commitment to efficiency, or to colleagues, cus-
tomers or other stakeholders. An organization’s culture can be observed in its slogans, 
ceremonies, dress, and office layout (Daft, 1998).  
Especially in small firms, the culture will be determined by the values and norms of the 
business owner(s). These values and norms may influence not only the goal of the en-
terprise, but also the strategy on how to obtain that goal (Kotey and Meredith, 1997). 
The organizational culture will not only be shaped by the owner’s values, norms and 
goals, but also by the way in which these are communicated to the employees (Marlow 
and Patton, 1993)
11.  
The dominant role of the business owner is not only due to the owners’ personality and 
characteristics, but also due to the lack of other stakeholders in the decision-making 
processes. Often, the employer combines the roles of CEO, board of directors and HR 
staff. In addition, work councils, if present, have fewer rights than in large firms. Con-
sequently, managers’ internal room for manoeuvre is larger for smaller companies. This 
is illustrated by Simon (1996), who has examined over 500 successful small and me-
dium-sized enterprises: “I frequently ask managers what percentage of their energy they 
waste fighting internal resistance. In large corporations, the answer usually lies between 
50 and 80%, small to mid-size companies usually cite a range of 20 to 30%” (Simon, 
1996, page 197). 
2.3.4 Environment 
Some authors argue that the main characteristic of SMEs, beside their size, is uncer-
tainty. Uncertainty regarding internal activities and procedures is lower for small-firm 
employers, because it is easier to directly monitor the activities of most or all employees 
(Barron et al., 1987; Westhead and Storey, 1996). The external uncertainty is, however, 
higher for small firms. This is a direct result of their lack of power at various market 
places, for labour, capital, and output (Westhead and Storey, 1996). This raises the 
transaction costs of transactions with external parties (Nooteboom, 1993) and results in 
 
11 An introduction into the relationships between entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial, organiza-
tional and societal culture can be found in Audretsch et al. (2002). Managing personnel within small firms 
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a relatively short time horizon for small firms (Storey, 1994; Westhead and Storey, 
1996).  
Legislation may also differentiate between small and large firms, mostly by being less 
stringent for small firms. Often, public and non government organizations have more at-
tention for the actions of large firms than for those of small firms. In this respect, the 
environment is paying less attention to smaller firms than to larger organizations. This 
may be beneficial for smaller firms, in that they are less restricted in their activities. 
However, this lack of attention can also result in a deficiency of information and ser-
vices adjusted to the specific needs and requirements of small companies. For example, 
Westhead and Storey (1996) argue that many providers of training are focused on the 
requirements and needs of large firms, making their services less suitable for small 
firms.  
2.3.5 Organizational  technology 
Differences in market power, organizational structure and production technologies re-
sult in diseconomies of scale for small firms. The impact of production technologies is 
however decreasing: recent developments in ICT technologies have reduced the mini-
mum efficient scale of many production technologies, reducing the diseconomies of 
scale due to production technologies for SMEs (Audretch and Thurik, 2000, 2001; 
Nooteboom, 1993). 
2.4  HRM within SMEs 
2.4.1 Previous  research 
Most studies on HRM within SMEs are based on qualitative studies, as Heneman et al. 
(2000) have recently documented in a literature review on this topic amongst 28 differ-
ent publications. 403 articles on HRM were identified, of which 129 specifically ad-
dressed human resource topics in SMEs. Only 14 of these apply quantitative methods to 
analyse the available information
12. They conclude that “the lack of information about 
human resources in SMEs is problematic for theory, research and practice” (Heneman et 
al., 2000, page 11). 
The available empirical information on HRM within SMEs suggests that smaller firms 
make less use of high performance HRM practices than larger organizations do (Barron 
et al., 1987; Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990). This is in line with the finding that small or-
ganizations are in general more likely to operate in an informal and flexible manner than 
larger firms are. For instance, Koch and McGrath (1996) find that, in general, firm size 
is positively related with the incidence of HRM planning and formal training, and with 
the level of overall HRM sophistication. Westhead and Storey (1997, 1999) find that 
both managers and employees are less likely to get formal training in a small firm. In a 
study by Jackson et al. (1989), smaller companies are found to have less formalized per-
 
12  These articles have been published in only three different journals: Journal of Small Business 
Management (11 articles), Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Theory (2 articles) and Journal of Oc-
cupational and Organizational Psychology (1 article). Heneman et al. (2000) mention 17 empiri-
cal articles instead of 14, but three articles focus on self-employed people without personnel. Chapter 2 
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formance appraisals, less likelihood of bonuses based on company productivity and less 
training than do larger companies (with more than 1,000 employees). Aldrich and Lang-
ton (1997) find that larger companies have more formalized recruitment practices. Firm 
size is, however, not the only factor in predicting HRM practices: a large heterogeneity 
exists in the type and formalization of HRM practices found among smaller firms.  
In attempts to explain these HRM patterns, some scholars argue that an informal ap-
proach is more suited to the small firm. For instance, Hill and Stewart (1999) suggest 
that smaller firms should be more flexible and informal to be able to cope with the 
higher levels of environmental uncertainty. By contrast, others argue that it is lack of 
foresight and/or resources that leads to less use of formal high performance HRM prac-
tices in small businesses. For instance, Hendry et al. (1991) conclude that owners of 
small companies view any training beyond the level necessary to perform their immedi-
ate jobs as a luxury to be provided only when the firm is making large profits. And Gol-
har and Deshpande (1997) argue that a lack of understanding of HRM issues by small 
business owners may be one of the explanations for firm-size differences in HRM prac-
tices. 
In addition to being characterized as informal, small firms are often held to be less spe-
cialized than larger firms (Bacon et al., 1996; Jackson et al., 1989; Wagner, 1997). Em-
ployees in smaller firms often have to perform a greater variety of tasks than do em-
ployees in larger firms, and specialists are less likely to be found in smaller firms. 
Heneman and Berkley (1999) confirm this trend within the HRM function. In a random 
sample of 117 companies with less than 100 employees, they find that only 15 have an 
HRM department.  
In spite of the above-mentioned studies, growing evidence, largely derived from case 
studies and small pilot studies, suggests that HRM practices can be more sophisticated 
than expected in the typical small firm (Arthur and Hendry, 1990; Bacon et al., 1996; 
Curran et al., 1993; Deshpande and Golhar, 1994; Hendry et al., 1991; Hornsby and 
Kuratko, 1990; Marlow and Patton, 1993). For example, Deshpande and Golhar (1994) 
find HRM practices within many small manufacturing firms to be as sophisticated as 
those in larger companies. Similarly, Hornsby and Kuratko (1990) find that while firms 
of all sizes use primarily informal recruitment and selection techniques (mainly em-
ployee referrals and the interview), that even among small firms, HRM practices are of-
ten more sophisticated than they had expected. Using a small set of cases, Hill and 
Stewart (1999) also demonstrate variation in level of sophistication of HRM practices 
among smaller organizations. 
2.4.2 Main  findings 
Research on HRM within SMEs is still in an explorative stage. By and large, empirical 
studies are of a descriptive nature. A sound theoretical underpinning or perspective 
seems to be lacking, and the empirical part is generally limited to a presentation and 
discussion of the results of a questionnaire or a number of case studies. The practice of 
deriving and testing hypotheses has not yet become customary. In fact, Kotey and 
Meredith (1997) is the only identified example of this practice. Notwithstanding these 
limitations, some conclusions may be drawn.  Managing personnel within small firms 
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Unique approaches to HRM within SMEs: well documented 
The majority of empirical studies describes HRM practices that are applied by small and 
medium-sized enterprises. Some studies focus on a specific field of HRM
13, but most 
studies include various aspects of HRM. We may conclude from these studies that 
smaller firms generally have less sophisticated HRM practices, but a substantial amount 
of unexplained variation still remains across small firms. 
The general impression that research on HRM within SMEs is still in an explorative 
stage does not apply to all fields of HRM practices. Especially research into wage dif-
ferentials between small and large firms has moved well beyond this stage
14. On aver-
age, smaller firms pay lower wages to (observably equal) employees than larger firms 
do (Audretsch et al., 1999; Barron et al., 1987; Oosterbeek and Van Praag, 1995). Using 
data from the Netherlands, Oosterbeek and Van Praag (1995) find support for a screen-
ing view on hiring decisions to explain this finding. Large firms are assumed to have 
higher monitoring costs (due to the size of their labour force), which increases the bene-
fits of screening for workers with high abilities. They conclude that “large firms are in-
capable of observing workers’ ability, but by offering a higher rate of return on school-
ing they succeed in attracting the most able workers” (Oosterbeek and Van Praag, 1995, 
page 181). 
Various studies address the question whether the applied HRM practices are applied 
with a specific goal in mind and integrated with other (HRM) practices, or whether they 
are the result of legal obligations and ad hoc decisions. In other words, to which extent 
does the way in which these firms manage their workforce satisfy normative HRM 
models. The general notion seems to be that way in which SMEs manage their employ-
ees resembles the “bleak house” concept, where employment relations can be “typified 
by direct management control, poor terms and conditions, high staff turnover and little 
training” (Bacon et al., 1996, page 82). The finding that smaller firms, in general, pay 
lower wages and provide less training than larger firms do (Black et al., 1999; Barron et 
al., 1987; Patton et al., 2000) seems to support this notion. In addition, it is argued that 
“individual HRM changes in most organizations do not add up to a consistent integrated 
package deriving from a long-term coherent management strategy” (Duberley and 
Walley, 1995, page 905).  
Nevertheless, various authors claim that this general notion is incorrect, or at least 
doesn’t apply to a large group of SMEs (Hill and Stewart, 1999; Hornsby and Kuratko, 
1990). Small and medium-sized enterprises may even have a behavioural advantage 
over large firms when it comes to managing employment relationships: “The lack of 
formal or professional policy towards employee management enables flexibility within 
the labour process, and an individual approach to the employment relationship. This is 
further facilitated by the lack of collective employee representation which owners and 
managers consider unnecessary, because of the quality of the employment relationship 
which has a classic unitarist framework. Paradoxically, however, the very lack of formal 
 
13 Heneman and Berkley (1999) focus on recruitment and selection practices, while Hill and Stew-
art (1999) and Goss et al. (1994) limit their attention towards training. 
14 It is interesting to note that this stylised fact has been studied within the field of labour econom-
ics, but seems to be ignored in the literature on HRM within SMEs. Chapter 2 
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implementation raises a debate as to whether these practices are indeed HRM as they 
lack strategic foresight.”( Marlow and Patton , 1993, page 63).  
Determinants of HRM practices: relevance of contextual and structural 
dimensions has received less attention 
How may we explain differences in HRM practices that exist between small and me-
dium-sized enterprises? The relevance of contextual and structural dimensions (other 
than firm size itself) has been examined in a limited number of studies. For example, 
Duberley and Walley (1995) discuss the relevance of firm age, presence of an HRM de-
partment, business ownership, level of unionisation and strategy. Kotey and Meredith 
(1997) include goals and values of the entrepreneur as relevant characteristics. The re-
sults of these studies are, however, mixed, amongst others due to limited sample sizes. 
All in all, the majority of empirical studies on HRM within SMEs doesn’t seem to pay 
systematic attention to other organizational dimensions besides firm size.  
Impact of HRM practices: terra incognita 
The relationship between HRM and performance is receiving much attention in HRM 
studies amongst large firms. Amongst small and medium-sized enterprises, this topic is 
still very much terra incognita. Two studies have been identified that examine the rela-
tionship between HRM practices and performance measurements: Heneman and Berk-
ley (1999) examine how HRM practices in the field of recruitment and selection affect 
outcomes of the recruitment and selection process, while Kotey and Meredith (1997) 
study relationships between personal values of business owners, business strategy and 
organisational performance. In both studies, positive relationships are found.  
Generalization of results of existing studies on HRM within SMEs is not without diffi-
culties. This is especially due to the differences in the size of the firms that are included 
in the samples. For example, Hornsby and Kuratko (1990) investigate firms with 1-150 
employees. Within that sample, differences between smaller and larger firms are identi-
fied. Jackson et al. (1989) and Deshpande and Golhar (1994) define small firms as those 
with less than 250 employees, and Golhar and Deshpande (1997) use a size class 
boundary of 500 employees. Lower boundaries on the number of employees also differ 
between studies, and range from 1 employee (Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990), through 10 
employees (Deshpande and Golhar, 1994) and 15 employees (Bacon et al., 1996) to a 
minimum of 100 employees (Duberley and Walley, 1995) or even 250 employees 
(Snell, 1992). Other studies mention firm-size effects, but present no information on the 
size of organizations within their sample (Barron et al., 1987). 
2.5 Research  questions 
With the previous section ends our introduction into the field of HRM within SMEs. In 
this section, we present the objective and research questions for this thesis, after which 
the main results and conclusions will be presented in the following sections. The re-
search questions can be placed within the context of a broader research agenda, aiming 
to increase our understanding of HRM practices. This section therefore starts with a 
presentation of this general research agenda. In addition, we propose a general theoreti-
cal framework for this research agenda. This framework combines elements from vari-Managing personnel within small firms 
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ous perspectives on HRM (as discussed in section 2.2), and specifically includes the 
relevance of firm size and size-related organizational and contextual determinants.  
2.5.1  General research agenda 
The main findings presented in the previous section indicate that there is still a lot to 
learn about human resource management within small and medium-sized enterprises. 
We are in need of theoretical studies as well as empirical research to test these theories. 
In this section we propose a research agenda, which should help us to move beyond the 
current explorative research phase. This research agenda distinguishes three main 
themes: the approaches to HRM that are found within SMEs, determinants of these 
HRM practices, and their impact.  
Unique approaches to HRM within SMEs 
HRM practices amongst SMEs have been documented and discussed in various publica-
tions. In addition, studies that apply normative HRM models have raised the question to 
which extent the management of employees within SMEs can be characterised as HRM. 
What seems to be missing, is an understanding of why some enterprises would try to 
develop a coherent HRM policy, while other enterprises limit their attention for HRM to 
ad hoc choices for specific practices. We are in need of theories on the relationships be-
tween various organizational dimensions and the degree of integration of the HRM 
practices. The most relevant dimensions seem to be organizational goals and strategy 
and organizational culture (i.e. the personal characteristics of the business owner).  
Determinants of HRM practices 
Firm size is often used as a contingency or control variable in studies on HRM. How-
ever, the number of employees in itself does not explain much. It is often used as an in-
dicator for various other unobserved variables. Furthermore, we have only just begun to 
examine the differences in HRM practices between small and medium-sized enterprises. 
How can we explain these differences? Are they determined by the same, often unob-
served, variables that can explain the general difference between SMEs and large or-
ganizations? Future research should try to develop a theory on which organizational di-
mensions may be considered as predictors of HRM practices for small, medium-sized 
and/or large enterprises.  
Impact of HRM practices 
Within mainstream HRM (that is, HRM within large organizations), the impact of HRM 
practices on various performance measures is currently one of the main areas of re-
search. Do the results of such studies also apply to SMEs? Advocates of a best-practice 
approach may believe this to be the case. After all, “best practices” are practices that all 
firms should try to put into practice, irrespective of size or other organizational charac-
teristics. It is, however, possible that “best practices” are contingent on certain charac-
teristics that most large firms have in common, but that differ between small and large 
firms. Examples of such characteristics may be the level of formalization within the or-
ganization, available financial resources and the availability of a certain minimum body 
of knowledge about HRM. According to a behavioural perspective on HRM, it is even 
more plausible to assume that the impact of certain (combinations of) HRM practices 
may differ between small and large firms, and also within the group of small firms. Chapter 2 
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These differences may be explained by differences in various contextual and structural 
dimensions.  
Theories on the impact of HRM practices can be either general (regarding the overall ef-
fect of various HRM practices on performance measures) or specific (examining the 
conditions under which specific HRM practices are most likely to be successful), and 
can study the effect on either HRM outcomes (such as inflow and outflow rates, absence 
rates and job satisfaction) or organizational outcomes (for example, production and 
value added).  
A theoretical framework 
Various theoretical perspectives should be combined to tackle this research agenda. 
Limiting research to a single theoretical perspective beforehand would neglect the com-
plexity of the research agenda, which includes aspects from such diverse research 
themes as HRM, SMEs, transaction costs and entrepreneurship.  
Paauwe (1998) has proposed a general framework on human resource management. 
This framework combines elements from the resource-based, the behavioural and the 
institutional perspective, but lacks proper attention for firm size. Therefore, we have 
combined his framework with Daft’s (1998) distinction between various organizational 
and structural dimensions. Here, firm size is recognised as a specific contextual dimen-
sion, which is related with other contextual dimensions (such as goals and strategy, and 
culture) and structural dimensions (such as formalisation and specialisation). The result-
ing framework is presented in Figure 2.1. Starting (at the top) with determinants of 
HRM practices, this framework continues with the resulting unique approaches to 
HRM, and ends with the impact of those approaches on HRM outcomes and organisa-
tional performance. 
2.5.2  Objective and research questions of the current thesis  
Objective  
There is still a lot to learn about human resource management within small and me-
dium-sized enterprises. The objective of the current thesis is, therefore, to increase our 
general understanding of HRM practices within the population of SMEs.  
Making choices  
This objective has led to a number of choices to determine which parts of the general re-
search agenda are to be included in this thesis. Given the explorative nature of the cur-
rent research on HRM within SMEs, the first choice is that this thesis should move be-
yond this explorative stage. The research questions should be conceptual, in that they 
focus on the relationship between HRM practices and other variables. In addition, they 
should be answered by means of quantitative research, and provide a sound theoretical 
underpinning for specific hypotheses which are then tested empirically. 
Previous research on HRM within SMEs has focused on the first theme of the general 
research agenda (unique approaches to HRM within SMEs). The second choice is there-
fore to aim our attention at the second and third theme (determinants and impact of 
HRM practices). Managing personnel within small firms 
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Contextual dimensions: 
-  size 
-  environment 
-  technology 
Structural dimensions: 
-  formalization 
-  specialization 
-  standardization  
-  centralization 
Constrained margin for decision-making 
Stakeholders: 
-  owner and/or director 
-  management team 
-  HR staff 
-  employee representatives (works council, unions) 
-  governmental and non-governmental organizations 
 
Stakeholders’ decisions are influenced by the following contextual dimen-
sions:  
-  goals and strategy 
-  organizational culture 








Source: Based on Paauwe (1998) and Daft (1998). 
 
The third choice is to examine four different research questions rather than concentrat-
ing on just one. The first two research questions are concerned with determinants of 
HRM practices, and the final two with the impact of HRM practices. 
The fourth choice is related to the HRM practices that are examined in this thesis. We 
have chosen a dualistic approach: some research questions focus on specific HRM fields 
(absenteeism and precautionary actions, and firm-provided training), while other re-
search questions involve various fields of HRM practices (recruitment, selection, com-Chapter 2 
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pensation, appraisal, and training and development). The latter approach has the advan-
tage that a more comprehensive picture of HRM practices can be drawn. At the same 
time, the inclusion of numerous HRM practices in an empirical study makes it difficult 
to identify specific dependent variables. In order to reduce information on various HRM 
practices to a limited number of dependent variables, we have chosen to examine the 
usage of high performance HRM practices, in particular the degree to which such prac-
tices are applied. The rationale for this choice is the finding that, at least within large 
firms, “the more of the high performance HRM practices that are used, the better the 
performance as indicated by productivity, labour turnover or financial indicators” 
(Guest, 1997, page 272). 
Research questions 
These choices are reflected in the four research questions of this thesis: 
On determinants of HRM practices: 
-  How may we predict the usage of high performance HRM practices within SMEs 
from specific contextual variables (chapters three and four)?  
-  Which factors determine whether enterprises take precautionary actions or not 
(chapter five)?  
On impact of HRM practices: 
-  Does the impact of firm-provided training differ between small and large firms 
(chapter six)?  
-  Can differences in the outcomes of HRM practices explain differences in firm size 
(chapter seven)? 
Personnel economics not included  
To answer these research questions, insights from various perspectives will be used. 
Specifically, all perspectives discussed in section 2.2 will be used, with the exception of 
personnel economics. The main argument for this choice is personnel economics’ as-
sumption of rational maximising behaviour by employers, who are able to determine the 
most optimal solution for their situation, given the information they have available. Es-
pecially for SMEs, this assumption is not without criticism, as we have discussed in sec-
tion 2.3. Generally speaking, researchers studying small businesses agree that the role of 
the person owning/managing an SME is very important (Kotey and Meredith, 1997; 
Nooteboom, 1993). Personnel economics doesn’t seem to offer the right tools to analyse 
this central role of the entrepreneur regarding the HRM practises within a firm. 
It should be noted, however, that chapters six and seven can be seen as a first attempt to 
bring elements from personnel economics into HRM research, by introducing formal 
model building. Chapter six specifies the role of training in a production function of in-
dividual firms prior to deriving hypotheses on specific parameters of that function, 
while chapter seven applies a simulation model on labour flows within individual firms. 
This simulation model actually models organisational choices as a maximisation prob-
lem. Especially the relationship between wages and hierarchical levels contains ele-
ments from personnel economics (tournament theory). However, while personnel eco-
nomics is about deriving conditions under which this type of compensation policy is op-
timal, we simply assume that this policy is optimal for the simulated firm, and deter-
mine the consequences. Managing personnel within small firms 
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2.6  Determinants of HRM practices  
The first two research questions aim to examine determinants of HRM practices. The 
first question includes various categories of HRM practices. In contrast, the second re-
search question focuses on a specific aspect of HRM, namely how enterprises react to 
and deal with absenteeism. These differences in focus are reflected in differences in the 
theoretical underpinning of the studies: whereas general theories on HRM will be used 
to formulate hypotheses regarding the usage of high performance HRM practices, re-
search on absenteeism will be based on specific theories on sickness absence behaviour. 
This section presents the main results of the three studies that have been performed to 
answer these two research questions.  
2.6.1  Organization context and human resource management in the small 
firm 
Generally speaking, smaller firms apply less high performance HRM practices than lar-
ger firms do. To which extent can these firm-size effects be explained by other contex-
tual dimensions? 
Based on information obtained from interviews with various small-business owners, we 
have performed an explorative study to derive and test a model on how certain contex-
tual variables may influence the usage of high performance HRM practices. This model 
combines insights from the resource-based perspective, behavioural perspective, institu-
tional perspective and transaction cost economics, as well as from empirical studies on 
HRM within SMEs.  
Specific contextual variables that are included in this model, besides firm size, are the 
presence of a collective labour agreement, the company’s strategic orientation toward 
growth (growth strategy), and whether or not the company is associated with a large 
firm, either as supplier, purchasing group or franchiser (large-firm associate). These 
contextual variables may influence certain intermediary variables: requirements from 
external stakeholders regarding high performance HRM practices, availability of re-
sources, and the perceived value of high performance HRM practices by the CEO. In 
turn, these intermediary variables may stimulate the usage of high performance HRM 
practices. The assumption is that if the small-firm CEO has the resources, the know-
how, and the recognition of the importance of high performance HRM practices, he or 
she will develop and implement them. Empirical information on the intermediary vari-
ables is not available, so the hypotheses that are formulated directly link the contextual 
variables to the usage of high performance HRM practices.  
A preliminary test of the model is possible, based on information that has been obtained 
from interviewing small business owners about their human resource management. Us-
ing semi-structured interviews has the advantage of providing in-depth information on 
the particular circumstances and characteristics of each individual enterprise, which 
may be very helpful in the process of formulating a model. A disadvantage is that com-
parable and codeable data are only available for a limited number of variables and HRM 
practices. Especially, information on the application of high performance HRM prac-
tices is limited to three variables: usage of written job descriptions, regularity of per-
formance appraisal and availability of firm-provided training. Chapter 2 
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The admittedly preliminary results suggest that not all contextual variables are equally 
important. As predicted, firm size is related with the usage of high performance HRM 
practices, including greater regularity of performance appraisal and greater likelihood of 
employer-based training. Another finding is the significance of having a large-firm as-
sociate. Companies with a large-firm associate are more likely to report having em-
ployer-based training programmes. A weak relationship is found between a more 
growth-oriented strategy and the presence of formal training programmes and perform-
ance appraisal. Predictions based on collective labour agreements are not supported. 
2.6.2  High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enter-
prises  
In chapter four, we further develop the model from chapter three. The general structure 
of the model remains intact: firm size, along with other contextual variables, influences 
certain intermediary variables, which in turn stimulate the usage of high performance 
HRM practices. The model has been adapted by including other contextual variables, 
and by elaborating the intermediary and dependent variables.  
The contextual variables that are included in the adapted model reflect the availability 
of a business plan, the choice to export, the choice to associate with a franchise organi-
zation, family ownership of the company, and the degree of unionisation. These contex-
tual variables are supposed to have an effect on the intermediary variables. The role of 
the available resources has been made more explicit in the adjusted model, by distin-
guishing between the demand for human resources and the supply of financial re-
sources.  
The intermediary variables can have a direct effect on the usage of high performance 
HRM practices, but also an indirect effect, by increasing the likelihood that an HRM 
department or manager will be present. In turn, the presence of such a department or 
manager is hypothesized to stimulate the usage of high performance HRM practices. 
Firm size, the availability of a business plan, the choice to export, and the choice to as-
sociate with a franchise organization are all hypothesised to be positively related with 
the presence of an HRM department and/or the usage of high performance HRM prac-
tices. Family businesses are expected, ceteris paribus, to make less use of high perform-
ance HRM practices, and are less likely to have an HRM department. 
The hypotheses are tested using information obtained from a written questionnaire on 
human resource management. The sample includes 695 Dutch firms with 1 to 500 em-
ployees from six different sectors of industry. The questionnaire contains items on vari-
ous fields of HRM practices, including recruitment, selection, training, compensation 
and appraisal practices. For each of these categories, a separate scale is constructed that 
represents the usage of high performance HRM practices. In addition, a single scale is 
constructed that represents the overall usage of high performance HRM practices.  
The first part of the empirical analysis focuses on the probability of having an HRM de-
partment or manager. According to the calculations, HRM departments are found espe-
cially in large, non-family-owned businesses with a written business plan. The presence 
of an HRM department is independent of the choices to export or to associate with a 
franchise organization, and of the degree of unionisation. Managing personnel within small firms 
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In the second part of the analysis, regressions are used to determine the extent to which 
the usage of high performance HRM practices (as measured using various scales) de-
pends on the number of employees and on the other contextual determinants. Large 
firms are found to make more use of high performance HRM practices than small firms 
do. This is in line with previous studies. Our study, however, goes one step further by 
examining possible explanations for this firm-size effect. As it turns out, about half of 
the firm-size effect can be explained by other contextual variables related to firm size. 
Corrected for firm size, firms with an HRM department or manager apply more high 
performance HRM practices than other firms do. On the other hand, enterprises owned 
and managed by members of a single family apply less high performance HRM prac-
tices than non-family businesses do. The choice to export is associated especially with 
an increased usage of high performance recruitment and selection practices, while fran-
chising only stimulates the usage of high performance training and development prac-
tices.  
What can we conclude from these findings? First of all, they are consistent with previ-
ous studies that find a relationship between firm size and the usage of high performance 
HRM practices. Smaller firms, on average, make less use of high performance HRM 
practices, and are less likely to have a specific HRM department or manager, than larger 
firms are. This not only holds between small and large firms (with at least 500 employ-
ees), but also within the sample of small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, small 
firms with a relatively formal strategy-formulation process (as indicated by the presence 
of a written business plan) are also more likely to apply high performance HRM prac-
tices, and are more likely to have an HRM department or manager. 
Thirdly, given the previous effects, family businesses make less use of high perform-
ance HRM practices than non-family enterprises do. This suggests that managers of 
family businesses have different goals, attitudes or abilities regarding the management 
of their personnel than managers of non-family businesses do. This is in accordance 
with previous studies that indicate that family owners have a relatively strong desire to 
keep full control over their business, and that they are of the opinion that using formal 
high performance HRM practices (as well as other policy decisions) may result in a loss 
of control. 
2.6.3  Absenteeism and precautionary actions  
The second research question focuses on a specific field of HRM practices: precaution-
ary actions aimed to reduce absenteeism.  
The attendance of employees depends on both their ability to attend and their motiva-
tion to attend. Absenteeism has been studied from both a psychological and an eco-
nomical perspective, and both perspectives focus on the motivation to attend. Especially 
within economic literature, absenteeism is usually treated as a deliberate labour supply 
adjustment of workers dissatisfied with the number of contracted working hours. Never-
theless, firms may not only try to influence the motivation to attend, but also the ability. 
The ability to attend depends, amongst others, on the working conditions within the or-
ganization. Consequently, one of the ways in which firms can reduce the levels of ab-
senteeism, is by taking precautionary actions to improve working conditions. This is es-
pecially relevant for small and medium-sized enterprises: while small firms have on av-
erage lower overall absence levels than large firms do, the probability that individual 
employees have an occupational accident is higher for smaller establishments. The Chapter 2 
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study presented in chapter five examines the decision of small and medium-sized enter-
prises whether or not to take precautionary actions.  
Firms will implement precautionary actions if the benefits of these actions are believed 
to outweigh the costs. The expected benefits of precautionary actions are related to the 
effect of those actions on actual absence levels. It seems plausible that the expected 
benefits are related to the expected relationship between working conditions and ab-
sence levels within the firm. The main hypothesis is, therefore, that organizations that 
identify a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism (“identification”), 
are more likely to take precautionary actions. Other hypotheses examine possible de-
terminants of this opinion.  
Data has been obtained by means of telephonic interviews amongst Dutch establish-
ments with less than 200 employees, resulting in 579 valid observations. The results 
clearly show that identification is not a necessary condition for taking precautionary 
measures. While 37% of all enterprises have taken precautionary measures, only 18% 
have identified a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism
15. This 
might be explained by the obligatory status of many precautionary measures (for exam-
ple, wearing safety helmets at construction sites). Another explanation could be that 
many respondents think no connection exists between current working conditions and 
current absenteeism, because of precautionary measures taken in the past.  
This finding does not, however, rule out the possibility that identification increases the 
probability of taking precautionary actions. Further analysis to examine this possibility 
reveals that the probability of identifying a relationship between working conditions and 
absenteeism depends on the employer’s assessment of the physical and mental working 
conditions, on reported physical health complaints and stress complaints, on absence 
rates and on the number of employees. The main hypothesis is rejected: whether or not 
such a relationship is identified, is not related to the probability that precautionary 
measures are taken. Instead, firms are more likely to take precautionary measures if they 
have more employees, if a larger share of their employees is performing physically de-
manding work, if physical complaints are made, and if a risk inventory and evaluation 
have been performed. 
The results suggest that most small firms do not have a deliberate policy of reducing ab-
sence rates by improving working conditions. This may be due to the low absence rates 
and the limited management time of small-firm employers. Large firms are more likely 
to take precautionary actions than smaller organizations are, irrespective of differences 
in absence levels and in the probability of identifying a relationship between working 
conditions and absenteeism. This firm-size effect may be due to increased attention 
from external stakeholders for precautionary actions, differences in legislations, or sim-
ply the availability of experience, know-how and manpower to implement certain prac-
tices.  
 
15 These percentages represent weighted observations. Managing personnel within small firms 
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2.7  Impact of HRM practices  
The third and fourth research question aim to examine the impact of HRM practices. 
Again, one of these questions combines various HRM practices, while the other ques-
tion focuses on a specific aspect of HRM: firm-provided training. This section presents 
the main results of the studies that have been performed to answer these research ques-
tions.  
2.7.1  The impact of firm-provided training on production  
Numerous studies have shown that small firms provide less training to their employees 
than large firms do. Little is known, however, about the relationship between firm size 
and the impact of training. Does the impact of firm-provided training on production dif-
fer between small and large firms? This is the topic of chapter six. 
Generally speaking, training will have two opposite effects on production. On the one 
hand, training is assumed to raise the productivity of individual employees, which can 
increase production at organizational level. On the other hand, training reduces the 
number of productive hours. Usually, empirical studies that try to estimate the impact of 
firm-provided training on firm performance cannot separate these two effects. This is 
due to the fact that information on time spent in training is mostly missing. Here, such 
information is available, which allows us to separate the positive effect of training on 
productivity from the negative effect on productive hours. 
Various arguments can be made, why the impact of firm-provided training may differ 
between small and large firms. These arguments are related to the management of train-
ing: how much training is provided, to which employees, and how are these employees 
supported? In particular, three different firm-size effects are examined. These are the se-
lection effect, the HRM effect (both indirect firm-size effects) and the scale effect (a di-
rect firm-size effect). The selection effect asserts that the returns to training decrease 
with the amount of training that has already been taken. According to this effect, the av-
erage returns to training would, generally speaking, be lower for larger firms. This is 
due to the fact that large firms provide on average more training to their employees than 
small firms do.  
The other two effects imply a positive relationship between firm size and the average re-
turns to training. The HRM effect considers the role of training support, which is de-
fined as the time spent on administrating and co-ordinating firm-provided training. Ac-
cording to the HRM effect, training support can be seen as an investment in the quality 
of the training programme, implying a positive relationship between training support 
and the returns to training. If small firms provide, on average, less training support to 
their employees than large firms do, the HRM effect results in an indirect firm-size ef-
fect.  
The final effect examined in chapter six is the scale effect. Larger firms may benefit 
from economies of scale: if more employees need to take certain courses, courses can be 
developed that are adjusted to the specific needs of the firm. Such adjustments can in-
crease the returns to training.  
Calculations have been performed using panel data with observations on 173 individual 
firms, for the years 1990 and 1993. These firms can be divided amongst three size Chapter 2 
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classes: 40-150 employees, 150-500 employees and more than 500 employees. To test 
the various hypotheses, panel data estimators have been used to estimate a nested pro-
duction function, with the number of training days as one of the production factors.  
The estimation results only find support for the HRM effect. This implies that the re-
turns to training are, generally speaking, lower for smaller firms, since they provide less 
training support to their employees. Without training support, training does not seem to 
have any positive effect on firm performance. These positive training effects may be 
compared with the negative effect on productive hours. Tentative calculations can be 
made to determine the break-even point, where the loss in productive hours is just offset 
by the increase in productivity. For firms with at least 500 employees, a break-even 
point of 3 or 4 years is found; for firms with less than 150 employees, the average 
break-even point is at least 20 years. We must however be careful with any conclusions 
regarding the profitability and desirability of training investments, due to the tentative 
character of these calculations.  
2.7.2  The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
In the first six chapters of this thesis, firm size is treated as an exogenous variable, ex-
plaining the usage and/or impact of HRM practices within small and medium-sized en-
terprises. These HRM practices not only affect specific HRM outcomes (such as in- and 
outflow of personnel, internal labour flows, and competences and commitments of in-
cumbent workers), but also organizational performance. Which, in turn, is related to 
firm size (see Figure 2.1)
16. This suggests that firm size may partly depend on (outcomes 
of) HRM practices. Is this indeed the case? Can differences in the outcomes of HRM 
practices explain differences in firm size? 
Various theories or approaches have been developed that explain variation in firm size. 
These include transaction cost economics and the labour flow approach from labour 
economics. The transaction cost approach can be used to examine (transaction) costs of 
the internal organization. The labour flow approach has pointed towards the interaction 
between firm size, employee turnover and internal labour flows. In combination with 
the assumption that employees can differ in their individual qualities, these approaches 
may be used to explain differences in the size of firms operating in similar environments 
(for example, within the same sector and country). 
To examine the relative importance of these approaches in explaining differences in 
firm size, we use a simulation model. This model formalizes decisions of a profit-
maximizing employer on the optimal number of employees. This decision depends on 
costs and benefits of recruiting, allocating and supervising employees, and on the costs 
and benefits of cooperation between employees. Individual employees can have differ-
ent qualities. The quality of new employees (and the exit rate of incumbent workers) is 
modelled as a stochastic process. To account for these random processes, all simulation 
experiments are replicated 100 times. 
The parameters of the model are calibrated in such a way that the baseline calibration 
generates a benchmark representative firm with several hierarchical levels. The flow 
 
16 Firm size may even be considered as a performance measure itself, at least for firms with a spe-
cific growth strategy. Managing personnel within small firms 
29 
characteristics of this firm (quits, fires, and internal and external worker flows) mimic 
the results found in scarcely available empirical studies. The first simulation experi-
ments examine to which extent the survival rate and size of this benchmark firm depend 
on average labour productivity and specialization. Next, this information is used to 
model two new benchmark firms: a small firm (25 employees on average) and a large 
firm (790 employees on average). The final set of simulation experiments consists of 
sensitivity analyses performed on these two benchmark firms. 
The model provides explanations for differences in size between enterprises operating 
in similar environments. Two sources for such size differences are identified. The first 
source is differences in transaction costs that may lead to size differences between oth-
erwise comparable firms. This effect is already explained by microeconomic theory, but 
the possibility that the impact of transaction costs on the number of employees may be 
different for small and large firms has been ignored. Our study demonstrates that such 
effects can exist: simulation experiments show that small firms are less sensitive to 
changes in transaction costs than large firms are. 
The second source of size differences is heterogeneity of labour supply and the reaction 
of personnel management to this heterogeneity. Even when transaction costs are the 
same for similar firms, their sizes may differ due to variations in the qualities and quali-
fications of incumbent workers. These variations are, in fact, variations in the outcomes 
of various HRM processes. As such, they are due to variations in the quality or effec-
tiveness of those HRM programmes and procedures, such as hiring procedures, training 
programmes, the matching of employees to internally available vacancies, and the ex-
tent to which the organization can improve the motivation and job satisfaction of em-
ployees. Although we have not explicitly modelled these HRM processes, the qualities 
and qualifications of employees can be interpreted as the outcomes of these processes. 
While we are unable to determine the most efficient way in which to shape these HRM 
processes, we can determine to which extent variations in the efficiency of these proc-
esses affect various organizational processes, and, ultimately, the survival and size of 
the organization.  
The magnitude of this effect of labour heterogeneity appears again to be different in 
small businesses and large businesses. In our simulation model, the relative influence 
that labour heterogeneity has on firm size depends crucially on the ratio between trans-
action costs and wage costs. This is due to the assumption of marginal productivity 
wages, whereby wage costs per unit of production are independent of the human capital 
of individual employees. Transaction costs, on the other hand, are negatively related 
with the amount of human capital. In our calibrated model, small businesses with a rela-
tively flat organization and few hierarchical levels face relatively few transaction costs, 
but transaction costs gain importance when the number of hierarchical levels rises and 
intra-firm bureaucracy increases. Therefore, the impact of labour heterogeneity (and, 
therefore, the scope for HRM) on firm size is more severe in large enterprises than in 
small enterprises. Within small firms, labour heterogeneity has a different kind of im-
pact: differences in qualities of individual employees have no impact on the number of 
employees (given that the firm survives), but on the continuity and survival of the firm 
instead. Chapter 2 
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2.8 Conclusions 
To increase our general understanding of human resource management practices within 
SMEs, we have examined four different research questions. This section brings together 
the main conclusions regarding these research questions, and in the final section of this 
chapter we present some remarks on how our findings relate to the main body of knowl-
edge on HRM within SMEs. 
The first research question is how we may predict the usage of high performance HRM 
practices within SMEs. We find that, within a population of firms with 1 to 500 em-
ployees, larger firms apply more high performance HRM practices than smaller firms 
do. Firm-size effects are usually interpreted as indicators for the relevance of structural 
dimensions such as the degree of centralization, standardization, specialization and for-
malization. We find, however, that at least half of the firm-size effect in our sample can 
be explained by contextual dimensions. Once we take certain contextual determinants 
into account, the firm size effect becomes substantially less, and even insignificant for 
the usage of high performance compensation and appraisal practices. Family-owned and 
family-managed organizations make relatively little use of high performance HRM 
practices, which is also the case for businesses without a business plan. These busi-
nesses are also less likely to have an HRM department or HRM manager. The presence 
of an HRM department or manager is related to an increased usage of high performance 
HRM practices, which implies that firm size, family ownership and the availability of a 
business plan are both directly and indirectly related to the usage of high performance 
HRM practices.  
The second research question focuses on absenteeism, and questions which factors de-
termine whether enterprises take precautionary actions to reduce absence levels. Our re-
sults suggest that the probability that firms take precautionary actions increases with the 
assumed share of employees for whom the working conditions are physically demand-
ing, and is higher for establishments that have recorded physical complaints. In addi-
tion, larger enterprises, as well as establishments that are part of a larger organization, 
are more likely to take precautionary actions, as are establishments that perform a risk 
inventory and evaluation (RI&E). The decision whether or not to take precautionary ac-
tions is independent of the actual absence rate and of the assumed share of employees 
for whom the working conditions are mentally demanding. In addition, and contrary to 
our expectations, it is also independent of the employer’s opinion whether or not ab-
sence rates are related to the working conditions within the organization. 
The third research question concerns the impact of firm-provided training. Does the im-
pact of firm-provided training differ between small and large firms? Our results suggest 
that this is indeed the case. Both small and large firms benefit from firm-provided train-
ing, in that it increases the productivity of employees. The impact of firm-provided 
training on labour productivity is found to be positively related with the amount of train-
ing support that firms provide: firms that invest more time in setting up and managing 
their training activities enjoy higher benefits of training. On average, large firms provide 
relatively more training support to their employees than smaller firms do. This results in 
an indirect firm-size effect, whereby the productivity increase of an additional training 
day is positively correlated with firm size. 
The final research question that we have examined is whether differences in the out-
comes of HRM practices can explain differences in firm size. Based on exercises with a Managing personnel within small firms 
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simulation model, this research question can be answered positively. This model for-
malizes decisions of a profit-maximizing employer on the optimal number of employ-
ees, taking account of costs and benefits of recruiting, allocating and supervising em-
ployees, and on the costs and benefits of cooperation between employees. Simulation 
exercises with this model show that heterogeneity of labour supply is a possible expla-
nation for differences in the size of enterprises that operate in similar environments.  
Although we have not explicitly modelled HRM processes, the qualities and qualifica-
tions of incumbent employees can be interpreted as the outcomes of specific HRM prac-
tices. As such, differences in these qualities are due to variations in the quality or effec-
tiveness of those HRM programmes and procedures, such as hiring procedures, training 
programmes, the matching of employees to internally available vacancies, and the ex-
tent to which the organization can improve the motivation and job satisfaction of em-
ployees.  
Also here, the impact of labour heterogeneity on firm size appears to be different for 
small and large enterprises. In our calibrated model, small businesses with a relatively 
flat organization and few hierarchical levels face relatively few transaction costs, but 
transaction costs gain importance when the number of hierarchical levels rises and intra-
firm bureaucracy increases. Therefore, the impact of labour heterogeneity (and, there-
fore, the scope for HRM) on firm size is more severe in large enterprises than in small 
enterprises. For small firms, labour heterogeneity does not matter for their size, but for 
their survival.  
2.9  Final remarks  
How to manage an organization’s workforce is a fundamental aspect of each organiza-
tion, irrespective of its size. Enterprises are faced with the task of recruiting and retain-
ing a suitable workforce. This is not only a challenge for large enterprises, but also for 
small and medium-sized enterprises. For example, over 20% of all European SMEs re-
port that during the end of the 1990’s, recruiting skilled employees has been their major 
business constraint (European Commission, 2002)
17.  
Studies on the impact of HRM practices within large firms show that an increased usage 
of high performance HRM practices is generally associated with improved firm per-
formance (Boselie et al., 2001; Guest, 1997). Comparable research has not been per-
formed with small or medium-sized enterprises, but our results from the simulation 
model suggest that the quality or efficiency of HRM practices may also be important to 
explain the performance of small firms: as McEvoy (1984) already suggested, HRM 
practices may be an important cause of small-firm success or failure. Since HRM prac-
tices have not been modelled explicitly, the simulation model doesn’t allow us to deter-
mine what an effective HRM policy looks like, nor whether it depends on the applica-
tion of specific formal high performance HRM practices. It may well be the case that for 
small firms, informal HRM practices are often to be preferred over more formal high 
 
17 Amongst others, this holds for 20% of all firms with 0-9 employees and 30% of all firms with 
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performance practices, given the informal manner in which small organizations often 
operate. 
Having said this, our examination of the impact of firm-provided training suggests that 
at least for this field of HRM practices, medium-sized organizations also benefit from a 
more formal approach. At least, if this formal approach includes a fair amount of train-
ing support per employee. The results indicate that training can improve firm perform-
ance, as long as employees receive enough training support. Firms that are faced with a 
limited training budget should be aware that only a part of this budget should be spent 
on training courses themselves; especially firms with less than 150 employees should 
consider spending less money on training courses, and more time on supporting em-
ployees that follow a training course. Case studies amongst small British firms that fol-
lowed the Investors in People programme also conclude that even small firms benefit 
from a more formal training approach (Goss et al., 1994). 
The answers to the third and fourth research question of this thesis suggest that HRM 
practices do indeed matter for the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
This is in line with the studies by Heneman and Berkley (1999) and Kotey and Meredith 
(1997), which can be seen as the first studies of the impact of HRM practices on the per-
formance of SMEs. Knowing the importance of HRM practices for SMEs, it becomes 
relevant to know how these enterprises determine their choice of HRM practices. What 
is the relationship between contextual and structural dimensions and the unique HRM 
approaches of SMEs?  
That smaller firms apply less high performance HRM practices than large firms do, has 
already been established. The aim of the first research question was to determine to 
which extent this firm-size effect could be explained by differences in contextual di-
mensions. Our results suggest that roughly half of the firm size effect can be explained 
by differences in contextual variables. An especially important determinant is owner-
ship. Enterprises that are owned and managed by members of a single family are less 
likely to use high performance HRM practices. In addition, having an HRM department 
or HRM manager stimulates the usage of such practices. 
When discussing the usage of high performance HRM practices, we must keep in mind 
that we are, in fact, discussing the average usage of various categories of HRM prac-
tices. Our results suggest that enterprises show considerable variation in the degree to 
which they apply high performance practices in various HRM categories. The correla-
tions between the scales on high performance HRM practices that we derive in chapter 
four vary between 0.33 and 0.52. Based on our interviews with 16 small-business own-
ers (chapter three), we even cannot reject the hypothesis that the applications of three 
specific high performance HRM practices are independent of each other.  
One of the implications of this within-firm variation in the usage of high performance 
HRM practices is that it warrants more in-depth studies in specific HRM categories. The 
chapters on absenteeism and firm-provided training can be seen as examples of such an 
approach.  
We still need to learn a lot about how (and why) firms actually manage their personnel, 
and how they may improve their current practices. In this thesis we have looked for dif-
ferences between smaller and larger firms, and tried to explain these firm-size effects 
with other (contextual) dimensions. The number of employees in itself often doesn’t ex-Managing personnel within small firms 
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plain much; it is frequently used as an indicator for other non-observed variables. In our 
empirical studies, we have identified some of these variables.  
Nevertheless, the number of employees does explain some differences in HRM prac-
tices. Especially within very small enterprises, where hiring and selection occurs only 
once or twice a year (or even less), and outflow is limited, the character of HRM will be 
very different than with large multinationals. Within these small firms, personnel man-
agement may be dominated by the social skills of the manager or business owner, rather 
than by the application of various specific (high performance) HRM practices. Research 
into the management of personnel would then in fact become research into entrepre-
neurship and leadership styles. 
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Chapter 3: Organization context and human resource 
management in the small firm 
3.1 Introduction 
HRM is becoming increasingly important in the new “knowledge-based” economy, as 
companies face the double challenge of the need for more highly trained employees 
coupled with a shortage of qualified labour. These challenges, coupled with the third 
trend toward smaller firms in general, reinforce the need for effective HRM practices in 
the small firm (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000, 2001). It is therefore not surprising that  re-
search on HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises has captured increased 
attention in recent years.  
The basic assumptions in this line of research frequently include homogeneity among 
smaller firms: small firms are assumed to have a simple structure, characterised by low 
levels of formalization and specialisation, and high levels of centralisation (Paauwe, 
1989; Schermerhorn et al., 2000). In line with this assumption, HRM practices are as-
sumed to be informal (if present at all), and high performance HRM practices are as-
sumed to be virtually lacking.  
A growing base of research evidence, however, shows that there are many exceptions to 
this pattern
18. Apart from firm size, other relevant contextual factors may influence 
HRM practices as well. In this chapter we derive and test a model that relates the pres-
ence of high performance HRM practices within small and medium-sized enterprises to 
certain aspects of their organizational context.  
As defined by Daft (1998), organization contextual variables include firm size, strategy, 
technology, culture and the environment (especially other organizations or institutions). 
These variables have been identified as possible predictors of high performance HRM 
practices in several studies (Arthur and Hendry, 1990; Buller, 1988; Jackson et al., 
1989; Schuler et al., 1989), which in turn may stimulate organisational performance 
(Guest, 1997). In the following two sections, elements of various theoretical perspec-
tives, including the resource-based approach, institutional theory, transaction cost eco-
nomics (TCE), behavioral theory and other concepts from strategic management, are 
used to develop the rationale for proposed linkages. In sections 3.4 to 3.6, we present 
qualitative and quantitative results of a pilot study of HRM practices in a sample of six-
teen small Dutch firms. These results are intended as a preliminary test of the model. 
The chapter concludes with recommended directions for further research. 
 
18 See section 2.4 for a discussion of previous studies on HRM within SMEs. Chapter 3 
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3.2  Organization contextual variables and HRM: a transaction cost 
perspective 
We build our rationale from a blend of theoretical perspectives. The resource-based 
view highlights the importance of the environment in building up human resource capa-
bilities. Institutional theory provides a different perspective on the role of the environ-
ment in shaping expectations about management practices within the small firm. The 
behavioral perspective and other research from the strategic management literature fo-
cuses on the role strategy may play in shaping HRM practices. In addition to these per-
spectives, which have been discussed in chapter two, we incorporate elements from 
transaction cost economics (TCE). TCE is especially helpful in understanding how cer-
tain players from the environment (other private organizations in particular) may serve 
to mediate the disadvantages of size and scale effects in the small firm.  
Within transaction cost economics, the units of observation are individual transactions. 
Transactions can take place either within or between firms. Transaction costs arise be-
cause of bounded rational and opportunistic behavior of the transaction parties involved.  
Using the TCE perspective, Nooteboom discusses the special case of the small firm in 
detail (Nooteboom, 1993). He explains that small firms are often at a disadvantage rela-
tive to large firms with respect to costs, due to smaller volume produced (scale) and 
fewer products (scope). They may also be characterized by less experience and more 
limited capacity for the acquisition of knowledge (Nooteboom, 1993). As Nooteboom 
points out, whereas TCE generally focuses on the make-or-buy decision among large 
firms, for small firms, neither choice may be valid. The small company may have nei-
ther the resources to develop needed programs in-house nor the resources to search, 
evaluate and negotiate for quality programs from the outside. Nooteboom concludes that 
small companies often lack more sophisticated programs because they lack the re-
sources to implement them, not because such programs are less appropriate to the small 
firm. 
Nooteboom (1993) suggests that there may be strategies to lower transaction costs for 
small firms, either through their own initiatives, such as collective cooperation among a 
group of small firms (e.g. for technology development or a buying group) or with out-
side help. For instance, technology transfer programs sponsored by the government or 
other institutions may provide a way to lower the “thresholds in transaction costs” so 
that adoption can take place (Nooteboom, 1993: page 294). Research by Goss et al. 
(1994) provides a good practical demonstration of this point. They examine a group of 
companies wishing to receive the national designation of Investor in People from the 
British government. Goss et al. (1994) provide case support for the ability of small com-
panies to learn to copy HRM practices. In particular, they report that participating com-
panies are often successful at adopting more sophisticated practices after being given 
the proper structure or blueprint for more formal HRM systems. Using Nooteboom’s 
logic, one could argue that by absorbing the search and development costs for HRM, 
this program reduces the transaction costs for those companies adapting these tech-
niques. Another demonstration is provided by Zacharakis (1997), who uses TCE to 
explain entrepreneurial entry into foreign markets. Although not related to HRM prac-
tices per se, the study demonstrates that utilizing a partner with some knowledge of the 
target market can help leverage the entrepreneur’s resources (with an export agent, li-
censing, joint ventures, etc.), thus lowering their transaction costs.  Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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The application of TCE within entrepreneurship research is still in its early stages and 
does not always obtain clear predictive support. For instance, Klaas et al. (2000) find a 
lack of support for TCE predictions regarding outsourcing of the HRM function in 
smaller firms. Nevertheless, TCE may provide an added theoretical basis for certain 
predictions involving HRM practices within smaller firms. 
In sum, the rationale drawn from TCE is that the lack of high performance HRM prac-
tices in smaller firms is not due to size per se, but can be attributed to the generally 
higher costs required to develop specific programs that fit the needs of the smaller firm. 
However, government assistance and/or private-sector partnerships may serve to lower 
a small company’s transaction costs for introducing new HRM practices. This may ex-
plain some of the differences in the usage of high performance HRM practices among 
similarly-sized firms. 
3.3  The Proposed Model and Hypotheses  
Although smaller firms in general make less use of high performance HRM practices 
(variously defined) than larger firms do, a substantial amount of unexplained variation 
still remains across small firms. The objective of this chapter is to identify possible un-
derlying explanations for this variation. We propose a model that explains the number 
of high performance HRM practices that are applied, combining elements from the re-
source-based approach, transaction cost economics, the institutional approach and the 
strategic contingency approach. The proposed model is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1  A model of HRM practices 
The model presents a short list of independent contextual variables: in addition to firm 
size, we investigate the impact of the presence of a CLA, access to a larger company 
supplier or customer closely associated with the company (referred to as “large firm as-
sociate” in the model) and the orientation toward growth as a strategy (referred to as 
“growth strategy”). These four contextual variables together are thought to influence the 
number of applied high performance HRM practices. The reader should note that the 
model is not intended as a comprehensive list of all possible organization contextual 
predictors, but rather as a starting point upon which other research can build. 
The proposed model includes a set of three intermediary “latent” variables. These are 
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the linkages between the independent and dependent variables. The underlying assump-
tion is that if the small company CEO has the resources, the know-how, and the 
recognition of the importance of high performance HRM practices, he or she will 
develop and implement them. The specific hypotheses to be tested that are implied by 
this model will be discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Collective labour agreements 
In the Netherlands, CLAs often prescribe the expected approach to be taken in HRM 
practices. These prescriptions often refer to high performance HRM practices, e.g. writ-
ten job descriptions, performance appraisals or formal employee training programs. 
These CLAs vary by sector, with some being more specific than others. Generally, such 
documents primarily provide expectations of labour unions and the government. Never-
theless, for some sectors (e.g. metal) actual tools may be provided in the agreement, 
such as examples of written job descriptions for each of the standard job classifications. 
In those cases, the development costs for implementing such programs are reduced and 
the adoption rate is expected to be higher. Further, the Dutch government generally pro-
vides neither funding or assistance to execute such agreements, nor sanctions against 
nonexecution of part or all the agreement unless an employee files a grievance. How-
ever the latter is rarely done. Thus, in the proposed model, the CLA requirements are 
presumed to have an indirect impact on HRM practices primarily by heightening the 
awareness of such HRM practices by the CEO, and by clarifying the expectations of 
certain stakeholder groups (organized labour and the government). To the extent that an 
understanding of such expectations influences the CEO’s decisions in implementing 
various HRM practices, and in accordance with institutional theory predictions, we pro-
pose the first hypothesis as follows:  
H3.1: Small companies with collective labour agreements make more use of high 
performance HRM practices than companies without such agreements. 
Firm size  
Scale effects, based on firm size, have been fairly well substantiated in the literature and 
are also included in the proposed model. The TCE perspective provides one rationale 
for the impact of size on the development of high performance HRM practices. Most of 
these practices, such as training programs, performance appraisal instruments, and writ-
ten job descriptions, require considerable development costs to be done correctly (Klaas 
et al., 2000). According to both the resource-based and the TCE perspective, most small 
firms lack the resources for development costs, in spite of a possible need for special-
ized programs. With the advantages of scale, larger companies have more resources to 
cover development costs (Nooteboom, 1993).  
Financial resources are not the only intermediary between firm size and the application 
of high performance HRM practices, as can be seen in Figure 3.1. For instance, larger 
companies may be held to different legal standards by the government, as in the United 
States. Given their size, they may also be more likely to have HRM specialists on staff 
familiar with high performance HRM practices. Larger companies may also have a 
greater need to systematize their practices to manage a large-scale labour force more ef-
ficiently. For all these reasons, we propose the second hypothesis of this chapter as fol-
lows: Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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H3.2: Larger companies make more use of high performance HRM practices than 
smaller companies. 
Franchising and supplier or customer networks 
Using the TCE perspective and resource-based perspective, we posit that a larger firm 
partner or “associate” can help the small firm to reduce the transaction costs associated 
with development of high performance HRM practices (Gales and Blackburn, 1990; 
Zacharakis, 1997). The rationale for hypothesis H3.2 already explains why we would 
expect larger firms to apply more high performance HRM practices. Small companies 
working with a larger firm may benefit from this knowledge. In particular, smaller 
companies that work closely with a larger company, either as a supplier, customer, or 
franchiser, may gain access to relevant HRM programs from the larger firm (e.g. a train-
ing module or performance appraisal instrument). This lowers the development costs 
(and thus the resources required). The large firm associate may also communicate 
higher expectations to their associated small firms regarding the value of high perform-
ance HRM practices (e.g. through ISO9000 standards, etc.). Finally, close contact with a 
larger firm associate may result in a better understanding by the small firm CEO of 
some of the benefits of such practices. Thus, hypothesis H3.3 is as follows: 
H3.3: Small companies associated with a larger firm (through a supply or cus-
tomer network or franchise) apply more high performance HRM practices than 
those companies that lack such an association. 
Growth strategies 
Finally, based upon the behavioral and strategic contingency perspectives and other em-
pirical research (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988; Thakur, 1998), we propose 
that companies that are more growth-oriented may also be more apt to recognize the 
perceived value of HRM practices to build a more competent employee base. Thus, 
these firms are more likely to develop high performance HRM practices than those 
without a growth-oriented strategy. The fourth hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
H3.4: Small companies with a growth strategy apply more high performance 
HRM practices than those small companies without a growth strategy. 
3.4 Research  Method 
3.4.1  Sample and data collection techniques 
To test the model and hypotheses presented in the previous section, a series of semi-
structured interviews were conducted in the summer of 1997 with twenty Dutch SMEs. 
Four companies are excluded from analyses—three are subsidiaries of larger firms and 
one is an outlier with respect to size (125 employees). The remaining companies range 
in size from 10 to 41 employees, representing four different sectors: metal products and 
machinery manufacturing (metal), food retail, cleaning services and information and 
communication technology (ICT). The first three sectors are subject to CLAs. 
Given the exploratory nature of the research and the small sample size, it was decided to 
include companies past the initial start-up phase, which were assumed to have solidified Chapter 3 
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their HRM practices. Thus, only firms five years and older were selected to participate 
in the pilot study. Table 3.1 provides a description of the participating companies by 
sector and size.  
Table 3.1  Sector and firm size statistics for the sample 
  Sample size  Firm size (no. of employeesa) 
   Mean  Range 
Cleaning services
  3 14.0 10-18 
Metal products and machinery manufacturing b  5 17.0 10-25 
Information and communication technology  3  19.0  12-25 
Retail (food)  5  22.8  10-41 
Total   16  17.6  10-41 
a: excluding owners. 
b: size missing for one company. 
The structure of the semi-structured interviews is based on a classification system of 
HRM practices developed by Fisscher et al. (1988). Within this system, three classes of 
HRM practices are distinguished: practices pertaining to flow of employees into and out 
of the organization, control procedures, and development activities (e.g. training and ca-
reer development). Though this approach provides a rather detailed set of comments, 
because of the methodology used (i.e., open-ended questions), comparable and codeable 
data are only available for a limited number of high performance HRM practices: writ-
ten job descriptions, regularity of performance appraisal and the availability of em-
ployer-based training.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the way in which each of the independent and dependent vari-
ables are measured. Two variables are used as indicators for collective labour agree-
ments. The variable CLA contains the scores on a three-point scale that takes account of 
the heterogeneity of the CLAs, as far as HRM requirements are concerned. The lowest 
score is reserved for companies without a CLA, the highest score for companies with 
detailed HRM requirements (metal sector). Alternatively, the sector dummy for metal 
can be used as an indicator for companies with CLAs that contain detailed HRM re-
quirements. In the case of the metal sector, the CLA specifies extensive requirements, 
including use of predefined job descriptions (provided within the CLA document), an 
annual training program and the requirement to give a donation to an organization to 
promote and develop training courses. Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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Table 3.2  Independent and dependent variables obtained from the pilot study 
Variables Answer  categories 
Independent variables:   
Firm size  Number of full-time and part-time employees 
Collective Labour Agreement (CLA)  No CLA 
  CLA with limited requirements regarding HRM practices 
  CLA specifying extensive requirements 
Metal sector  All other sectors 
  Metal products and machinery manufacturing sector 
Large firm associate  No association with an outside firm  
  Association with an outside firm, either as supplier or 
franchisor 
Growth strategy  Intention to contract 
  Intention to remain stable 
  Intention to grow 
Dependent variables:   
Written job descriptions  Absence of written job descriptions 
  Presence of written job descriptions 
Regularity of performance appraisal  Never 
 Seldom 
 Regularly 
Formal (employer-based) training 
programme 
Training nor or seldom offered, or offered ad hoc as an 
initiative by employees 
  Initiative by employer, with a training budget and plan 
available 
  note: for each variable, answer categories are presented in ascending order. 
3.4.2 Data  analysis 
Both qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques are applied to the data set. In the 
qualitative analysis, respondent comments are sorted according to the main HRM prac-
tices, including HRM planning, recruitment, selection, performance appraisal, compen-
sation and benefits, training and development, and team building. Because these catego-
ries are different than those used in the original study (set up by a different team of re-
searchers), data are missing and/or not uniform enough for quantitative comparison for 
all categories. However, the available case studies provide a preliminary look at some 
aspects of the model presented in Figure 3.1. 
In spite of the small and nonrandomly drawn sample, in the second part of the analysis 
quantitative statistical techniques are used to examine the four proposed hypotheses. In 
cases where both independent and dependent variables are dichotomous variables, 
Fisher’s Exact Test is chosen to test for independence of the two variables. The Fisher’s 
Exact Test is particularly well suited to this dataset because of the very low count in 
some of the cells of the 2x2 tables. For these analyses, the Phi coefficient is then used to 
test for the direction of the relationship. For the remaining relationships (i.e. where at 
least one of the two variables was an ordinal variable with three or more data points) the Chapter 3 
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Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient is used to measure both the strength 
and direction of the relationship. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Qualitative  analysis 
Annex 3.1 presents a summary of five of the sixteen cases examined for the qualitative 
analysis. Within the size range of relatively small companies included in the study (be-
tween 10 and 50 employees), companies display a large variation in approach to HRM 
practices. This is consistent with the findings in previously reported studies.  
Case 1, a small specialty grocery store, fits the stereotype of the typical small firm. The 
degree of formalization of HRM practices is limited. The CEO reports that he provides 
periodic performance feedback, but recruitment remains informal -- within the immedi-
ate circle of family and friends. Moreover, training and development is not carried out 
and team building consists of an annual outing with employees.  
By contrast, case 2, a somewhat larger supermarket, has fairly highly developed HRM 
practices. Perhaps some of this difference is due to its larger size. The respondent also 
makes specific reference to the influence of the large firm associate on HRM prac-
tices—in this case a large Dutch grocery-purchasing group. The CEO specifically notes 
that the purchasing group impacts overall HRM planning, as well as the training pro-
gram. Recruitment is also more professionalised, with reliance on a job center, newspa-
per advertisements and shop posters. The CEO in case 2 also seems to pay more atten-
tion to the CLA that applies to food companies. He reports that job descriptions as well 
as rewards follow the guidelines of the food retail CLA. Thus, although size is definitely 
an issue here, the influence of the large firm associate and greater attention paid to the 
CLA (perhaps as an interaction with size) is also relevant for this case.  
Cases 3 and 4, both in the ICT sector, are not covered by a CLA in the Netherlands. 
Whereas case 3 reports a larger company business partner, IBM, as its large firm associ-
ate, case 4 reports no large company associations. Again, HRM practices for these two 
companies, matched for size, are quite different. The influence of the business partner 
comes through strongly in several aspects of HRM practices found with case 3, includ-
ing HRM planning, training programs, and written job descriptions. This firm also re-
ports the usage of high performance HRM practices in the field of recruitment, using far 
more channels outside the immediate circle of family, friends, and employees, and the 
use of a selection test for programmers. Again, given the small firm size, these cases 
appear to demonstrate the relative importance of the large firm associate in explaining 
company differences. The higher growth orientation of cases 2 and 3 may also help to 
explain their usage of more high performance HRM practices relative to the other firms.  
Case 5, roughly within the same size range as the other cases, belongs to the metal sec-
tor. In spite of a rather strict CLA spelling out a number of requirements for more for-
mal HRM practices, case 5 tends to have a fairly informal approach to HRM practices. 
Case 5 aims at somewhat limited growth. It has adopted a few high performance HRM 
practices, including the use of a temporary employment agency for recruitment, using 
skill level as a criterion when hiring, and performance appraisals when employees per-
form poorly. Also, it pays attention to some of the CLA requirements (in compensation Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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but not job descriptions). It may be argued that because of a very low turnover rate (less 
than one employee per year), and a relatively limited growth rate, high performance 
HRM practices are not considered particularly important. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that case 5 fails to use written job descriptions, given that examples are provided for all 
metal job classifications in the metal CLA. 
3.5.2 Quantitative  analysis 
Table 3.3 provides a summary of other sample characteristics, in addition to the size and 
sector data presented previously in Table 3.1 for the total group of sixteen firms. 
Table 3.3  Other descriptive statistics of the sample 






Large firm associate  16  5  31% 
Growth strategy  15  5  33% 
HRM specialist  16  0  0% 
Regular performance appraisals  13  3  23% 
Written job descriptions  16  6  38% 
Formal training program  16  5  31% 
About a third report the intention to grow with or without a recent growth spurt and one-
third report having a link with a “large firm associate”. About two-thirds are covered by 
a CLA. Although none of the companies have an HRM department or even HRM staff, 
about a quarter to one-third do report having formal training programs (5 out of 16 
companies), written job descriptions (6 out of 16 companies) and/or regular perform-
ance appraisals (3 out of 13 companies).  
Table 3.4 presents results of the quantitative tests for the four proposed hypotheses, as 
well as tests for the interrelationships among the independent and dependent variables. 
Looking first at the interrelationships among the independent variables, firm size is as-
sociated with both growth strategy and the presence of a large firm associate. In addi-
tion, the presence of a large firm associate is related with growth strategy. The CLA 
variable is highly correlated with the metal sector dummy variable, but this is to be ex-
pected since both are based on the sector classification of the companies. The presence 
of a CLA is unrelated to the other three independent variables. The three dependent 
variables (regularity of performance appraisal, written job descriptions and the avail-
ability of a formal (employer-based) training program) are also completely unrelated to 
one another, even though they each represent a high performance HRM practice. There-
fore, hypotheses were tested for each dependent variable separately. Chapter 3 
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Table 3.4  Correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables 
Variable  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 
Collective Labour Agreement a  1
           
Metal sector b  2    .85         
Number of employees  3  -.09   -.13            
Large firm associate b  4  -.32   -.46   .61**        
Growth strategy  5  -.16    .10   .53**  .46*       
Regularity of  
performance appraisal  6   .00   -.25   .52* .47    .57*     
Written job descriptions b  7   .42    .59**  .35   .04   .26   .00   
Formal training program b  8 -.51** -.45  .68*** .71** .46* .23  .04 
*:  significant at 10% level. 
**:   significant at 5% level. 
***:  significant at 1% level. 
a:   within our dataset, the variable “Collective Labour Agreement” is equivalent to a dummy 
for the ict sector. 
b:   dummy variable. The relationship between two nominal variables is measured by the Phi 
test of association. For dummy variables, the Phi coefficient is identical to Pearson’s corre-
lation. Fisher’s exact test is used to test for dependency between two dummy variables. 
3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1  Support for hypotheses 
Hypothesis H3.1 posits that the presence of a CLA will be associated with the applica-
tion of high performance HRM practices. No support is found for this hypothesis. The 
only significant correlation (between CLA and the presence of a formal training pro-
gram) is opposite to the predicted direction. However, the metal sector dummy variable 
is positively associated with the presence of job descriptions (which is in the expected 
direction). Perhaps this is due to the fact that the CLA for the metal sector has the most 
specific requirements for written job descriptions and also includes examples for com-
panies to use. Thus, in addition to clarifying stakeholder expectations, added resources 
are provided to implement this requirement.  
The weak support for hypothesis H3.1, with the above exception, points to the possibil-
ity that external stakeholder expectations alone have only a minor influence on the ac-
tual practices chosen to implement. Added supplemental resources (as are provided by 
the job descriptions provided in the metal CLA), or the appreciation for the value of a 
practice by the CEO may be required to assure the development and implementation of 
mandated HRM practices. The presence of a CLA is even negatively associated with 
formal training programs in spite of the fact that it is specifically required in the metal 
sector. Given the small sample size, it is difficult to distinguish the CLA effect from 
other sector effects. For instance, within the ICT sector, where state-of-the art learning 
is critical to maintain competitiveness, much attention is paid to training and develop-
ment. Further research examining CLA and sector effects separately and using a broader 
range of CLA and nonCLA sectors is needed to test this hypothesis further.  Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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Hypothesis H3.2, with firm size as independent variable, is most clearly supported for 
the presence of a formal training program (r=.68; p<.01). A positive correlation (r=.52; 
p<.1) between firm size and the regularity of performance appraisal also suggests a rela-
tionship to be tested using a larger sample. Comparing the results of hypotheses H3.1 
and H3.2 would attribute more explanatory power to the TCE perspective and resource-
based approach than to institutional theory. 
Empirical support for the third hypothesis is limited to a significant relationship be-
tween the presence of a large firm associate and the application of high performance 
HRM practices. Statistically speaking, this relationship is rather strong (r=.71; p<.01). 
The hypothesis is not supported, however, for regularity of performance appraisal or 
written job descriptions. 
Given that size and the large firm associate variable are strongly correlated, both with 
one another and with the dependent variable (formal training program), an obvious 
question is whether the large firm associate variable has an effect on training independ-
ent of firm size. Further analysis of the data using partial correlations provides support 
for this conclusion. Controlling for firm size, the partial correlation between the large 
firm associate variable and the dependent variable of formal training becomes 0.49, 
which is significant at a 10% significance level. It is again noted that the data set is very 
small and conclusions should be revalidated on larger, randomly drawn samples. 
Finally, relatively weak but consistent support is found for hypothesis H3.4, the rela-
tionship between growth strategy and the application of high performance HRM prac-
tices. For two of the three indicators - regularity of performance appraisal and formal 
training programs - the relationship found is significant at the 10% significance level. 
This effect may be weak due to the small sample size and small number of companies 
pursuing a growth strategy. However the trends hint at the potential usefulness of pursu-
ing this line of thinking in further research on a larger randomly drawn sample of small 
companies.  
3.6.2  Further discussion and suggestions for future research 
The results of this pilot study point to a number of interesting directions for further ex-
ploration. First, consistent with past research, even within a small sample with relatively 
narrow size ranges, firm size appears to be an important predictor of at least two of the 
indicators of high performance HRM practices. This confirms the importance of scale in 
predicting the overall shape of organizations. 
Second, even though the overall sample is fairly small, the companies studied in our re-
search demonstrate that small firms vary widely in the types of HRM practices used. 
Thus, in spite of the importance of firm size, this variation suggests that other factors 
may also shape HRM practices in the organization. In particular, our findings point to 
the possible fruitfulness of other organizational contextual variables, including aspects 
of the firm’s environment and strategy as explanatory factors. 
Third, the lack of interrelation among the three high performance HRM practices is 
rather striking. For instance, companies that have developed an employer-based training 
program do not necessarily appraise performance on a regular basis or write out their 
job descriptions.  Chapter 3 
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Fourth, the patterns of results in this chapter appear to support the importance of re-
source availability rather than external stakeholder expectations, as the primary influ-
ence on HRM practices in small firms. For instance, on the one hand, the mere existence 
of a CLA, which spells out some of these external stakeholder expectations by labour 
groups and by the Dutch government, appears to have little influence in the HRM prac-
tices implemented. Only where the CLA actually provides direct assistance on how to 
implement the requirement (e.g. by providing examples of written job descriptions in 
the case of the metal sector) does the CLA appear to predict HRM practices. On the 
other hand, small companies with a large company partner or associate are more apt to 
implement certain practices for which search and development assistance was provided. 
Taken together, these patterns appear to give more support to the resource-based and 
TCE perspectives than to institutional theory predictions. Of course, further research is 
needed to validate these conclusions. For instance, the current data set does not allow us 
to test for the impact of the three latent intermediary variables (resources, external 
stakeholder expectations, and the perceived value of HRM practices by the CEO). These 
variables might be operationalized and measured in future research to improve our un-
derstanding of the determinants of HRM practices.  
Fifth, consistent with the behavioral and strategic contingency perspectives in strategic 
management theory, there is weak evidence that the nature of the overall competitive 
strategy, especially an orientation toward growth, influences the choice of certain HRM 
practices. 
Sixth, given the wide variation in HRM practices in small companies, future research is 
needed to further clarify the relationships between the various HRM practices and small 
firm performance. Future research should validate the importance of the application of 
high performance HRM practices relative to firm performance.  
In sum, future research on larger, randomly-drawn samples from multiple sectors is 
needed to test the hypotheses and tentative conclusions outlined here. Additionally, lon-
gitudinal research can provide a better understanding of the directions of cause and ef-
fect among the proposed linkages. Future research should also further examine both the 
organization contextual variables measured in this chapter as well as the other omitted 
contextual variables (including technology and culture). Nevertheless, the trends re-
ported here suggest that the use of organizational contextual variables in addition to 
firm size may be a very promising line of research in efforts to predict HRM practices in 
smaller firms. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter aims at the development and preliminary testing of a predictive model that 
explains the usage of high performance HRM practices by small firms from three dif-
ferent categories of organization contextual variables: firm size, strategy, and the envi-
ronment. Two aspects of the environment are chosen for measurement: collective labour 
agreements, representing government stakeholder expectations, and the presence or ab-
sence of a large firm associate. The proposed model attempts to integrate key aspects 
from several theories. Results are most consistent with the predictions of the resource-
based, behavioral and TCE perspective. They are least consistent with predictions 
drawn from institutional theory. Organization context and human resource management in the small firm 
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Our admittedly preliminary results point to a few practical implications. First, it may be 
more effective to stimulate the usage of high performance HRM practices by providing 
technology transfer assistance, than by mandating that specific practices are adhered to. 
In the absence of sanctions or additional resources, official mandates that communicate 
stakeholder expectations, as is customary with most Dutch Collective Labour Agree-
ments, appear to have very small impact on adoption of appropriate HRM practices. 
Simply increasing the information about implementation in such documents (e.g. by 
providing examples of written job descriptions) may improve the adoption rate. Other 
efforts to lower search and development costs (as part of the total transaction costs) may 
also have a positive impact on HRM implementation. There is a general awareness that 
historically, government agencies and government-sponsored small business assistance 
programs can play an effective role in technology transfer to small companies. But re-
sults of our pilot study underscore the potential of transfer from larger private firms as 
well. As evidenced in our pilot results, large business partners or associates working 
with a large number of similar small companies (such as franchisers or supplier groups) 
can also provide technology transfer assistance, for HRM practices as well as other ac-
tivities.  
Our conclusions presume that high performance HRM practices are beneficial, and that 
we have a clear understanding of what they entail. However, shortcomings in definition 
and measurement in past research suggest the need for further validation of HRM prac-
tices in small firms, and a more careful definition of what is meant by high performance 
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Appendix 3.1: Results of qualitative analysis of selected cases 
Table 3.5  Overview of selected cases  
Subject  Information provided in interview 
Case 1   
Sector Food 
Size (No. of employees)  10 




Growth orientation  Stable 
HRM planning  No information 
HRM recruitment  Recruit friends and family. Informal. Tried newspapers once but 
failed. 
Selection  Employee profile must match customer profile--not too young or old. 
Performance appraisal  Performance feedback 4x a year. 
Compensation/benefits No  information 
Training & development  Not important so not offered. 
Job descriptions  No information 
Team building  Once a year company trip. 
Other comments  An upscale “fresh market”. 
Case 2   
Sector Food 
Size (No. of employees)  41 




Growth orientation  Growth-plans to expand current location. 
HRM planning  C1000 used for advice on HRM. HRM seen as part of overall strategy. 
HRM recruitment  Use of job center, newspaper and shop posters.  
Selection  Social skills are important. Two week trial period with two perform-
ance appraisals. 
Performance appraisal  Recently added bimonthly performance feedback. If specified goals 
not reached, employees can be fired. 
Compensation/benefits  Rewards are according to the CLA. 
Training & development  Just wrote a training plan with help of C1000. Training is considered 
important. 
Job descriptions  Yes. Taken from the CLA. 
Team building  Once a year company trip. 
Other comments  Owner took over 1 year ago, replaced 11 employees and changed pur-
chasing group to C1000. Appendix 3.1 
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Subject  Information provided in interview 
Case 3   
Sector ICT 
Size (No. of employees)  25 




Growth orientation  Growth-Recently added a subsidiary. 
HRM planning  IBM requires a quality plan with personnel policy, training plan and 
written job descriptions.  
HRM recruitment  Various channels, including magazines, newspapers, own employees, 
walk-ins, and recruitment co. (last didn’t help) 
Selection  A test is used for programmers. The management assistant makes first 
cut, then the owner.  
Performance appraisal  No performance feedback. Appraisal is ad hoc. It should be improved 
but no time is available. Results are more important than how ob-
tained. 
Compensation/benefits  Profit-sharing, competitive wages and several savings programs. 
Training & development  Initiative used to be with employees. Now the employer make training 
mandatory. No formal career development plans. 
Job descriptions  Yes. Prove a helpful tool for appraisals. 
Team building  New employees are appointed to a coach. Regular company evenings 
and trips. 
Other comments  Low turnover rate. Most employees are under 30.  
None are older than 50. 
Case 4   
Sector ICT 
Size (No. of employees)  25 




Growth orientation  Stable. 
HRM planning  No information 
HRM recruitment  Recruitment via friends and acquaintances; also internet advertise-
ment. 
Selection  Selection is done by the team needing a new employee, then with the 
director, who decides jointly with the team. 
Performance appraisal  Not done until now. 
Compensation/benefits  Profit-sharing for all employees. Everyone is expected to work late at 
least once a week. 
Training & development  Training budget but team/employees must take the initiative to follow 
the course. New employees must be employable right away. 
Job descriptions  No information 
Team building  No information 
Other comments  The company wants to have as few formalised procedures as possible 
to avoid rigidity and inflexibility. Results of qualitative analysis of selected cases 
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Subject  Information provided in interview 
Case 5   
Sector Metal 
Size (No. of employees)  20 




Growth orientation  Growth-aim at limited growth. 
HRM planning  Limited planning. The trade association is sometimes used for assis-
tance. 
HRM recruitment  Mainly uses temporary employment agencies, but only have about 3 
vacancies every five years. 
Selection  Skill level is an important criterion. Whether the applicant fits in the 
team is also important. 
Performance appraisal  Only if employees perform badly. These are written down and if 
needed a second appraisal takes place. 
Compensation/benefits  Competitive wage offered (above CLA requirements). 
Training & development  Very limited training. On the job training used: Younger employees 
learn from more experienced colleagues. 
Job descriptions  In spite of CLA regulation, the company does not yet have formal de-
scriptions. 
Team building  Team spirit is high. Most employees are loyal. Once a year company 
trip. 
Other comments  Low quit rate. In 16 years, one employee got fired, and one left for 
reasons other than retirement. 
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Chapter 4: High performance HRM practices in small 
and medium-sized enterprises  
4.1 Introduction 
In the knowledge-based economy, companies are challenged to meet their demand for 
more highly trained employees in labour markets characterized by a shortage of quali-
fied labour (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000, 2001). At the same time, the knowledge-based 
economy is characterized by an increasing share of small and medium-sized enterprises 
or SMEs (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000; Audretsch et al., 2002). Generally speaking, 
small firms pay less attention to human resource management than their larger counter-
parts do (chapter two).  
Does the combination of these developments pose a threat to the success of knowledge-
based economies? Our current understanding of HRM practices with SMEs is as yet in-
sufficient to provide an answer to this question. Especially quantitative studies, in which 
specific hypotheses on HRM with small firms are tested empirically, are lacking. 
In this chapter, we examine contextual determinants of the application of high perform-
ance HRM practices within small and medium-sized enterprises. Since it is unlikely that 
a single theory on organizational behaviour can ascertain all relevant determinants, we 
combine elements from four different theoretical perspectives on organizational behav-
iour: the resource-based perspective, the behavioral perspective, transaction cost eco-
nomics (TCE), and the institutional approach. We present a framework on high per-
formance HRM within SMEs, which is based on a combination of insights from these 
four theoretical perspectives, and builds upon the framework derived in the previous 
chapter (De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001).  
The framework is used to derive six hypotheses on the application of high performance 
HRM practices within small firms. These hypotheses identify various contextual vari-
ables as determinants, including not only firm size, but also family ownership, the avail-
ability of an HRM department or HRM manager, and the existence of a formal business 
plan. To test these hypotheses, we use data obtained from a written survey amongst 
Dutch SMEs. This survey, which is discussed in the section on the research method, re-
sulted in data on almost 700 firms with 1-500 employees. We use logistic and ordinary 
least-squares regressions to test the hypotheses. Our main conclusions are presented in 
the final section. Amongst others, we find that, within our sample of small firms, larger 
firms apply more high performance HRM practices than smaller firms do. However, 
once we take the contextual variables into account, the relationship with firm size is 
roughly halved. 
4.2  Previous research  
4.2.1  High performance HRM practices 
Studies by Delery and Doty (1996), Huselid (1995), Huselid et al. (1997), Ichniowski et 
al. (1997), Koch and McGrath (1996) and MacDuffie (1995) show that “the more of the Chapter 4 
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high performance HRM practices that are used, the better the performance as indicated 
by productivity, labour turnover or financial indicators” (Guest, 1997, page 272). 
High performance HRM practices refer to specific HRM practices designed to improve 
competences and commitment of employees. This concept includes practices such as 
testing of applicants, incentive pay systems, increased emphasis on workforce training 
and employee participation, and increased employment security. However, little consen-
sus exists regarding a more specific demarcation of high performance HRM practices 
(Guest, 1997), and in each empirical study the concept is operationalised differently. 
4.2.2  The role of HRM departments  
According to Hendry and Pettigrew (1992), firm size will have an indirect effect on the 
application of high performance HRM practices. In their model of strategic change and 
human resource management, they differentiate between HRM context and HRM con-
tent. The context of HRM contains its role, definition, organization, and outputs. This 
included the presence of an HRM department or HRM manager. The HRM content in-
cludes labour flows, work systems, reward systems, and employee relations. The appli-
cation of high performance HRM practices can be considered as a characteristic of the 
HRM content.  
According to this model, the organizational context influences the HRM context, which 
in turn - partly - determines the HRM content. Applied to the current model, organiza-
tional characteristics may influence the presence of an HRM department or HRM man-
ager, which is in turn a determinant of the application of high performance HRM prac-
tices. Small and medium-sized enterprises are less likely to have a specific HRM de-
partment or manager (Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990; Atkinson and Meager, 1994). This is 
in accordance with the finding that smaller firms apply less (high performance) HRM 
practices than larger enterprises. 
4.2.3  A combination of theoretical perspectives  
In the previous chapter, we have combined elements from various theoretical perspec-
tives into a framework in which various contextual variables are related to the usage of 
high performance HRM practices. Their framework suggests four different mechanisms, 
along which contextual variables may influence an organization’s choice regarding the 
choice for high performance HRM practices. These mechanisms are represented by the 
following four intermediary variables:  
-  demand for human resources;  
-  supply of financial resources; 
-  expectations and requirements from external stakeholders;  
-  the CEO’s perceived value of HRM practices.  
The rationale for these intermediary variables is based on insights from the resource-
based perspective of the firm, the behavioral perspective, the institutional approach and 
transaction cost economics (TCE).  
Both the resource-based perspective and the behavioral perspective points towards the 
demand for human resources as intermediary variable in our model. The choice for high 
performance HRM practices results from the demand for human resources (both in 
terms of quantity and quality). This, in turn, depends on the corporate strategy. Other High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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contextual dimensions (organizational size, environment and culture) may influence or-
ganizational strategy, and thus, indirectly, the demand for human resources. Alterna-
tively, they may influence the demand for resources directly. Institutional theorists view 
organizations as entities that gain legitimacy and stakeholder acceptance by conforming 
to these stakeholders’ expectations for behavior.  
Some have argued that TCE can be of help in gaining a better understanding of differ-
ences among small firms. Using the TCE perspective, Nooteboom discusses the special 
case of the small firm in detail (Nooteboom, 1993). For small firms, “the perspective 
from which external scanning is performed is often dominated, and thereby restricted, 
by the personal perspective of the entrepreneur” (Nooteboom, page 289). Bounded ra-
tionality thus points towards the importance of theories on entrepreneurship, to explain 
the heterogeneity in HRM practices with small and medium-sized enterprises. The at-
tention of the entrepreneur for the management of human resources, and thus his or her 
perceived value of HRM practices, may be related to various contextual dimensions.  
The main contribution of TCE to our framework is threefold. Firstly, we have included 
the perceived value of HRM practices by CEOs as an intermediary variable. The impor-
tance of the perceived value by CEOs as a determinant of the usage of high performance 
HRM practices is a direct result of their bounded rational behavior. Secondly, the usage 
of high performance HRM practices may depend upon the supply of financial resources 
within the firm. Thirdly, TCE focuses our attention on the role that external stake-
holders may play, by reducing the costs of introducing and applying certain high per-
formance HRM practices. 
4.3  High performance HRM practices within small firms 
4.3.1 A framework of organizational contextual determinants of HRM 
within small firms 
The theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous section can explain how the ap-
plication of high performance HRM practices depends upon four intermediary variables: 
the demand for human resources, the supply of financial resources, the expectations and 
requirements from external stakeholders, and the CEO’s perceived value of HRM prac-
tices (Figure 4.1). Following Hendry and Pettigrew (1992), the HRM practices include 
both the presence of an HRM department (or manager) and the usage of high perform-
ance HRM practices. The impact of the intermediary variables on the usage of high per-
formance HRM practices may therefore be both direct and indirect.  
We focus on HRM practices rather than HRM strategy. Our first argument for this focus 
is that firms without specific strategies may still apply certain practices. Secondly, simi-
lar HRM strategies may result in different practices to realize those strategies, depend-
ing on contextual differences. Consequently, we do not investigate whether or not a spe-
cific HRM strategy exists. Nor do we investigate to which extent the HRM practices are 
internally consistent (resulting in an internal fit) or integrated with the overall business 
strategy (which represents an external fit). Chapter 4 
56 






The intermediary variables are, in turn, determined by an organization’s structural and 
contextual dimensions. In this chapter, we focus on contextual dimensions. Firm size is 
a contextual dimension of its own, and one of the contextual determinants in this chap-
ter. Goals and strategy of an enterprise, also a contextual dimension, are more difficult 
to measure. The presence of a business plan is used to indicate whether the goals and 
strategies are made explicit. Two other indicators of this contextual dimension concern 
specific strategic choices: the choice to export, and the choice to associate with a fran-
chise organization.  
Another contextual determinant is family business. A family business is defined as a 
business that is not only owned by members of one family, but also managed by mem-
bers of this family. It indicates a specific aspect of the relationship of an organization 
with its environment: the ownership relationship. Since family ownership may stimulate 
the notion of the company-as-extended-family (Legge, 1995), this variable may also be 
seen as an indicator of culture. In addition, the culture of organizations is represented by 
the degree of unionization. 
4.3.2 Hypotheses 
We are now able to derive our hypotheses. We will concentrate on the contextual de-
terminants since intermediary variables are not available. 
Firm size  
Several arguments can be made to expect a positive relationship between firm size and 
the usage of high performance HRM practices.  
First of all, if the number of employees increases, so does the need to decentralize and 
communicate between employees and departments. This, in turn, requires a higher level 
of standardization, specialization and formalization (Daft, 1998; Nooteboom, 1993). In 
addition, an increase of the number of employees results in an increasing demand for 
HRM practices regarding recruitment, selection, performance appraisal etc. The combi-
nation of these two developments indicates that larger firms are faced with a higher de-
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mand for standardized and formalized HRM practices than smaller firms are. Conse-
quently, larger firms would benefit more from departments and / or employees that have 
specific knowledge and expertise on the implementation of such HRM practices. Larger 
firms are, therefore, more likely to have an HRM department or HRM manager than 
smaller firms. This relationship is confirmed by previous studies (Hornsby and Kuratko, 
1990; Atkinson and Meager, 1994). In turn, the presence of such a department or man-
ager will have a positive impact on the application of high performance HRM practices 
(this relationship will be elaborated at the end of this section).  
Large firms may benefit from scale effects in the usage of high performance HRM prac-
tices, even when an HRM department or HRM manager is absent. This suggest that firm 
size also has a direct effect on the usage of high performance HRM practices.  
Furthermore, most high performance HRM practices require considerable development 
costs (Klaas et al., 2000). This results in a cost advantage for larger firms, which is 
strengthened by the limited supply of financial resources of many small firms. Finally, 
requirements from external stakeholders will also differ between small and large firms: 
legislation is often differentiated by size class.  
These arguments are in line with a behavioral perspective on HRM practices: larger 
firms apply more high performance HRM practices than smaller firms, because larger 
firms benefit more from such practices than smaller firms would. In contrast, the best 
practice approach suggests that high performance HRM practices are equally beneficial 
for small and large firms. The usage of such practices may be lower for smaller firms 
than for larger firms, if small firms are more bounded in their rationality.  
To conclude, we hypothesize the existence of a direct effect of firm size on the usage of 
high performance HRM practices, as well as an indirect effect through the presence of 
an HRM department or manager. The relationship between the presence of an HRM de-
partment and high performance HRM practices is discussed at the end of this section; 
here, we state the first hypothesis of this chapter as follows:  
H4.1: Firm size is positively related with the usage of high performance HRM 
practices and the probability of having an HRM department or HRM manager. 
Business plan 
The availability of a business plan can be interpreted as a characteristic of organizations 
with a relatively long planning horizon. These firms will be more aware of the need to 
use specific HRM practices to build a competent employee base, implying a relatively 
high perceived value of HRM practices by the CEO. In addition, the availability of a 
business plan may be seen as an indicator for enterprises that have a relatively high de-
gree of formalization. Both cases support the following hypothesis:  
H4.2: Organizations with a business plan are more likely to apply high perform-
ance HRM practices and are more likely to have an HRM department or HRM 
manager. 
Export  
Growth-oriented strategies may result in a greater emphasis on professional HRM de-
velopment (De Kok and Uhlaner, 2001; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988). Tha-Chapter 4 
58 
kur (1998) concludes in a case-based research study of several Indian establishments 
that companies with a goal of new venture growth tend to have more professional HRM 
practices. Matthews and Scott (1995) find in a study of 130 small firms that entrepre-
neurial firms (defined as those aiming at higher growth) engage in more sophisticated 
planning than small firms in general; although they find that as the perception of envi-
ronmental uncertainty increases, strategic and operational planning decrease. Exporters 
by definition are aiming for growth growth by seeking new markets outside the bounda-
ries of their own countries. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H4.3: Organizations that export are more likely to apply high performance HRM 
practices and are more likely to have an HRM department or HRM manager. 
In addition, exporting may indicate a relatively long planning horizon of the organiza-
tion. Exporting often involves additional administrative burdens and getting acquainted 
with legal and other requirements in other countries. The willingness to overcome these 
specific difficulties and start-up costs suggests a relatively long planning horizon, which 
can lead to an increased awareness of the importance of HRM. 
Franchise 
We posit that a franchise organization can help the franchisees to reduce the transaction 
costs associated with development of more formalized HRM practices. Franchisees may 
gain access to relevant HRM programs from the larger franchiser. This lowers the de-
velopment costs.  
H4.4: Franchisees are more likely to apply high performance HRM practices 
than non-franchisees. 
We do not hypothesize a relationship with the probability that an HRM department or 
manager is present. On the one hand, the expectations of franchisors may stimulate 
franchisees to install an HRM department. On the other hand, the availability of external 
HRM expertise with the franchisor may reduce the need for a separate HRM department 
with the franchisee.  
Family ownership 
Family ownership implies, that the selection of the CEO is not (solely) based on his or 
her skills to manage a small or medium-sized enterprise. Consequently, the management 
of a family-owned business is less likely to have the necessary management skills, and 
more specifically to have knowledge on (the benefits of) high performance HRM prac-
tices. Also, family ownership is associated with a desire to remain independent and keep 
full control over the organization (Blais and Toulouse, 1990; Bacon et al., 1996). Case-
studies suggest that employers often associate high performance HRM practices with a 
loss of control over (and flexibility of) the employee relations (Koch and De Kok, 
1999).  
These arguments suggest that the perceived value of HRM practices may be relatively 
low for CEO’s of family-owned business. This results in the following hypothesis:  
H4.5: Family businesses are less likely to apply high performance HRM practices 
and are less likely to have an HRM department or HRM manager. High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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Unionization 
For the US, several studies have found relations between unionization and HRM prac-
tices with medium-sized enterprises (Deshpande and Flanagan, 1995; Flanagan and 
Deshpande, 1996; Ng and Maki, 1993). For the Netherlands, such a relationship is not 
likely to exist. This is due to the institutional context, which has a profound influence on 
the shape of human resource management (Boselie et al., 2001). For example, approxi-
mately 800 collective labour agreements (CLAs) have been signed in the Netherlands, 
which frequently contain requirements for high performance HRM practices (Rojer and 
Pulleman, 2000). Whether or not a small firm falls under a specific CLA is independent 
of the unionization degree. In addition, every organization with more than 50 employees 
is legally obliged to install a works council, which has various legal rights. Conse-
quently, we have no clear-cut idea about the impact of the degree of unionization on the 
usage of high performance HRM practices in Dutch firms, and therefore do not specify 
a hypothesis. 
HRM department 
The presence of an HRM department or HRM manager may be associated with a higher 
level of relevant knowledge and experience in HRM practices, which decreases the 
costs of carrying out those practices. In addition, once an HRM department is available, 
certain fixed costs have been made. Consequently, the (marginal) costs of developing 
and /or applying more formal HRM practices are lower. Also, HRM professionals may 
be biased in favor of formal HRM practices because this enhances their status within the 
organization (Ng and Maki, 1993). Our final hypothesis is therefore:  
H4.6: Organizations with an HRM department or HRM manager are more likely 
to apply high performance HRM practices.  
4.4 Research  method 
We use logistic and ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions to test the formulated hy-
potheses. Logistic regressions are used to examine determinants of the probability that 
organizations have an HRM department or HRM manager, and OLS is used to examine 
which independent variables are related to the usage of high performance HRM prac-
tices. The analysis results are presented in the following section. This section discusses 
the collection of the necessary data, and the variables used in the analyses.  
4.4.1  Sample and data collection 
Data has been collected by means of a written questionnaire, sent to Dutch small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The questionnaire has originally been developed by the Uni-
versity of Southern Queensland, Australia (Wiesner and McDonald, 2001). A first ver-
sion of the questionnaire has been submitted to a sample of 70 Australian SMEs, 31 of 
which responded. The results of this pilot have been used to modify the questionnaire. 
Subsequently, it has been submitted to several senior academics on HRM for their 
comments. The revised questionnaire has been translated and controlled by Dutch HRM 
researchers and practitioners. Chapter 4 
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A stratified sample plan is used, distinguishing six sectors (manufacturing, construction, 
trade and repairs, catering, transport and communication, services) and three size classes 
(20-49 employees, 50-99 employees and 100-199 employees). 4000 questionnaires have 
been sent, addressed to the company’s CEOs. 736 questionnaires were received, 52% of 
which has been answered by the CEO, 33% by an employee directly answering to the 
CEO. With 18%, the response rate of our survey is higher than those mentioned by Koch 
and McGrath (1996) (6.5%) and Heneman and Berkley (1999) (12%), but lower than for 
example those reported by Huselid (1995) (28%) and Golhar and Deshpande (1997) 
(52%).  
Not all respondents fall within the stratified size classes. 100 Enterprises have either less 
than 20 employees, or 200 or more. To avoid the loss of 100 observations, we have de-
cided to apply the Small Business Administration definition of SMEs (Flanagan and 
Deshpande, 1996), and include all enterprises with 1 to 500 employees in our analysis. 
In Table 4.1, the firms that are included in our analysis are described by sector and size 
class. 
Table 4.1  Sampled enterprises, by sector and size class 
  Size class (number of employees) 
Sector  1-20  21-50 51-100  101-200 201-500 Total 
Manufacturing and construction  10  69  86  67  11  243 
Trade and repairs   6  24  32  21  6  89 
Transport, communication and services  31  91  97  57  15  291 
Other  3  16  28 22  3 72 
Total  50  200  243 167  35 695 
With such relatively low response rates, sample selection bias may become a problem. 
To check for sample selection bias by size and sector, we compare the response rates for 
the 18 strata of our sample. For 10 strata, the response rate lies between 16% and 20%. 
The two largest response rates are 27% and 22%, the two lowest are 14%. This suggests 
that there is no serious sample selection bias by size or sector. Whether selection is bi-
ased by the respondent’s attitude towards HRM cannot be determined.  
The questionnaire contained, amongst others, 12 items on recruitment practices, 12 
items on selection methods and procedures, 12 items on compensation, 14 items on 
training and development and 8 items on appraisal. Each of these items is measured on a 
3-point scale (no, for some vacancies/jobs, for all vacancies/jobs). A list of all items can 
be found in appendix 4.1. 
4.4.2 Measures 
Scales on the application of high performance HRM practices 
We have developed a single scale on high performance HRM practices that represent 
the usage of such practices: the more high performance HRM practices are used, the 
higher the score on the HRM scale. The rationale for this scale is based upon previous 
studies, which suggest a positive relationship between this scale and various perform-
ance measures (Guest, 1997). In addition, separate scales measure the usage of high per-
formance HRM practices for specific categories of HRM practices. This allows us to de-High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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termine the correlation between the usage of high performance HRM practices of vari-
ous categories, and to examine if the relationship between firm size and the usage of 
high performance HRM practices differs between categories. The following categories 
are included: recruitment, selection, compensation, training & development and ap-
praisal. 
The items on the various HRM practices are combined to construct a separate scale for 
each category. More specifically, each scale is defined as the average score of a selec-
tion of the available items
19. The selected items all represent high performance HRM 
practices, hence the scale is interpreted as an indicator of the number of high perform-
ance HRM practices in that specific HRM category that are applied within the enter-
prise. To determine the reliability of these scales, Cronbach’s alpha is calculated for the 
selected items. In addition, factor analysis is performed on all items, and the correlation 
between the main factor(s) and the scale is calculated
20. The average scores, percentiles 
and reliabilities of all scales are presented in Table 4.2.  












Score          
Mean 1.6  2.0  1.8  1.7  2.0 
10% percentile  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.0  1.3 
90% percentile  2.0  2.8  2.2  2.3  2.7 
Reliability          
Cronbach’s alpha  .62  .69  .64  .81  .43 
Correlation PCA factor  .94  .85 a .97  .93  .91 
Valid observations  533  619  621  669  598 
  a:   Principal Component Analysis (PCA) identified more than 1 factor. The table presents the 
correlation with the factor that has the highest correlation with the scale. 
  note: all scales are defined on the interval [1,3]. 
For four of the five scales, Cronbach’s alpha exceeds .60 (Table 4.2). According to cri-
teria proposed by Nunnaly (1967)
21, the reliability for these scales is acceptable for an 
explorative study. The reliabilities of these scales are comparable with those reported by 
e.g. Huselid (1995) an Delery and Doty (1996). The exception is appraisal. With a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .43, the reliability of this scale is unsatisfactory. Given the impor-
tance of this scale, we nevertheless decide to include it in this chapter. 
 
19 The selected items are discussed in appendix 4.1. 
20 Three different methods of factor analysis have been applied: a principal component analysis 
(PCA), a principal axis analysis and a categorical PCA (which explicitly takes account of the or-
dinal nature of the items). We report only the correlations with the PCA factor, but the correla-
tions with the factors determined according to the other methods are nearly identical. 
21  For early stages of basic research, Nunnally (1967) suggested that a Cronbach’s alpha between .5 
and .6 would be sufficient. Later on, Nunnally (1978) suggested a lower boundary of .7. Chapter 4 
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None of the scales can be calculated for all firms. This introduces the risk of a selection 
bias. To determine whether such a bias may occur, we examine for each scale whether 
the respondents to that scale significantly different in their average scores on a number 
of variables compared to the non-respondents
22. No significant differences in firm size 
are found between respondents and non-respondents. What does matter, is the position 
of the respondent within the organization. For CEO’s, the response rate is significantly 
lower than for other respondents
23. This holds for all scales, with the exception of the 
recruitment scale. A possible explanation for this finding is that the CEO takes less time 
to fill in the complete questionnaire. 
In addition, if the questionnaire is answered by the CEO, the average score on HRM 
scales is relatively low. The differences are however small, and only significant (at a 5% 
confidence level) for recruitment, selection, and training and development. It is not clear 
whether this represents a “genuine” CEO effect, since the probability that the question-
naire is filled in by the CEO decreases with firm size. The position of the respondent 
will therefore be included as a control variable in the regressions. 
An overall HRM scale 
The overall HRM scale is calculated as an unweighted average of the underlying scales 
for the separate HRM categories. The resulting overall HRM scale is defined for 519 
enterprises. A Cronbach’s Alpha of .78 suggests that this is a reliable scale. The re-
sponse rate for this overall HRM scale is significantly lower for smaller firms, for 
CEO’s, and for members of a franchise organization.  
HRM department 
Firms were asked whether an HRM department and an HRM manager were present. 
These questions have been used to construct a variable “HRM department”. This vari-
able indicates whether an HRM department or an HRM manager is present.  
Independent variables 
The independent variables used in this chapter are presented in Table 4.3. In addition to 
the variables discussed in the previous section, we also include information on organiza-
tional age and sector to control for possible effects these variables may have. 
 
22 These control variables are size, sector, current working position of the respondent, location of 
the firm, current tenure of the respondent, whether the respondent is (part) owner, whether the 
company is owned by a family, whether the enterprise is member of a franchise organization, if a 
business plan is available, and the respondent’s gender. 
23 The response rate is also lower if the respondent has a long tenure with the firm, or is (part) 
owner of the firm. Since ownership, tenure and being CEO are strongly related with each other, 
these differences in response rate are interpreted as confirmations of the CEO-effect. High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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Table 4.3  Independent variables 
Variable name  Definition 
Size  Log (number of employees), including employees with temporary contracts; 
no correction for part-time work 
Business plan
 a  A formal business plan or strategic plan exists 
Export
 a Enterprise  exports 
Franchise
 a  Enterprise is part of a franchise organization 
Family
 a  Family business, defined as both owned and managed by member(s) of one 
family 
Unionization  % of employees that is member of a union (classified into 7 categories) 
Union member
 a  At least one employee is member of a union 
Age  Log (age of enterprise)  
Service
 a  Enterprise is (mainly) active in transport and communications, catering, finan-
cial services, business services or other services 
Trade
 a  Enterprise is (mainly) active in wholesale, retail or repairs sector 
Manufacturing a   Enterprise is (mainly) active in manufacturing or construction sector  
a: dummy variable (0=no, 1=yes). 
4.5 Results 
We now turn towards the results of our analysis. After a discussion of the correlations, 
multivariate analyses are used to test the hypotheses presented section 4.3.  
4.5.1 Correlation  analysis 
All correlations between the dependent variables are significantly positive (Table 4.4). 
The overall HRM scale is strongly correlated with the various scales on the individual 
HRM categories. The correlations between the various HRM scales (excluding the 
overall HRM scale) do not, however, exceed .55. This suggests that it is worthwhile to 
examine these scales individually, instead of limiting ourselves to the overall HRM 
scale. Correlations between independent variables do not exceed .35, with the exception 
of the correlations between the sector dummies, and between union membership and un-
ionization (Table 4.5). The latter two variables are both indicators of the unionization 
within organizations, which explains the high correlation between them.  
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Table 4.4  Correlations between dependent variables (HRM scales and HRM department) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Recruitment  1  1       
Selection  2  .45  1      
Compensation  3  .43  .42  1     
Training & development  4  .52  .51  .38  1       
Appraisal  5  .33 .43 .37 .43  1     
Overall  HRM  scale  6  .70 .79 .68 .78 .72  1   
HRM  department  7  .40 .38 .26 .33 .22 .43  1 
note: all correlations are significant at 1% confidence level. 
Firm size is correlated with most independent variables. Smaller enterprises are more 
likely to be family owned and managed, and to be found in the service sector. Larger 
enterprises are older, more likely to have a business plan, have on average a higher de-
gree of unionization, and are more likely to export.  
Table 4.5  Correlations between independent variables 
    1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10  11 
S i z e   1   1             
Business plan a  2    .25**  1           
Export a    3    .10**    .06  1          
Franchise a  4  -.01  -.00  -.11**  1         
Family a  5  -.27**  -.24**  -.08*    .05  1        
Unionization  6    .13**    .07    .09*  -.10**  -.03  1      
Union member a  7   .14**   .03   .09*  -.04  -.02   .62**  1         
Age  8   .11**  -.03   .06  -.20**   .06   .17**   .16**  1       
Service a  9  -.11**  -.02  -.32**   .03   .00  -.19**  -.14**  -13**  1     
Trade a  10   .00  -.03   .09*   .17**  -.00  -.16**  -.07   .05  -.33**  1   
Manufacturing a  11   .08*   .04   .25**  -.12**   .01   .29**   .17**   .07  -.62**  -.28**  1 
*:   significant at 5% level. 
**:  significant at 1% level. 
a:   dummy variable. The relationship between two nominal variables is measured by the Phi coef-
ficient. For dummy variables, the Phi coefficient is identical to Pearson’s correlation. 
Fisher’s exact test is used to test for dependency between two dummy variables. 
In hypothesis H4.6, the presence of an HRM department is an explanatory variable. 
Correlations between the variable “HRM department” and the independent variables are 
presented in appendix 4.2. The presence of an HRM department is especially correlated 
with firm size (.41) and family business (-.29). Family businesses are less likely to have 
an HRM department, as are smaller organizations. Since family owned businesses tend 
to be smaller, simple bivariate correlations do not suffice to determine whether the pres-
ence of an HRM department is determined especially by family ownership, or by other 
size-related variables. Multivariate analyses are needed to answer this question.  High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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4.5.2  Determinants of the probability of having an HRM department 
According to hypotheses H4.1, H4.2, H4.3 and H4.5, the presence of an HRM depart-
ment is related with firm size, the availability of a business plan, export, and family 
ownership. To put these hypotheses to the test, logistic regression equations have been 
estimated, with the probability of having an HRM department as the independent vari-
able. A full version of the regression equation included all independent variables
24. Ac-
cording to the regression results, the variables franchise, union member, age, export, 
trade and manufacturing were not related to the presence of an HRM department
25. The 
regression equation has therefore been reestimated, including only size, business plan 
and family ownership (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6  Results of logistic regression on probability that HRM department is present 
Variable HRM  department  d 
Size  1.11**   
Business plan   .44*   
Family   -.75**   
   
Goodness of fit measures   
% predicted correctly a 69.8 
R² (Nagelkerke)  .27 
Chi² test for model parsimony b 10.96  (.09) 
Chi² test for model fit c  136** (.00)  
Valid observations  615 
*:   significant at 5% level. 
**: significant at 1% level. 
a:  the reference value is 54,8%: the share of firms in the sample with an HRM department. 
b:   test for the joint hypothesis that the parameters for franchise, union member, age, export, ser-
vice and trade are equal to zero. Probability value between parenthesis. 
c:   test for the hypothesis that all included parameters (except constant) are equal to zero. Prob-
ability value between parenthesis. 
d:   the significance of the parameters is based upon both Wald statistics and Likelihood Ratio 
test statistics. Both test statistics lead to the same conclusions. A constant term has been esti-
mated, but is not included in the table. 
The regression results indicate that hypotheses H4.1, H4.2 and H4.5 are accepted. Both 
smaller firms and family owned and managed organizations are, ceteris paribus, less 
likely to have an HRM department. The availability of a business plan is associated with 
an increased probability of having an HRM department. Whether an organization ex-
ports or not, is not related to the presence of an HRM department; hypothesis H4.3 is 
not accepted. No specific hypothesis regarding franchise organizations and unionization 
 
24 Where the degree of unionisation is represented by the variable union member. In addition, re-
gressions included a dummy variable indicating the position of the respondent (owner/manager 
or not), to control for a possible answer bias. This control variable had no significant impact in 
any of the regression equations discussed in this section. 
25 A chi
2 test for model parsimony cannot reject the joint hypothesis that the parameters of the 
excluded variables do no differ significantly from zero. Chapter 4 
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has been made. The results of our analysis indicates that the presence of an HRM de-
partment is independent of any association with a franchise organization, and of the de-
gree of unionization. 
4.5.3  Determinants of the application of high performance HRM practices 
A regression of firm size on the various HRM scales results in significant positive rela-
tionships (Table 4.7). The size of these relationships differs between the HRM scales. 
The strongest relationship can be found between firm size and the scale on high per-
formance training & development practices, the weakest relationships between firm size 
and the scales on high performance compensation and appraisal practices.  



























Adjusted R²   .16  .09  .03  .15  .04  .15 
Valid obser-
vations  474 545  548  582 529  461 
*:   significant at 5% level. 
**:   significant at 1% level. 
note: reported parameter estimates include standard errors (between parenthesis); a constant 
term has been estimated, but is not included in the table. 
Once the other independent variables are included (Table 4.8), the strength of the rela-
tionship between firm size and the HRM scales decreases. The relative differences be-
tween the HRM scales remain intact: firm size has the strongest impact on the training 
& development scale, and the weakest impact on the compensation and appraisal scales. 
The relationship between firm size and these two scales is not even significant, which 
rejects hypothesis H4.1 for the compensation and appraisal scales. Indirectly, however, 
these scales are still related with firm size: firm size is positively related with the prob-
ability than an HRM department is present, which in turn stimulates the usage of high 
performance HRM practices for all HRM categories. 
With the exception of recruitment, the availability of a business plan has a positive ef-
fect on the usage of high performance HRM practices. Hypothesis H4.2 is therefore ac-
cepted for all scales, except recruitment. Exporting firms apply relatively many high 
performance recruitment and selection practices, but no difference is found regarding 
the usage of high performance practices regarding compensation, training & develop-
ment and appraisal. Hypothesis H4.3 is nevertheless accepted for the overall HRM 
scale. Hypothesis H4.4 is rejected for all scales but one. Franchise organizations appar-
ently stimulate the training and development of the personnel of their franchisees, but 
do not encourage the application of high performance HRM practices in other HRM 
categories. Family businesses are less likely to apply high performance HRM practices, 
even if we control for firm size and the availability of an HRM department. This is in 
accordance with hypothesis H4.4. 
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8.8   
(.55) 
12.7    
(.24) 
Valid observa-
tions  474 545  548  582 529  461 
  *:   significant at 5% level. 
  **:   significant at 1% level. 
a:   Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality of the residuals. Reported significance level based 
on the Lilliefors significance correction. 
  b:   Breusch-Pagan test statistic for homoscedasticity, following a chi-squared(10) distribution. 
  note: reported parameter estimates include standard errors (between parenthesis), reported 
goodness of fit measures include probability values (between parenthesis); a constant term 
has been estimated, but is not included in the table. 
The presence of an HRM department is expected to have a positive relationship with the 
usage of high performance HRM practices (hypothesis H4.6). This hypothesis is ac-
cepted for all scales, and the magnitude of this relationship is similar for all scales (with Chapter 4 
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the exception of selection)
26. The relationship between the presence of an HRM depart-
ment and the usage of high performance HRM practices partly reflects indirect effects 
of firm size, family ownership and the availability of a business plan (Table 4.6). We 
may therefore expect that a re-estimation without the variable “HRM department” will 
increase the parameter estimates for the variables firm size, family and business plan. 
This is indeed the case. This suggests that part of the impact of family ownership and 
firm size on high performance HRM practices is channeled through the presence of an 
HRM department or HRM manager. 
We have not formulated a specific hypothesis on the impact of unionization. The results 
from Table 4.8 tell us, that unionization has a limited negative effect on the usage of 
high performance recruitment and compensation practices. The negative relationship 
with compensation could indicate a reluctance of union members towards performance 
based compensation schemes. A higher degree of unionization could correspond to a 
higher share of union members in the workers council, which could in turn influence 
management’s decisions regarding the nature of the compensation scheme. The degree 
of unionization has, however, no significant effect on the overall usage of high perform-
ance HRM practices.  
The remaining independent variables are not related to overall usage of high perform-
ance HRM practices. Elder organizations seem to apply relatively more high perform-
ance selection procedures than younger enterprises, but otherwise, organizational age is 
not related with the usage of high performance HRM practices. Sectoral differences are 
found for recruitment, compensation and training and development practices.  
Outliers 
Generally speaking, firms with an HRM department make more use of high perform-
ance HRM practices. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. On the one hand, 
some firms without an HRM department use relatively many high performance HRM 
practices. And, on the other hand, several firms with an HRM department make rela-
tively little use of such practices. To test these “outliers” for common characteristics, we 
have defined two outlier categories, “high” and “low”. The category “high” contains 21 
firms without an HRM department, whose score on the overall HRM scale lies within 
the highest quartile. Similarly, the category “low” consists of 38 enterprises with an 
HRM department, whose score on the overall HRM scale lies within the lowest quartile.  
Logit regressions are performed to examine which, if any, of our independent variables, 
determines the classification of these outliers (Table 4.9). Generally speaking, logit re-
gressions are not suitable if less than 20% of the population belongs to the category of 
interest. In this case, however, the logit analysis results in significant parameter esti-
mates. For both models, chi² tests for model fit reject the hypothesis that all model pa-
rameters are zero.  
The outliers are not characterized by their size. Family ownership and management in-
creases the possibility of being a “low” outlier, while manufacturing and construction 
 
26  We cannot be sure that this represents a causal relationship; it could also indicate the impact of a 
specific HRM strategy on both the availability of an HRM department and on the formality of 
HRM practices. High performance HRM practices in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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companies are relatively less likely to belong to this category. At the other end of the 
spectrum, several of the organizations classified as “high” outliers report that they ex-
port. We have controlled for a respondent bias: if the respondent is owner/manager the 
organization is more likely to be classified as “high”. The inclusion of the respondent’s 
position in our analysis does, however, not alter our conclusions. Bivariate comparisons 
of the variables involved support these results. The average firm size does not differ 
significantly between the outliers and the rest of the sample. And Fisher’s exact test sta-
tistics confirm the relations between family ownership, manufacturing and the “low” 
outliers, and between export and the “high” outliers.  
The outlier analysis confirms some of our previous findings. Family businesses are less 
likely to have an HRM department, but after we correct for the impact of HRM depart-
ment on the usage of high performance HRM practices, there still exists a negative ef-
fect of family business on high performance HRM practices. On the other hand, firms 
that export apply relatively many high performance HRM practices, even though ex-
porting is not related to the presence of an HRM department. These findings are consis-
tent with the relations between family business, export and the probability of being an 
outlier. 
Table 4.9  Results of logistic regressions on outliers (low and high)  
 Outliers   
 Low  High 
Family   .85*   
Manufacturing -1.27**   
Export   1.12*   
    
Goodness of fit measures:      
% predicted correctly
a 92%  96% 
R² (Nagelkerke)  .07  .04 
Chi² test for model parsimony
b  9.6 (.21)  11.8 (.16) 
Chi² test for model fit
c  14.2 (.00)  5.64 (.02) 
Valid observations  466  466 
*:   significant at 5% level. 
**:   significant at 1% level. 
a:   the reference values are 92% and 96% respectively: the share of firms that are classified as 
“low” and “high” respectivel. 
b:   test for the joint hypothesis that the parameters for all independent variables not included 
in the model are equal to zero. Probability value between parenthesis. 
c:   test for the hypothesis that all included parameters (except constant) are equal to zero. 
Probability value between parenthesis. 
note: a constant term has been estimated, but is not included in the table. the significance of the 
parameters is based upon both Wald statistics and Likelihood Ratio test statistics. Both test 
statistics lead to the same conclusions. 
4.6 Discussion   
The results presented in this chapter are in line with previous research. The positive re-
lationship between firm size and high performance HRM practices has been demon-
strated before, amongst others by Barron et al. (1987). They estimate regression equa-Chapter 4 
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tions, and find that smaller firms pay less attention to high performance recruitment and 
training practices. They do not, however, correct for contextual variables. Only one ex-
planation is offered for the firm size effect: larger firms are hypothesized to have higher 
employee monitoring costs, which prompts them to increase the capital intensity of their 
production process and stimulate long tenure. Although this may partly explain the size 
effects, differences in monitoring costs are just one of many possible explanations.  
The explanations offered in this chapter explain at least half of the size effect of the us-
age of high performance HRM practices: for the overall HRM scale, the introduction of 
the contextual determinants in the regression equation has almost halved the impact of 
firm size, and more than doubled the explained variance
27. The main contextual deter-
minants are the presence of an HRM department or manager, the availability of a busi-
ness plan, and whether or not the business is family owned and managed.   
With the exception of training and development practices, the application of high per-
formance HRM practices is independent of being a franchisee or not. In addition, fran-
chisees are just as likely to have an HRM department or HRM manager as other small 
and medium-sized organizations. This confirms the findings from the previous chapter 
on the relationship between being associated with other (larger) organizations and HRM 
practices.  
Deshpande and Flanagan (1995), Flanagan and Deshpande (1993) and Ng and Maki 
(1993) conclude that the degree of unionization in U.S. and Canadian enterprises is an 
important determinant of HRM practices with medium-sized enterprises. For the Neth-
erlands, we find only partial support for such relations: the degree of unionization is 
negatively related to the usage of high performance recruitment and compensation prac-
tices. These differences may be due to differences in national legislation (Boselie et al., 
2001). 
Organizational age and the usage of high performance HRM practices do not seem to be 
closely related. Only for selection practices do we find a positive relationship between 
organizational age and high performance HRM practices. This conclusion is comparable 
to the results by Heneman and Berkley (1999), who examine determinants of the out-
comes of recruitment and selection practices. Four different outcome indicators are dis-
tinguished in their study, and organizational age is related to only one of these. Delery 
and Doty (1996) include organizational age as a control variable, and find that it is cor-
related with three of the seven distinguished HRM practices. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine and explain differences in the usage 
of high performance HRM practices within small firms. We have presented a frame-
work on contextual determinants of HRM practices, which we use to derive and test six 
hypotheses regarding determinants of both the presence of an HRM department or an 
HRM manager, and the usage of high performance HRM practices.  
 
27 As measured by the adjusted R
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We find that, within this sample of small firms, larger firms make more use of high per-
formance HRM practices than smaller firms do. This firm size effect may be due to un-
measured differences in the degree of centralization, standardization and specialization 
between small and large firms. Firm size is often used as an indicator for these structural 
dimensions, and firm size effects are interpreted as a sign for the relevance of these di-
mensions. We find, however, that at least half of the firm size effect in our sample can 
be explained by contextual dimensions. Once we take certain contextual determinants 
into account, the firm size effect becomes substantially less, and even insignificant for 
the usage of high performance compensation and appraisal practices. Family owned and 
managed organizations apply less high performance HRM practices, as do businesses 
without a business plan. These businesses are also less likely to have an HRM depart-
ment or HRM manager. The presence of an HRM department or manager is related to 
an increased usage of high performance HRM, which implies that firm size, family 
business and the availability of a business plan are both directly and indirectly related to 
the usage of high performance HRM practices.  
According to contingency theories of HRM, the impact of high performance HRM prac-
tices on firm performance will depend on various contingency variables. Although we 
have examined the role of firm size and other contextual determinants, we cannot con-
clude whether these variables are important contingency variables. This would require 
an empirical investigation into the relationship between high performance HRM prac-
tices and firm performance. 
Ownership seems to be an unlikely contingency variable; it is unlikely that the impact of 
high performance HRM practices on firm performance depends, ceteris paribus, on 
whether or not a business is owned and managed by members of a single family. The 
relevance of family business is more likely to reflect differences in goals, attitudes and 
abilities of the management of the enterprise.  
The number of employees is a more likely contingency variable. While larger firms may 
benefit from an increased usage of high performance HRM practices, small firms may 
actually benefit from more informal HRM practices. Large firms are more likely to stan-
dardize their tasks, and formalization of HRM practices will allow them to be more 
efficient in recruiting, selecting and maintaining employees with the right qualifications 
for given tasks and positions. Small firms, on the other hand, could create jobs around 
the unique experience, knowledge, skills, and interests of both incumbent and newly 
hired employees, which requires a more flexible and less formalized HRM (Hill and 
Stewart, 1999). This strategy is also called “serendipitous” job design (Lado and Wil-
son, 1994).  
Different explanations have been discussed to support our hypotheses, referring to dif-
ferent perspectives on organizational behavior. These explanations are reflected by the 
intermediary variables of our model: requirements from external stakeholders, demand 
and supply of resources, and the perceived value of HRM practices by the CEO. The 
relative importance of the various explanations cannot be established, since no informa-
tion on these intermediary variables is available. In addition, we cannot answer the 
question whether the firm size differences reflect differences in optimal HRM practices, 
or that smaller firms are more likely to make suboptimal differences due to a more 
bounded rationality. To answer this question, future research is needed to examine rela-
tions between HRM practices and performance for small firms, using firm size as a con-
tingency variable. 
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Appendix 4.1:  Scales on high performance HRM practices 
This appendix provides additional information on the HRM scales that are used in this 
chapter. The HRM scales are based on the available items in the questionnaire. Each of 
these items is measured on a 3-point scale (no, for some vacancies/jobs, for all vacan-
cies/jobs). For each HRM scale, the scope of the available items is discussed by com-
paring the items with high performance HRM practices discussed in descriptive studies 
on HRM. We use Sisson (1994) as a reference regarding recruitment, selection, com-
pensation and appraisal practices. We indicate which items are used in the definition of 
each scale, and discuss the correspondence with the results of factor analysis on all 
items. Three different methods of factor analysis have been applied: a principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA), a principal axis analysis and a categorical PCA (which explicitly 
takes account of the ordinal nature of the items). The outcomes of these analyses are 
almost identical; in this appendix, we only report the PCA results. 
Recruitment 
Firms are asked about the usage of various channels to recruit new employees. The 
items in the questionnaire include all relevant recruitment channels for external recruit-
ment that are discussed in Sisson (1994). Internal recruitment is excluded from our re-
search (Table 4.10).  
The recruitment scale is defined as the average score on seven selected items, for those 
firms that answered at least 6 of the 7 items. Both factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha 
indicated that the most often used recruitment channel (newspapers) should not be in-
cluded in this scale. Various items in the scale have a low response rate (130-180 miss-
ing values). This results in a low response rate for the recruitment scale: it is defined for 
only 533 firms, by far the lowest response for all scales. 
Table 4.10  Recruitment items in questionnaire 
Item  Used in scale  Factor matrix factor 1 
Recruitment and selection office  x  0.60 
Temporary employment agencies  x  0.42 
Magazines x  0.58 
Internet x  0.63 
Referrals by employees  x  0.47 
References from other sources  x  0.47 
Open house  x  0.50 
Newspaper    
Government employment agency     
Radio    
Television    
Direct mail      
Cronbach’s Alpha (only for the scale)  0.62   
Eigenvalue (only for the factor)    2.43 
valid observations  533  502 
note: factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported. Appendix 4.1 
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PCA on the available items results in four independent factors with an eigenvalue larger 
than 1. A scree plot of the eigenvalues suggests, however, only one factor. Factor load-
ings of .4 and larger are reported in Table 4.10 
Selection 
Firms are asked about the selection procedures, and the involvement of managers and 
employees in the selection decision. We focus on the selection procedures for new em-
ployees. These selection procedures include the collecting and ordering of data, opin-
ions and inferences on which the decision will be based. Sisson (1994) mentions six 
methods of collecting information about candidates. Four of these are included in the 
questionnaire; only letters of application and assessment centers are not included. The 
most important sources for the final decision, references and interviews (Sisson, 1994, 
page 213), are included in our questionnaire (Table 4.11).  
Table 4.11  Selection items in questionnaire 
Item  Used in scale  Rotated factor matrix 
   1  2  3  4 
Items on selection procedures          
Use of written job descriptions  x  0.77       
Job analysis  x  0.72       
Psychological tests  x  0.62       
Interview panels  x    0.65     
Formal selection procedures    0.69       
One-on-one interviews       -0.88     
Application forms        0.56   
Checking up on references        0.75   
Informal selection procedures        0.59  0.50 
Items on selection decision          
Selection decision made by line man-
ager 
 0.45       
Other managers and employees have 
input in selection design 
       0.70 
Other employees have input in selec-
tion decision 
       0.67 
Cronbach’s Alpha (only for the scale)  0.69         
Eigenvalue (only for the factor)    2.56  1.40  1.33  1.51 
Valid observations  619  554  554  554  554 
note: a varimax rotation procedure has been used.  
note: factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported. 
A PCA confirms the difference between selection procedures and the selection decision. 
Four factors are identified with an eigenvalue of at least 1, of which three mainly refer 
to selection procedures, and one to the selection decision. Focusing on the factors that 
concern the selection procedures, the first factor included items that are correlated with 
what employers consider to be formal selection procedures. The second factor measures 
the preference of organizations for interview panels relative to one-on-one interviews. Scales on high performance HRM practices 
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The remaining items on selection procedures (the usage of application forms and check-
ing up on references) load on a factor which is related to what employers consider to be 
informal selection procedures.  
The selection scale is based on the first factor (the correlation between the scale and the 
first factor is 0.85). Since the usage of interview panels is considered to be a high per-
formance HRM practice, this item has been included in the scale. The item “formal se-
lection procedures” is excluded from the scale, because no definition of “formal selec-
tion procedures” was presented to the respondents. The item “selection decision made 
by line manager” has been removed, since we limit ourselves to the selection procedure. 
Compensation 
Sisson (1994) distinguishes three criteria on compensation decisions that are used in 
practice: behavioral traits of employees, skills and competences, and output. All of these 
criteria are included in our questionnaire.  
The compensation scale is defined as the average score on nine selected items, for those 
firms that answered at least 8 of the 9 items. PCA on the available items results in four 
independent factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1. A scree plot of the eigenvalues 
suggests, however, only one factor. Factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported in 
Table 4.12 
Table 4.12  Compensation items in questionnaire 
Item  Used in scale  Factor matrix factor 1 
Performance pay  x  0.43 
(Partly) based on job evaluation  x  0.54 
Competitive wages  x  0.50 
Wages based on acquired skills   x  0.54 
Group incentive programs  x  0.53 
Individual incentive programs  x  0.58 
Profit sharing  x  0.47 
Annual bonus  x  0.55 
Additional financial benefits, other than pensions 
(for example, insurance and savings arrangements)  
x 0.41 
Pay based on seniority     
Employee share schemes     
Salary structures used     
Cronbach’s Alpha (only for the scale)  0.64   
Eigenvalue (only for the factor)    2.56 
Valid observations  621  573 
note: factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported. 
Training and development 
The items on training and development include not only questions on firm-provided 
training, but also on the use of specific training tools (computer-aided instruction), on 
on-the-job training, and on coaching and mentoring of employees. We focus on charac-
teristics of firm-provided training programmes. Appendix 4.1 
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The scale is defined as the average score on seven selected items, for those firms that 
answered at least 6 of the 7 items. PCA on the available items results in three independ-
ent factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1. Again, a scree plot of the eigenvalues sug-
gests only one factor. Most items in the questionnaire have factor loadings of .4 and lar-
ger on this factor (Table 4.13). Items that are not related to firm-provided training (such 
as training on the job, specific training tools, mentorship and introduction of new career 
paths) are, however, excluded from the scale.  
Table 4.13  Training and development items in questionnaire 
Item  Used in scale  Factor matrix factor 1 
Training provided to employees    0.48 
Formal training budget available  x  0.62 
Recent introduction of formal training 
programs 
x 0.69 
Recent intensification of existing training 
programs 
x 0.68 
Formal in-house training by internal staff   x  0.57 
Formal in-house training by external staff  x  0.59 
External training   x  0.40 
Management and development training   x  0.65 
Technical and vocational training      
Informal training on the job    0.55 
Introduction of new career paths    0.70 
Informal mentorship    0.45 
Formal mentorship    0.47 
Computer-aided instructions    0.47 
Cronbach’s Alpha (only for the scale)  0.76   
Eigenvalue (only for the factor)    4.33 
Valid observations  598  531 
note: factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported. 
The original items in the questionnaire have only been answered by firms that provided 
training to their employees. To increase the number of valid observations, we have re-
coded missing values for the other items as “no”, for those firms that reported that no 
training was provided to their employees. This has added 72 valid observations to this 
scale, and increased Cronbach’s Alpha from 0.76 to 0.81. The item whether any training 
has been provided to employees is left out of the scale, since the answer to this item is 
now included in the answers to the other items (if all items included in the scale report 
“no”, the firm has not provided any training to their employees). 
Appraisal 
Appraisal “includes all those formal processes for observing, collecting, recording, and 
using information about the performance of staff in their jobs” (Sisson, 1994, page 230). 
Performance is typically appraised in one of three ways: trait scales, behavioral observa-
tion scales or objective outcome measures. Our questionnaire includes questions on rat-
ing scales and management by objectives, but no items on objective outcome measures. 
This category of HRM practices is least well covered in our questionnaire. Scales on high performance HRM practices 
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The appraisal scale is defined as the average score on three selected items. PCA on the 
available items results in two independent factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1. A 
scree plot of the eigenvalues suggests either one or two factors. Given the limited num-
ber of available items, the one-factor solution is preferred, and factor loadings of .4 and 
larger for the one-factor solution are reported in Table 4.14 
Table 4.14  Appraisal items in questionnaire 
Item  Used in scale  Factor matrix factor 1 
Rating scales  x  0.71 
Management by objectives  x  0.61 
Appraisal conducted by line manager  x  0.55 
Formal performance appraisal systems used    0.77 
Based on narrative essay by employees    0.43 
Appraisal conducted by employee    excluded a 
Appraisal conducted by employee’s colleagues    excluded a 
Informal performance appraisal     -0.01 
Cronbach’s Alpha (only for the scale)  0.43   
Eigenvalue (only for the factor)    1.96 
Valid observations  598  557 
a:   excluded from the analysis, due to a large number of missing observations (220). 
note: factor loadings of .4 and larger are reported. 
Overall HRM scale 
The overall HRM scale is calculated as an unweighted average of the underlying scales 
on high performance HRM practices. Other possibilities are to calculate the overall 
HRM scale by an unweighted average of the scores on the individual items, or using a 
principal axis factoring on the individual scales. Correlations between these scales and 
the scale presented here are .98. This implies that the overall HRM scale is very robust, 
in that the score on the overall HRM scale doesn’t depend on the exact methodology 
used to define the scale.  
A disadvantage of this method is the limited number of valid observations (411). To in-
crease the number of valid observations, the separate scales have been recalculated, al-
lowing for an (additional) missing item for each scale. This results in a further 108 valid 
observations. The factor scores for the adjusted HRM scales are reported in Table 4.15. Appendix 4.1 
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Table 4.15  The overall HRM scale defined 
HRM scale (adjusted)   Factor matrix factor 1 
Recruitment   0.75 
Selection 0.78 
Compensation 0.70 
Training and development  0.78 
Appraisal   0.68 
Cronbach’s Alpha (of the scale)  0.78 
Eigenvalue (of the factor)  2.72 
Valid observations (for both scale and factor)  519 
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Appendix  4.2:  Correlations between dependent and independent 
variables 
Table 4.16  Correlations between dependent and independent variables  














Size   .41**   .32**   .19**   .41**   .20**   .41**   .41** 
Business plan a   .21**   .34**  .23**   .34**   .20**   .35**   .22** 
Export a    .16**   .21**   .17**   .10*   .08   .19**   .12** 
Franchise a  -.04  -.06  -.06   .08*   .02   .03  -.06 
Family a  -.32** -.35**  -.26**  -.35**  -.22**  -.40**  -.29** 
Unionization  -.07   .12**  -.01   .09*   .01   .03   .05 
Union member a  -.01   .18**   .02   .06   .09*   .06   .10** 
Age  -.04   .10*   .00  -.02  -.07  -.03  -.01 
Service a   .05  -.07  -.17**  -.06   .03  -.06   .00 
Trade a  -.10* -.00   .00  -.02  -.02  -.04  -.03 
Manufacturing a  -.04   .06   .12**   .08  -.04   .06  -.03 
*:   significant at 5% level. 
**: significant at 1% level. 
a:  dummy variable. The relationship between two nominal variables is measured by the Phi 
coefficient. For dummy variables, the Phi coefficient is identical to Pearson’s correlation. 
Fisher’s exact test is used to test for dependency between two dummy variables. 
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Chapter 5: Absenteeism and precautionary actions  
5.1 Introduction   
Absenteeism results in considerable costs, both for individuals, firms and governments. 
For the EU member states, the total annual cost for medical care, daily allowances, and 
present and future compensation for cases of permanent disability and death is estimated 
at approximately 20 billion euro per year (Eurostat, 2000). For individual organizations, 
the main cost of absenteeism is due to production losses (and continued wage pay-
ments). For example, within the Dutch private sector, 5.5% of all working days in 2000 
were lost due to absenteeism
28. 
Absence spells are usually classified in one of the following three categories: certifi-
cated sickness absence, absence due to accidents and absence for other reasons (non-
certificated absences, strikes etc.)
29. Employees report absent either because they feel 
they are unable to work (due to sickness or accidents), or because they choose not to 
work (Brown and Sessions, 1996). Most economic studies focus on the latter explana-
tion; absenteeism is treated as a labour supply adjustment by employees. This chapter 
looks into the first explanation: absence due to sickness or accidents.  
Within the European Union, over 4.5 million accidents took place in 1996 that resulted 
in more than three days absence from work. A considerable number of these accidents 
was fatal: about 5500 people were killed in workplace accidents (Eurostat, 2000). Ac-
cording to the European Commission, absence due to sickness and accidents can be re-
duced by precautionary actions that improve working conditions (European Agency for 
Safety and Health at Work, 2000b). This chapter focuses on the possibility for individ-
ual firms to reduce absence due to sickness or accidents, by taking precautionary actions 
to improve working conditions.  
Recently, policy makers start to pay attention to absenteeism due to sickness and (occu-
pational) accidents. In the Netherlands, financial incentives have been introduced to 
stimulate enterprises to change their behaviour regarding prevention and reintegration of 
employees (Brouwers et al., 2000). The European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work has started an information campaign aimed at reducing the number of work-
related accidents (European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2000a). The focus 
of this campaign is on organizations with less than 50 employees. The reason for this 
focus is that the majority of all accidents
30 take place within this size class. These firms 
account for more than half
31 of total employment within the European Union (European 
Commission, 2000). Moreover, while the overall absenteeism rate is known to increase 
 
28 According to Statline, the on-site database from Statistics Netherlands, available at www.cbs.nl. 
29 A fourth category that is sometimes distinguished is absence on a legal or contractual basis. This 
includes absence due to annual leave, maternity leave, or death in the family (Boon, 2000; Prins, 
1990). This category is not related to the health status of employees, and usually ignored in stud-
ies on absenteeism. 
30 Resulting in absence spells of more than 3 days. 
31 53% in 1998. Chapter 5 
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with firm size (Boon, 2000), the individual risk of having an accident at work
32 is higher 
for establishments with less than 50 employees (Eurostat, 2000).  
Individual enterprises may implement precautionary actions to reduce the probability 
that individual employees become absent. The main benefit of such actions is related to 
the reduction in actual absence rates. This can be compared with the cost of implement-
ing precautionary actions. Often, firms are not aware of the actual benefits and costs, 
and will compare expected benefits and costs instead. These expected benefits and costs 
depend on many factors, including the actual absence level, current legislation and 
whether or not employers believe that working conditions within their firm are related 
to the absence level.  
In this chapter we examine which factors determine whether Dutch enterprises take pre-
cautionary actions. We focus on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), since the 
majority of accidents takes place within this size class. In section 5.2 we discuss various 
perspectives from which absenteeism may be studied, and the relationship between ab-
senteeism and precautionary actions. This information enables us to delineate the re-
search question of this chapter. Section 5.3 presents some facts on absenteeism with 
SMEs. In 5.4, six hypotheses are derived that characterize an organisation’s decision 
whether or not to take precautionary actions. These hypotheses are tested empirically; 
section 5.5 presents the research method, and the results are given in section 5.6. The 
main conclusion, which is included in section 5.7, is somewhat surprising: whether or 
not employers believe that the working conditions within their firm are related to the ab-
sence level, has no impact on the actual decision of those employers regarding precau-
tionary actions. 
5.2  Various perspectives on absenteeism 
Absenteeism has been studied from various perspectives. This section presents relevant 
findings from previous studies, both conceptually and empirically. At the end of this 
section, these findings are used to delineate the research question. 
5.2.1  A psychological and economic perspective on absenteeism 
Within studies of determinants of absence behaviour, two main perspectives can be dis-
tinguished: the economic and the psychological perspective (Barmby et al., 1991).  
Within the psychological literature, several explanatory models of absenteeism have 
been developed (Geurts, 1994). An influential model has been developed by Steers and 
Rhodes (1978). According to this model, attendance of employees is determined by the 
motivation to attend and the ability to attend. The ability to attend depends on the inci-
dence of illness and accidents, family responsibilities and transportation problems. The 
motivation to attend has however received most attention from this line of research. Job 
motivation, employee satisfaction and employee participation are considered to be im-
portant determinants of absenteeism (Boselie et al., 2001; Brooke and Price, 1989; 
Deery et al., 1995; Havlovic, 1991). 
 
32 Resulting in an absence spell of more than 3 days.   Absenteeism and precautionary actions 
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The same emphasis on the motivation to attend can be found within economic literature. 
Absenteeism is commonly treated as a deliberate labour supply adjustment of workers 
dissatisfied with the number of contracted working hours (Brown and Sessions, 1996; 
Yaniv, 1995). The main difference with the psychological literature is the focus on fi-
nancial arrangements to influence the motivation to attend. According to economic stud-
ies, absence levels can be partly explained by wages and sick pay schemes (Barmby et 
al., 1991; Barmby et al., 1994; Barmby et al., 2002; Kenyon and Dawkins, 1989).  
Recently, economists are paying attention to demand side factors also. Absenteeism 
may be more costly for some firms than for others, due to differences in production 
technologies and complementarities between workers. Consequently, firms for which 
absenteeism is more costly may offer higher wages. Coles and Treble (1996) establish 
an equilibrium framework in which firms who require better attendance rates at work 
pay higher wages, in order to reduce the absence level. Again, wages affect absenteeism 
levels, but in this framework firms take account of this behaviour and set their wages 
accordingly. 
Both approaches only consider working conditions, insofar as these may influence the 
motivation to attend. In this article we focus on precautionary measures, as a means to 
increase the ability to attend. 
5.2.2  An employee’s perspective on sickness absence behaviour 
In the case of sickness or accidents, the incidence and duration of absence spells de-
pends upon both the ability and the motivation to attend. An employee is confronted 
with a sequence of events and health or work-related decisions he or she has to make. 
This decision-making process has been examined by Prins (1990). His model of sick-
ness absence behaviour consists of four different roles that employees can assume
33:  
-  Healthy employee role. The individual’s constitution, and health problems ranging 
from minor ailments to serious disease, may be seen as the major determinant of an 
individual’s general state of health. Three factors can be discerned which can influ-
ence the state of health: personal conditions, living conditions and working condi-
tions (including occupational status, shift work, risk of accidents, social relations, 
and stress). 
-  Sick role. If the individual feels sick, he or she seeks and receives treatment to re-
store health or to stop the progression of the disease. 
-  Dependent patient role. This role starts with reporting sick and is in some countries 
formalised by certification of the work incapacity through medical evaluation. 
-  Permanent absence role. Most spells of sickness absence are completed by resump-
tion of the employee role. A minority of frequently or long term sick may (be forced 
to) substitute the dependent-patient role for the permanent absence role: a status as a 
disabled, unemployed or retired person.  
 
33 The labels “healthy employee role” and “permanent absence role” do not occur in the original 
study. Chapter 5 
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The decision to change from one role to another depends on specific thresholds: 
-  The sickness tolerance threshold. This standard defines whether and when the ex-
perience of symptoms makes the individual decide to assume the sick role with its 
role expectations (attempts to obtain diagnosis, treatment, and restoration of health).  
-  The absence tolerance threshold. This indicates when the individual (or his envi-
ronment) considers himself released from the duty to attend work. If this is the case, 
the sick role will be exchanged for the dependent patient role. If not, the individual 
accepts the health complaints and continues to attend to work.  
-  The work resumption threshold. This threshold indicates the conditions likely to 
terminate the dependent patient role and allow resumption of work. Alternatively the 
employee role is terminated and another branch of social security may be entered. 
5.2.3  Absenteeism and precautionary measures 
Absenteeism is known to be related with working conditions within organizations. Poor 
physical working conditions (such as an overexposure to heat, dust, gasses or noise, or 
unsafe working conditions) and ergonomic shortcomings are associated with higher ab-
sence rates (Geurts, 1994; Prins, 1990). The relationship between mental working 
conditions and absenteeism is less straightforward. On the one hand, Geurts (1994) and 
Huczynski and Fitzpatrick (1989) find that continuing high levels of job stress lead to an 
increase of absenteeism. On the other hand, a literature review by Houtman et al. (1999) 
reports mixed results on empirical research into stress and absenteeism. Jacobson et al. 
(1996) find that work stress is the most important source of high stress levels, but it is 
not related to actual levels of absence (while other sources of stress are). 
Practices aimed at reducing absenteeism can be classified into monitoring, absenteeism 
support and precautionary measures. Monitoring and absenteeism support are primarily 
aimed at reducing the length of absenteeism spells, whilst precautionary measures aim 
at reducing the number of absence spells. Precautionary measures include adaptation of 
tasks or workplace, promotion of personal protective gear use, and instruction of em-
ployees to improve the tackling of in-company health hazards (Brouwers et al., 2000). 
Research on absenteeism and working conditions suggests, that precautionary actions 
can reduce absenteeism due to occupational causes (Havlovic, 1991). Bertera (1990) 
finds that absence not due to occupational causes can also be reduced by specific com-
pany policies. Health promotion activities focusing on smoking cessation, fitness, 
weight control, lipid control, stress management, and healthy back result in a reduction 
of absenteeism levels (Bertera, 1990, page 1101). 
5.2.4  The research question delineated  
We are now able to delineate the context of this chapter. Absenteeism is determined by 
employee’s motivation and ability to attend. An increased ability to attend will result in 
lower levels of absenteeism due to sickness and accidents. Organizations can stimulate 
the ability to attend, by taking precautionary actions to improve the health status of em-
ployees. The research question of this chapter is which factors determine whether SMEs 
take precautionary actions to improve the ability to attend.   Absenteeism and precautionary actions 
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5.3  Absenteeism with small and medium-sized enterprises  
5.3.1 Overall  absenteeism 
On average, small firms have lower absence levels than large firms (Barmby and 
Stephan, 2000; Boon, 2000; Coles and Treble, 1996; Wilson and Peel, 1991). This may 
be explained by differences in the motivation to attend. Various authors argue that em-
ployees with smaller firms are more motivated, which increases the absence tolerance 
threshold and reduces the work resumption threshold. Some authors point towards the 
lack of bureaucracy and specialization as a source for this behavioural advantage of 
small firms (Nooteboom, 1993; Daft, 1998). Others argue that within smaller firms, the 
relationship between individual and organizational performance is clearer (Bacon et al., 
1996; Storey, 1994). 
These explanations focus on the relationship between firm size and employee behav-
iour. Other explanations are based on the behaviour of employers. Lower absence levels 
may be caused by lower monitoring costs for smaller firms (Barron et al., 1987), result-
ing in fewer possibilities for shirking. Alternatively, the equilibrium framework by 
Coles and Treble (1996) suggests that the equilibrium level of absenteeism may differ 
between small and large firms. Firms for which absenteeism is more costly will offer 
higher wages in order to limit the absence rates. In addition, they will hire reserve 
workers to guarantee a minimum amount of available labour. In this equilibrium 
framework, an increase in firm size requires a less than proportional increase in the 
number of reserve workers, because risks can be diversified among more workers 
(Barmby and Stephan, 2000; Coles and Treble, 1996). Consequently, larger firms can 
insure against (the consequences of) absenteeism at lower costs, and hence their equilib-
rium absence level is higher. 
5.3.2 Occupational  accidents 
The overall level of absenteeism is positively correlated with firm size. For the specific 
category of occupational accidents, the relationship is however opposite: the risk of hav-
ing an occupational accident is higher within smaller establishments than in larger ones 
(Eurostat, 2000; Storey, 1994)
34. According to Eurostat (2000), employees working in 
establishments with 10-49 employees are faced with an annual probability of having an 
accident (resulting in more than 3 days absence) of 5.2% (Eurostat, 2000). This is sub-
stantially higher than the 2.9% for employees working in establishments with at least 
250 employees.  
Also, the nature of accidents (resulting in major injuries) differs between size classes. 
Storey (1994) presents findings concerning the UK manufacturing industry in 1989. For 
establishments with 100 or more employees, the main category of accidents is slip, trip 
or fall (27% of all accidents). For establishments with less than 100 employees, this 
category contains 12% of all accidents. Accidents involving contact with moving ma-
chinery are the main category for this size class, accounting for almost 30% of all re-
 
34  This implies that for absence due to other causes (i.e. sickness and non-health related causes), the 
correlation between absence rate and firm size is even more positive than for the overall absence 
rate (assuming that the average length of an absence spell due to an occupational accident is in-
dependent of firm size). Chapter 5 
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ported accidents. This would reflect “poor training, less experienced operators, and gen-
erally less well-guarded machinery in smaller establishments” (Thomas, 1991, as cited 
by Storey, 1994). 
5.3.3  Knowledge and attitudes on absenteeism  
Between 1996 and 1999, changes in the Dutch social security legislation have intro-
duced financial incentives to change enterprise behaviour regarding absenteeism. Brou-
wers et al. (2000) investigate to which extent this has lead to an increased focus on re-
ducing absenteeism, amongst enterprises with less than 100 employees. Their findings 
first of all suggest, that smaller firms have in general less knowledge on health-related 
topics than larger organizations. For example, smaller firms were less informed about 
the legislative changes than larger firms. In addition, smaller firms are less likely to be-
lieve they can exert any influence on absence levels: 32% of firms with 1-9 employees 
are of the opinion that they can exert no influence at all on absence rates, versus 8% of 
firms with 50-99 employees.  
Secondly, the results of Brouwers et al. (2000) indicate that the identification of a rela-
tionship between working conditions and absenteeism may be a determinant of precau-
tionary actions. Organizations that consider themselves to be able to influence their ab-
sence rates, are more likely to have increased their focus on reducing absenteeism
35. In 
addition, 47% of the firms that increased their focus mentioned improved knowledge of 
in-company health hazards as an important reason for doing so
36. Another determinant 
of precautionary actions is firm size: larger firms are more likely to have increased their 
focus on reducing absenteeism
37. 
5.4  Determinants of precautionary measures 
What are the determinants of precautionary actions? Not much is known about which 
factors influence the decision of individual firms to implement precautionary actions. 
The study by Brouwers et al. (2000) suggests, that the available knowledge on this topic 
may be an influential factor. This suggestion is elaborated in this chapter. We focus on 
the opinion of employers, whether or not working conditions are related to the absence 
level within their firm. On the one hand, we examine the effect of this opinion: to which 
extent does it influence the implementation of precautionary actions. On the other hand, 
we look at possible explanations for this opinion.  
5.4.1  Implementing precautionary measures 
When will firms decide to take precautionary actions? A standard neoclassical approach 
to this problem would be to assume a rational acting firm, which performs a cost/benefit 
 
35 An increased focus on reducing absenteeism refers to various activities, such as adaptation of 
tasks or workplace, promotion of personal protective gear use, instruction of employees to im-
prove the tackling of in-company health hazards and an improved coaching of ill employees. 
36 Other often mentioned reasons include financial motives (69%) and an increased importance at-
tached to staff health (56%). 
37 Controlling, amongst others, for the extent to which organizations believe they can exert influ-
ence on absence levels and for sectoral differences.   Absenteeism and precautionary actions 
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analysis. This firm is completely and correctly informed of all relevant costs and bene-
fits. The firm would take precautionary actions, only if the benefits of precautionary ac-
tions exceed the costs.  
In this chapter, we use another framework to analyse the decision-making process of an 
individual firm. We assume that firms behave in a bounded rational manner. Employers 
are willing to make a rational decision, but their knowledge of alternatives and conse-
quences is prey to cognitive limitations, and they often lack the motivation to conduct 
the necessary information searches (Legge, 1995). In addition, small firms have a more 
limited capacity for the acquisition of relevant knowledge than larger firms. Conse-
quently, rationality is more bounded for these firms (Nooteboom, 1993). Employers 
may have certain expectations regarding costs and benefits of precautionary actions, but 
there is no guarantee that these expectations are anywhere near the actual costs and 
benefits.  
The expected benefits of precautionary measures will depend strongly on the expected 
effect of these measures on the level of absenteeism within the organization. In general, 
improving the working conditions within organizations will lower the absence levels. 
However, if measures are not implemented well, or if absenteeism levels are already 
low, it may be difficult for individual firms to recognise this relationship. Thus, we may 
expect that some employers are aware of this relationship, while others see no relation-
ship between the working conditions and the (current and future) levels of absenteeism 
within their company. We expect that if employers don’t identify this relationship, they 
are less likely to take precautionary actions to improve working conditions. This is for-
malised in the first hypothesis: 
H5.1: organizations that identify a relationship between working conditions and 
absenteeism, are more likely to take precautionary measures. 
In addition, we hypothesise that small firms are less likely to take precautionary meas-
ures, even if they assume that working conditions and absenteeism are related: 
H5.2: larger organizations are more likely to take precautionary measures.  
The rationale behind this second hypothesis is that precautionary actions may be (rela-
tively) more costly for smaller firms. This may be due to a lack of knowledge and/or 
manpower to implement certain practices. In addition, certain practices may have con-
siderable fixed costs, which increase the costs per employee for smaller firms.  
5.4.2 Identifying a relationship between working conditions and absen-
teeism 
According to hypothesis H5.1, the probability of taking precautionary measures depends 
upon the identification of a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism. 
This identification will in turn depend on other factors. Some of these factors will be re-
lated to characteristics of the employer, for example educational level, experience, and 
knowledge on absenteeism (and human resource management related topics in general). 
We hypothesise that, in addition, the opinion of the employer is related to the em-
ployer’s assessment of the working conditions: Chapter 5 
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H5.3: organizations that assume that working conditions are demanding for a 
larger share of employees, are more likely to identify a relationship between 
working conditions and absenteeism. 
If employers consider working conditions to be demanding for a larger share of em-
ployees, they are more likely to consider those working conditions as one of the deter-
minants of absenteeism.  
The share of employees for which working conditions are thought to be demanding can, 
in turn, depend upon reported health problems by employees. This implies an indirect 
relationship between reported health problems and the identification of a relationship 
between working conditions and absenteeism. Reported health problems may also have 
a direct effect upon the identification of this relationship: if (virtually) no health prob-
lems are reported, it is likely that such a relationship will not be identified, irrespective 
of the share of employees for which the tasks are considered to be demanding.  
Indicators for reported health problems include health complaints by employees and the 
absence level. The role of reported health problems is captured by the following two 
hypotheses: 
H5.4: organizations with more health complaints by employees, are more likely to 
identify a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism. 
H5.5: organizations with higher absence rates, are more likely to identify a rela-
tionship between working conditions and absenteeism. 
Reported health problems (both health complaints by employees and absence rates) thus 
are assumed to have an indirect effect on the probability that precautionary actions are 
taken
38. If health problems are reported, but not associated with an identification of the 
relationship between working conditions and absenteeism, they are supposed to have no 
effect on the probability that precautionary actions are implemented.  
Finally, we hypothesise that the probability of identifying a relationship between work-
ing conditions and absenteeism increases with firm size (controlling for differences in 
employer’s assessment of working conditions and reported health problems):  
H5.6: larger organizations are more likely to identify a relationship between 
working conditions and absenteeism than smaller organizations. 
This hypothesis is bases on the assumption that small firms may be more bounded in 
their rationality than large firms, due to a more limited capacity for the acquisition and 
processing of relevant knowledge (Nooteboom, 1993). Consequently, small firm em-
ployers may ceteris paribus be less likely to identify a relationship between working 
conditions and absenteeism than employers with larger firms. 
 
38 If precautionary actions are taken, these are supposed to reduce the absence level. This implies a 
dynamic interaction between absence levels and precautionary actions. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to examine this interaction. Precautionary actions are treated as a dependent variable 
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5.5  Research method  
The hypotheses derived in the previous section will be tested empirically. Logistic re-
gressions will be used to estimate the probabilities of taking precautionary actions, and 
of identifying a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism. The regres-
sion results are presented in the next section. In this section we discuss sample and data 
collection, and the variables used in the regressions. 
5.5.1  Sample and data collection  
The data for the research presented in this chapter was collected by means of telephonic 
interviews amongst Dutch establishments with less than 200 employees
39. The inter-
views were held in 1995, before the most recent changes in Dutch legislation (discussed 
in Brouwers et al., 2000). A stratified sample plan was used to ensure that all relevant 
sectors and size classes were adequately represented in the sample. The stratification 
plan distinguished six sectors (manufacturing, construction, trade and catering, trans-
port, financial and business services and other services) and five size classes (1-9 em-
ployees, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99 and 100-199). 900 establishments were called, asking for 
the manager in charge. 609 interviews were completed, 579 of which by establishments 
with less than 200 employees (a response rate of 64%). 41% of these interviews had 
been held with the owner and/or manager in charge, 28% with a personnel officer. The 
majority of the participating establishments were independent organizations, 174 estab-
lishments were part of a larger organization. 
5.5.2 Dependent  variables 
Two dependent variables are distinguished. The first dependent variable is “measures”, 
which records whether or not precautionary measures have been taken (in 1994) to im-
prove physical and mental working conditions. The second dependent variable is “iden-
tification”. This variable represents the opinion of the respondent regarding the relation-
ship between working conditions and actual absence levels. It contains the answer to the 
question whether or not the physical and mental working conditions within the estab-
lishment are believed to partly determine short- and long term absenteeism and/or out-
flow of employees. Besides being a dependent variable (see hypotheses H5.3-H5.6), 
“identification” is also an explanatory variable of “measures” (see hypothesis H5.1). 
Average scores of these variables are presented in Table 5.1, both overall and by size 
class. As expected, larger establishments are more likely to identify a relationship be-
tween working conditions and absenteeism, and to have taken precautionary measures. 
The results from Table 5.1 show that identification is not a necessary condition for tak-
ing precautionary measures. While 37% of all enterprises has taken precautionary 
measures, only 18% has identified a relationship between working conditions and ab-
senteeism. This might be explained by the obligatory status of many precautionary 
measures (for example, wearing safety helmets on construction sites). Another explana-
tion could be that many respondents think no connection exists between current working 
conditions and current absenteeism, because of precautionary measures taken in the 
past. 
 
39 The complete questionnaire (in Dutch) is included in Bosch and De Kok (1997). Chapter 5 
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Table 5.1  Inquiry results by size class 
  Size class (number of employees) 
  1-9 10-49 50-199 Total  c 
Dependent variables:         
Working conditions determine absenteeism and/or turn-
over (identification) a  
9 19  48  18 
Precautionary measures taken (measures)
 a  28 46  72  37 
Independent variables:         
Employees with physically demanding work b  47 48  49  47 
Employees with mentally demanding work b   38 31  32  36 
Employees reporting physical complaints a  13 27  53  17 
Employees reporting stress
 a   4   9  31  6 
a:  % of establishments. 
b:  % of employees. 
c:  weighted average, representing average per establishment. 
5.5.3  Independent variables  
An important explanatory variable for both dependent variables is establishment size, 
which is represented by the natural log of the number of employees. Other explanatory 
variables include indicators of: 
-  the employer’s opinion as to which extent the working conditions are demanding for 
employees; 
-  health complaints by employees; 
-  absenteeism within the establishment.  
The first two items are measured by two variables each. The variables “physically de-
manding work” and “mentally demanding work” represent the share of employees for 
which respondents consider the work to be physically or mentally demanding. Next, the 
variables “physical complaints” and “stress” indicate whether or not employees (i.e. 
more than 1) have reported to experience physical complaints or stress. Average scores 
for these variables are presented in Table 5.1.  
The assessment of the share of employees for which working conditions are demanding 
does not vary much with establishment size. On average, respondents report that 47% of 
the employees within their establishment has physically demanding work, while 36% 
has mentally demanding work. In contrast, the share of employers who receive health 
complaints is strongly correlated with size. For example, employees have reported stress 
within 4% of establishments with 1-9 employees, and within 31% of establishments 
with 50-199 employees.  
This difference is partially caused by the measurement scales. “Physically demanding 
work” and “mentally demanding work” report percentages of employees (within estab-
lishments), while the variables on health problems are dichotomous. Even if the prob-
ability that individual employees report health problems is the same for small and large 
establishments, the probability that more than one employee within an establishment 
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91 
Reported health problems are positively correlated with firm size. This is it true not only 
for reported health complaints, but also for reported absence levels (Table 5.2). Two out 
of every three establishments with less than 200 employees claim their absence rate (in-
cluding maternity leave) is below 2%. On the other hand, 5% of all establishments re-
port that more than 10% of all working days are lost due to absenteeism. 
Table 5.2  Annual absence rates 1994, including maternity leave, by size class  
Absence rate   Size class (number of employees) 
(% of working days lost due to absence)
   1-9  10-49   50-199   Total a 
0-1 76%  33%    6%  67% 
2-4 15%  39%  40%  19% 
5-6   3%  12%  25%   5% 
7-8   0%   8%  18%   2% 
9-10   1%   4%   9%   2% 
>=11   6%   5%   2%   5% 
a:   weighted average, representing average per establishment. 
note: due to rounding errors, column totals may not add to 100%. 
The self-reported rates presented in Table 5.2 may be compared with average absence 
rates reported in Statline, the on-line electronic databank from Statistics Netherlands 
(www.cbs.nl). For 1994, Statline reports average absence rates (including maternity 
leave) of 3.9% for enterprises with 1-9 employees, 4.5% for enterprises with 10-99 em-
ployees and 6.5% for enterprises with 100 or more employees. The Statline statistics 
differ from Table 5.2 both in the distinguished size classes and in the unit of observation 
(enterprises versus establishments). Still, the information from Statline suggests that the 
establishments in our sample underestimate or underreport their absence levels
40. 
The absence rate is positively correlated with the proportion of workers for whom the 
physical working conditions are considered to be demanding. The correlation between 
absence rate and the variable “mentally demanding work” does not differ significantly 
from zero
41.  
In the regression analyses, the seven categories presented in Table 5.2 are reduced to 
three categories (0-1%, 2-6% and >= 7%). This has been done to increase the number of 
observations within each category (in addition, it increases the parsimony of the equa-
tions to be estimated). Several additional variables are included in the analysis, to con-
trol for systematic variance that cannot be attributed to the variables of interest in this 
chapter. These include indicators for the independence of the establishment, whether or 
not risks within the company have been inventoried and evaluated (RI&E)
42, whether 
the establishment falls under a collective labour agreement, whether the establishment is 
member of a trade organization, the presence of a workers council, if the respondent is 
the employer or not (where employer is defined as being owner or manager in charge), 
 
40 Alternatively, our sample may not be representative for the Dutch private sector. 
41 At a 5% significance level. 
42 Since 1994, Dutch companies are obliged to make an inventory of occupational risks for their 
employees, develop a program to reduce these risks, and evaluate this program. This process is 
known as the RI&E. Although the RI&E was obliged at the time of the inquiry, only 56% of the 
respondents were aware of this obligation. Chapter 5 
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the financial position of the establishment, and the fraction of employees aged 45 years 
or above. The correlation between firm size and having a workers council is .56; other-
wise, correlations between the variables discussed in this section do not exceed .5. 
5.6 Results   
In section 5.4, we derived six hypotheses that are assumed to characterise the decision 
making process of small and medium-sized enterprises. In this section, logistic regres-
sions are used to test these hypotheses. Notice that the hypotheses are tested on data 
from establishments rather than independent organizations. We will refer to this prob-
lem in the second part of this section, where we discuss the results. First, we turn to the 
regressions. 
5.6.1  Determinants of precautionary actions 
We start with an examination of the probability that establishments identify a relation-
ship between working conditions and absenteeism within their firm. Results of a logistic 
regression (reported in Table 5.3) are used to test hypotheses H5.3 to H5.6. None of 
these hypotheses is rejected. The probability of identifying a relationship between work-
ing conditions and absenteeism depends on the employer’s assessment of the working 
conditions, on health complaints, on absence rates and on the number of employees. 
Table 5.3  Results of logistic regression on probability that establishment identifies relationship 
between working conditions and absenteeism 
Variable Model  1  c 
Size   .43 (.00) 
Physically demanding work  .89 (.02) 
Mentally demanding work  .98 (.01) 
Physical complaints  1.28 (.00) 
Stress  .90 (.00) 
Working days lost due to absenteeism  (ref: 0-1%)   
   2-6%  1.04 (.02) 
   >= 7%   2.16 (.00) 
Constant -5.05  (.00) 
Goodness of fit measures:    
% Predicted correctly a 79.4 
R² (nagelkerke)  .432 
-2 log likelihood  383.3 
Chi² test for model fit
 b 162.6  (.00) 
Valid observations  447 
a:   the reference value is 70%: the (unweighted) share of establishments in the sample for which 
“recognition” is zero. 
b:   test for hypothesis that all model parameters (except constant) are equal to zero. 
c:   reported significance levels (between parentheses) are based on Wald statistics Significance 
levels according to Likelihood Ratio test statistics are almost identical and lead to the same 
conclusions.   Absenteeism and precautionary actions 
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The estimated equation has been extended with several control variables, none of which 
have a significant impact
43. Amongst others, this implies that the probability of identifi-
cation does not differ between sectors. Nor is it dependent on the share of elderly em-
ployees (aged 45 or higher), on the independency of the establishment, or on whether or 
not the (obligatory) Risk Inventory and Evaluation (RI&E) has been performed. 
Next, we present the estimation results of two models on the probability that establish-
ments actually took precautionary actions during the preceding year (Table 5.4). These 
models test hypotheses H5.1 and H5.2. Model 2 represents a restricted equation, where 
the implementation of precautionary measures is explained by establishment size and 
identification (and control variables - these will be discussed later on in this section). 
The estimation results are in support of both hypotheses. Larger establishments are 
more likely to take precautionary actions (ceteris paribus) than smaller ones. If a rela-
tionship between working conditions and absenteeism is identified, the probability of 
taking precautionary actions increases. The acceptance of both H5.1 and H5.2 is in ac-
cordance with Brouwers et al. (2000). 
Table 5.4  Results of logistic regression on probability that establishment has taken measures 
to reduce physical working conditions and stress in the past year (1994) 
Variable Model  2  d Model  3  d 
Size     .36 (.00)    .25 (.03) 
Identification    .73 (.00)   -.00 (.99) 
Physically demanding work     1.00 (.00) 
Mentally demanding work      .48 (.16) 
Physical complaints      1.07 (.00) 
Stress       .44 (.20) 
Working days lost due to absenteeism (ref: 0-1%)     
    2-6%      .30 (.31) 
    >= 7%      .54 (.16) 
Not independent     .57 (.02)    .63 (.02) 
RI&E performed    .87 (.00)    .91 (.00) 
Constant  -1.98 (.00)  -2.78 (.00) 
Goodness of fit measures:      
% Predicted correctly a 70.1  72.8 
R² (nagelkerke)  .228  .324 
-2 log likelihood   524.8  484.9 
Chi² test for model improvement b   39.9  (.00) 
Chi² test for model fit c  82.0 (.00)  121.9 (.00) 
Valid observations  438  438 
a:  the reference value is 51.6%: the (unweighted) share of establishments in the sample that 
have taken precautionary measures. 
b:   test for hypothesis that additional parameters (compared to previous model) are equal to zero. 
c:   test for hypothesis that all model parameters (except constant) are equal to zero. 
d:   reported significance levels (between parentheses) are based on Wald statistics. Significance 
levels according to Likelihood Ratio test statistics are almost identical and lead to the same 
conclusions. 
 
43 Model 1 has been reestimated including the control variables discussed in section 5.5. None of 
these control variables has a significant impact, which is confirmed by a chi² test for the joint 
hypothesis that none of these variables has a significant impact. Chapter 5 
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Further analysis, however, indicates that H5.1 should be rejected. In model 3, the equa-
tion on precautionary measures is extended to include the explanatory variables of iden-
tification (of a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism). According to 
the estimation results, identification has no impact anymore on the probability that pre-
cautionary measures are taken. Instead, this probability increases with the assumed 
share of employees for whom the working conditions are physically demanding, and is 
higher for establishment that have recorded physical complaints. Not all explanatory 
variables of identification are also determinants of the probability that precautionary ac-
tions are taken: mentally demanding working conditions and reported stress have no 
impact on this probability, and neither does the absence rate. 
Two of the control variables have a significant impact on the probability of taking pre-
cautionary measures. Establishments that are part of a larger organization are more 
likely to take precautionary actions, as are establishments that perform an RI&E. These 
results are not surprising. First of all, according to models 2 and 3, both larger estab-
lishments and establishments that are part of a larger organization are more likely to 
take precautionary actions. This supports the hypothesis that the probability of taking 
precautionary actions increases with the size of organizations (instead of establish-
ments). Secondly, an RI&E includes that certain precautionary measures should be 
taken. Our results indicate that this does indeed take place
44. 
Other control variables have no impact. These include the sector of the establishment, 
whether the establishment falls under a collective labour agreement, and the financial 
position of the establishment
45. 
5.7 Discussion   
The regressions have been performed on establishment level data. The estimation results 
suggest that we may generalise the results to an organizational level. For model 1, inde-
pendency of the establishment is found insignificant, implying that the estimated rela-
tions are the same for independent organizations and dependent establishments. For 
models 2 and 3, a significant difference is found between dependent and independent 
establishments (given the positive effect of establishment size). We interpret this as 
support for the positive impact of organizational size (instead of just establishment 
size). In addition, the results do not depend on whether the questionnaire was answered 
by the employer or not.  
Of the six hypotheses, five have not been rejected by our estimations. Hypothesis H5.1, 
which is at the core of the assumed decision making process, is however rejected by 
model 3. We will therefore discuss the rejection of this hypothesis, the interpretation of 
this rejection, and possible explanations in more detail. 
 
44  An alternative interpretation is that starting an RI&E is in itself seen as a precautionary measure, 
irrespective of whether the RI&E resulted in additional precautionary actions. 
45 Models 2 and 3 have been reestimated including the control variables discussed in prargraph 5.5 
(excluding whether the establishment is independent, and whether an RI&E has taken place). For 
model 2, sectoral differences were found to be significant at a 5% significance level. For both 
model 2 and 3, a chi² test cannot reject, however, the joint hypotheses that none of these vari-
ables has a significant impact.   Absenteeism and precautionary actions 
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Support for hypothesis H5.1 is provided by Brouwers et al. (2000). Their result may 
how-ever be due to a missing variable bias. The missing variables in question are the es-
tablishment’s judgement of the working conditions and reported health problems. The 
study by Brouwers et al. (2000) lacks information on these variables. The logistic re-
gression presented in their study is therefore similar to our model 2, which also doesn’t 
reject hypothesis H5.1. The results of model 3 suggest that model 2 suffers from a miss-
ing variable bias, and the same bias may apply to the analysis by Brouwers et al. (2000). 
We therefore conclude that the results by Brouwers et al. (2000) do not conflict with our 
rejection of hypothesis H5.1
46. 
What are the consequences of the rejection of hypothesis H5.1 for the decision making 
process? Generally speaking, only half of the establishments that take precautionary ac-
tions have identified a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism. For 
establishments with less than 10 employees, this fraction is even down to one third 
(Table 5.1). Identification of such a relationship is clearly not necessary for taking pre-
cautionary actions. The rejection of hypothesis H5.1 suggests that identification does 
not even raise the probability of taking precautionary actions. Furthermore, reported 
health problems (health complaints and absence rate) were hypothesised to have an indi-
rect effect on the probability of taking precautionary measures. Instead, two of the three 
indicators of health problems have no effect at all. The third indicator, whether employ-
ees had made physical complaints, directly increases the probability that precautionary 
actions are implemented.  
How can we explain these findings? First of all, why do firms that assume no relation-
ship between working conditions and absenteeism, take actions to improve those condi-
tions? Several explanations are possible. Certain precautionary measures may be re-
quired by law, or expected by external stakeholders. These requirements may differ be-
tween firms of different sizes, thus partially explaining the firm size effect. More impor-
tantly, our hypotheses are based on the assumption that precautionary actions are taken 
to improve the ability to attend. Organizations may also use precautionary actions as a 
means to improve the motivation to attend. This is especially relevant, if employees 
have ample opportunities to find work elsewhere. This argument is supported by Veer-
man et al. (2001). They find that recent increases in the efforts of Dutch firms to reduce 
the inflow into disability are mainly the result of a tightening of the labour market.  
Secondly, why are firms that do identify a relationship between working conditions and 
absenteeism not more likely to take precautionary actions? Especially for smaller estab-
lishments, this may be due to a lack of knowledge on where and how to start, or a lack 
of manpower to take the necessary initiatives. Another argument is the relatively low 
absence level with smaller establishments. Low absence rates imply that expected bene-
fits of precautionary actions are also limited. Finally, we have not explicitly looked at 
the costs of implementing precautionary measures. A combination of limited financial 
resources and implementation costs that are relatively high for small firms may result in 
 
46  Bosch and De Kok (1997) also report that identification of a relationship between working condi-
tions and absenteeism has a positive impact on the likeliness that precautionary actions are taken. 
However, the variable that represents “identification” is defined as a combination of the identifi-
cation of such a relationship and the variables “physical complaints” and “stress”. It is therefore 
impossible to separate the effects of these variables on the implementation of precautionary ac-
tions. In addition, this study also suffers from missing variable bias. Chapter 5 
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the lack of a relationship between identification and taking actions. The latter two ar-
guments seem however less relevant, given that the financial position of the establish-
ments has no effect on the probability that precautionary actions are taken. This sug-
gests that the costs of precautionary actions do not play a dominant role in the decision 
making process. 
A limitation of the research presented in this chapter is that the question on identifica-
tion (of a relationship between working conditions and absenteeism) was limited to the 
actual situation. Respondents were not asked for an assessment of occupational risks, 
but whether the working conditions partly determined absenteeism. If the actual absence 
level was very low, respondents could only answer “no” to this question. So, while we 
were in fact interested in the relationship between working conditions and the perceived 
probability of employees becoming sick, having an accident, or otherwise becoming ab-
sent, we asked for a relationship between working conditions and actual absence levels. 
Future studies should examine the perceived risk by employers instead of the realization 
of absence levels. 
5.8 Conclusions   
Absenteeism results in considerable costs. Absence levels may be reduced by imple-
menting precautionary actions, to improve the working conditions within organizations. 
In this chapter, we have formulated six hypotheses that describe the decision making 
process of employers whether or not to take precautionary actions. Five of the six hy-
potheses are accepted. We find that the probability of taking precautionary actions in-
creases with firm size. The probability of identifying a relationship between working 
conditions and absenteeism depends on the employer’s assessment of the working con-
ditions, on health complaints, on absence rates and on the number of employees. Identi-
fication of such a relationship has however no impact on the probability that precaution-
ary measures are taken. Absence rates and complaints about stress have no effect on this 
probability; only physical complaints and the assumed proportion of employees whose 
tasks are physically demanding have a (direct) positive effect on this probability.  
The research presented in this chapter suggests that most small firms do not have a de-
liberate policy of reducing absence rates by improving the working conditions. Given 
the low absence rates, and the limited time of small-firm employers, this is not a surpris-
ing result. The majority of small firms take actions without identifying a relationship be-
tween working conditions and absenteeism. Instead, precautionary actions may be taken 
because of legal requirements, or to improve employee motivation. The financial posi-
tion of the organization also does not seem to be related to the likelihood of taking pre-
cautionary actions. Once it is decided that precautionary actions will be taken, the fi-
nancial position may well determine the nature of these actions.  
Large firms are more likely to take precautionary actions than smaller organizations, ir-
respective of differences in absence levels and in the probability of identifying a rela-
tionship between working conditions and absenteeism. This firm size effect may be due 
to increased attention from external stakeholders for precautionary actions, differences 
in legislations, or simply the availability of know-how and manpower to implement cer-
tain practices. The reported firm size differences may, however, also reflect differences 
in respondents’ perception of precautionary measures.  
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Chapter  6: The impact of firm-provided training on 
production  
6.1 Introduction 
According to endogenous growth theories, the accumulation of human capital consti-
tutes the main engine of macro-economic growth ( Lucas, 1988, 1993; Romer, 1987, 
1996; Mankiw et al., 1992). At a micro level, the resource based theory points to the 
human capital of employees as a major source for sustained competitive advantage for 
individual firms (Ferligoj et al., 1997; Koch and McGrath, 1996; Wright et al., 1994). 
Firms can increase the human capital of their employees by stimulating learning behav-
iour, such as learning from peers, learning by doing, learning by feedback from custom-
ers and suppliers, learning by copying, learning by experiment, learning by problem 
solving and opportunity taking, and learning from making mistakes (Patton et al., 2000). 
An important tool for stimulating such learning behaviour is formal, firm-provided 
training.  
It is well known that large firms provide more formal training to their employees than 
small firms (Black et al., 1999; Barron et al., 1987; Patton et al., 2000). Little is known, 
however, about the relationship between firm size and the impact of training. Studies in 
the field of labour economics look into the effects of training on wages and production 
for large firms. Within the field of entrepreneurship and small business economics, the 
impact of training on survival, growth and profits of small businesses is examined. 
Whether the impact of training on production is different for small and large firms, has 
not received much attention.  
This chapter examines the existence of firm-size effects in the impact of firm-provided 
training. The next section provides background information on training within SMEs, 
after which we discuss previous research on the returns to training. In section 6.4, we 
derive hypotheses regarding the impact of firm size on the returns to training. These hy-
potheses distinguish between direct and indirect firm-size effects. We use a nested pro-
duction function to estimate the impact of training on production at the level of individ-
ual firms. Section 6.5 describes panel data on 173 Dutch firms used to estimate this 
function. Information on actual time spent in training enables us to separate the benefits 
of training (due to an increased productivity) from the opportunity costs (training re-
duced the number of days worked). The production function is derived in section 6.6, 
and the estimation results are presented in section 6.7 and discussed in section 6.8. The 
main conclusions are presented in the final section.  
6.2  Training within SMEs 
Smaller firms provide less formal training to their employees than larger firms do. 
However, the difference has decreased during the last decennium, at least for the Neth-
erlands (Table 6.1). In 1999, firms with less than 100 employees still spent less than half 
on training compared to firms with 500 employees or more. In terms of the number of 
training courses, the difference between these two groups is much smaller.  Chapter 6 
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Table 6.1   Internal and external training courses in the Netherlands, by firm size 
Size class   Courses per employee    Training costs (% of labour costs a) 
(number of employees)  1990  1993  1999    1990  1993  1999 
 10 -  99  0.14  0.20  0.69    0.5%  0.8%  1.8% 
100 - 499   0.33  0.41  0.85    1.1%  1.3%  2.8% 
      ≥ 500   0.54 0.53  0.81   3.2%  3.1%  3.9% 
Total  0.33 0.38  0.77   1.7%  1.8%  2.8% 
source: Statline, the on-line database from Statistics Netherlands at www.cbs.nl. 
a:   training costs include out-of-pocket expenses and lost labour costs. 
Employers from both small and large firms generally seem to believe that the initiative 
for training should preferably be taken by employees. For small firms, this is concluded 
by Koch and Van Straten (1997), who have interviewed over 20 Dutch employers, 
mostly from firms with 10-25 employees. Brouwer et al. (2001) have interviewed man-
agers from 10 large Dutch enterprises about their employability policies, and arrive at 
the same conclusion. However, employees often do not take the initiative. Using a rep-
resentative sample of employees from firms with 10 or more employees, Brouwer et al. 
(2001) find that most employees find their educational level and specific knowledge and 
skills adequate for the required tasks. This might explain their lack of initiative. 
Various explanations have been offered to explain why small firms spend less on formal 
training than large firms. First of all, formal training may be too expensive for small 
firms (Curran et al., 1997). On the one hand, training costs may be higher for small 
firms (Westhead and Storey, 1996). Training costs include not only the out-of-pocket 
expenses of the training course, but also opportunity costs (the costs of lost output). Es-
pecially the opportunity costs may be relatively high for small firms: the absence of an 
individual employee will provide more difficulties, if there are less colleagues to fill in. 
On the other hand, small firms have less financial resources (Nooteboom, 1993; 
Westhead and Storey, 1996).  
Secondly, the shorter time horizon of smaller firms (Storey, 1994; Westhead and Storey, 
1996) makes it less attractive to invest in training. Thirdly, training may increase the 
outflow of (trained) employees. Due to the relative lack of internal promotion possibili-
ties, the outflow effect may be stronger for smaller firms than for larger ones. In addi-
tion, smaller firms have a more limited capacity for the acquisition of information 
(Nooteboom, 1993). Small firms may be less aware of the available training courses and 
the associated costs and benefits than large firms. Finally, small firms seem to prefer in-
formal training methods over formal training courses, because it is less costly (Koch and 
Van Straten, 1997), because it can be more easily integrated into the firm’s everyday ac-
tivities, and because it can be more easily focused on the worker’s specific individual 
and work role needs (Curran et al., 1997).  
In this chapter, we focus on firms that have chosen to provide formal training to their 
employees. Small and large firms differ in the topics on which they provide training 
(Table 6.2). The majority of training courses taken by Dutch SMEs deals with technical 
and ICT training and courses on environmental and working conditions. For the UK, 
similar findings are reported by Curran et al. (1997). Training courses on management 
and personal skills only account for 17% of all training courses for firms with 10-99   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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employees. The most notable differences between small and large firms are the provi-
sion of technical training and of training on finance and accounting.  
Table 6.2   Training course by topic (1999), by firm size 
Training course topic  Size class (number of employees) 
 10-99    100-499  ≥ 500 
Management 5%  5%  8% 
Personal skills   12%  16%  17% 
Sales and marketing  9%  9%  9% 
Finance and accounting  5%  3%  14% 
ICT   19%  24%  18% 
Technical training   20%  15%  9% 
Environmental and working conditions  20%  17%  11% 
Other 10%  11%  14% 
Total 100%  100%  100% 
source: Statline, the on-line database from Statistics Netherlands at www.cbs.nl. 
note:   both internal and external firm-provided training included. 
6.3  Previous research on the returns to training  
Studies on training within SMEs are often limited to the impact of management training 
(which accounts for a minority of all training courses). Despite claims that management 
training pays off, the relationship between participation in management training and 
small business performance is not well established (Patton et al., 2000; Westhead and 
Storey, 1996). The majority of these studies is qualitative, which is in line with results 
by Heneman et al. (2000).  
Within the field of labour economics, most studies on the returns to training are limited 
to the employee’s share of these returns: the impact of training on wages. These studies 
generally find a positive relationship between training and wages (Groot, 1999b). Em-
ployers will only invest in training if they expect to benefit from this investment. This 
implies that the effect of training on productivity will exceed the effect of training on 
wages (Dearden et al., 2000). The effects of training on production are, however, less 
often studied than the wage effects.  
At the individual level, the relationship between training and individual performance 
measures has been examined. These studies generally find a positive effect of training 
on performance (Groot, 1999a; Gelderblom and De Koning, 1996; Bishop, 1994; Bartel, 
1995). They have, however, the disadvantage of using subjective performance meas-
ures, either comparing productivity before and after training, or between employees 
who have and have not followed training courses.  
Estimating returns to training using objective performance measures 
If the effects of training on firm performance are studied, objective performance meas-
urements can be used. Bartel (1994) employs a panel with observations on US manufac-
turing firms for 1983 and 1986, to estimate the effect of formal employee training pro-
grams on production per employee. Using a fixed-effects estimation procedure to con-Chapter 6 
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trol for unobserved firm-specific effects, she finds a significant relationship between 
production per employee and the number of employee groups for which training pro-
grams exist.  
Black and Lynch (1996) present the estimation results of a production function, based 
on a cross-section of US firms. They examine whether production depends on the num-
ber (or fraction) of workers who received training. No significant relationship between 
production and this training variable is found. They do, however, find significant effects 
of specific dimensions of the training programs. In particular, computer training in-
creases production of nonmanufacturing firms, and the proportion of time spent in for-
mal off-the-job training has a significant positive effect on the production of manufac-
turing firms
47.  
Boon and Van der Eijken (1997, 1998) use panel data for 1990 and 1993. Their dataset 
contains detailed information on the amount of training provided by individual Dutch 
firms. Information on training costs is used to construct a measurement for the stock of 
human capital within a firm. They estimate the impact of the human capital stock on 
gross production and value added, using two different estimation methods (fixed effects 
and random effects estimators). Only the random effects estimator results in a signifi-
cantly positive elasticity of human capital (on value added).  
Dearden et al. (2000) examine returns to training at a sectoral level. This makes it pos-
sible to account for spillover effects of training. Information on training incidence by 
individual employees (obtained from a large-scale household survey) is combined with 
production statistics on capital, labour and output. This results in a panel over a long pe-
riod (1984-1996) with information on production and training for 94 different indus-
tries. They find a significant positive effect of training incidence on production per em-
ployee, both for off-the-job and on-the-job training. On average, a 5%-point increase of 




Training can influence performance, but firm performance can also influence training. 
On the one hand, increased organizational performance can stimulate training invest-
ments. Treating training as an exogenous variable would then result in an upward bias 
of the estimated returns to training. Another source for a positive relationship between 
performance and training is technological change. If changes in production techniques 
require extra training (Groot, 1999b) and increase productivity levels (Bartel, 1994), 
then the estimated returns to training suffer from an upward bias. De Grip et al. (1998) 
test the hypothesis of a positive relationship between technological developments and 
training incidence, but find no evidence for such a relationship
49. 
 
47 In Lynch and Black (1995) they also present estimations on productivity instead of production. 
This does not affect the conclusions. 
48 The mean proportion of workers being trained in an industry is 10%. 
49 Their indicator of technological change (relative growth of average automation costs per sector 
of industry) is however not ideal, as they themselves admit.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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On the other hand, performance can also have a negative impact on training invest-
ments. Bartel (1994) finds that firms with below-average productivity levels are more 
likely to implement training programs. In addition, firms may decide to introduce train-
ing programs when they are faced by negative demand shocks, since this lowers the op-
portunity costs of training.  
One of the few studies in which endogeneity can be controlled for, is Dearden et al. 
(2000). Because their dataset covers 13 years, they can use lagged variables as instru-
ments in the estimation of their production function. Their estimation results indicate an 
overall negative effect of performance on training investments. Treating training as an 
exogenous variable results in an underestimation of the causal effect of training on pro-
duction.  
6.4  Three firm-size effects of the returns to training 
A common characteristic of quantitative studies on the production effects of training is 
that they estimate production functions with a constant production elasticity of training. 
It can be argued, however, that the production elasticity of training depends on several 
variables. In this section, we will discuss three different effects, representing three dif-
ferent variables that may influence the elasticity of training. These are the selection ef-
fect, HRM effect and scale effect. All of these effects represent direct or indirect firm-
size effects. 
Returns to training are the combined result of two opposite effects: training increases 
the production per hour, but decreases the number of productive hours. Since we have 
information on the number of hours spent in training, we can separate these two effects. 
The effects discussed in this section are all related to the effects of training on produc-
tivity (the benefits of training). The opportunity costs of training will be discussed when 
the production function is derived.  
6.4.1 Selection  effect 
Organizations that provide training to their employees, must decide which employees 
take which training courses. Profit-maximizing firms will organize their training pro-
gram in such a way that the most productive combinations of employees and training 
courses are selected first (Dearden et al., 2000). The marginal returns to training will 
then decrease with the amount of training. This is translated in the following hypothesis 
on the selection effect: 
H6.1a: The elasticity of training is negatively related with the number of training 
days per full-time equivalent.  
The selection effect alone does not result in a firm-size effect. This will result only if 
smaller firms provide on average less training per employee than large firms do. To be 
more precise, this must hold for the subsample of firms that provide training:  
H6.1b: Conditional on training incidence, firm size is positively related with the 
number of training days per full-time equivalent.  Chapter 6 
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If both hypotheses are true, the elasticity of training is higher for smaller firms than for 
larger ones.  
6.4.2  Human Resource Management effect 
The selection effect concerns the relationship between the benefits of training and the 
amount of training provided. But what determines the benefits of a single training 
course? The primary outcome of a training course is that something must be learned, for 
example knowledge, skills and/or attitudes (Holton, 1996). If an employee has learned 
something, this can result in improved individual production. The transition from learn-
ing to improving individual production is however very complicated, and success is not 
guaranteed (Patton et al., 2000). It not only depends on what has been learned, but also 
on the motivation to actually apply the learning outcomes at the workplace (Porter and 
Tansky, 1996). Both the design of the training program and the motivation of employers 
and employees are important in this respect (Francis, 1995; Rowe and Cooke, 1995). 
Finally, individual production should increase production and productivity at firm level.  
If the effects of training depend on various influences, then a firm must control for these 
influences if it wants to maximize its returns to training. Setting up a training program 
with maximal efficiency requires a firm to follow certain steps (Scarpello and Ledvinka, 
1988):  
1.  identify the knowledge gap; 
2.  formulate the goals of training, and the criteria to evaluate it by. This is beneficial to 
the transition from learning outcomes to individual productivity, but can also stimu-
late the motivation to learn and apply; 
3.  choose the evaluation system; 
4.  determine the training design (training method, materials used, time and place, etc.); 
5.  perform the training course; 
6.  evaluate to which extent the training has reached the formulated goals (not only to 
learn more about the effects of this specific training course, but also to stimulate the 
motivation of employees to apply their newly gained knowledge in practice). 
Carrying out these steps takes time, and requires specific knowledge on (the effects of) 
training and available training courses. It is therefore likely that the benefits of firm-
provided training depend on the investment of setting up a proper training program: “it 
is not the presence of (...) training but a distinctive approach to (...) training that mat-
ters” (Guest, 1997). A similar argument has been made by Barron et al. (1987) regard-
ing the quality of new applicants. They argue that the quality of new applicants is a 
function of the investment firms make in their recruitment and selection process. If 
firms want to increase the average quality of new applicants, this will require screening 
more applicants and/or screening each applicant more intensively.  
We define the time spent on setting up a training program as training support. The Hu-
man Resource Management or HRM effect states that investments in training support 
have a positive effect on the benefits of training. The first step of setting up a training 
program suggests that the returns to training depend on the training support per em-
ployee, whereas the following steps indicate that training support should be related to   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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the number of training courses. Since we have no information on the number of training 
courses
50, we formulate the hypothesis regarding the HRM effect as:  
H6.2a: Training support per full-time equivalent and the elasticity of training are 
positively related. 
How does this relate to firm size? On average, small firms have limited resources to 
gather knowledge on firm training (Nooteboom, 1993; Patton et al., 2000). In addition, 
small firms are less formalized, which further hampers the development of a formalized 
training program (see chapters two, three and four). This leads to the following hy-
pothesis: 
H6.2b: Larger firms provide more training support (per full-time equivalent) than 
smaller firms do.  
If both H6.2a and H6.2b are accepted, we can conclude that a positive relationship ex-
ists between firm size and the elasticity of training. 
6.4.3 Scale  effect 
Both the HRM effect and the selection effect imply indirect effects of firm size. A more 
direct effect is that larger firms can benefit from economies of scale: if more employees 
need to take certain courses, courses can be developed that are adjusted to the specific 
needs of the firm. This includes the topic of the course, but also for example the presen-
tation, the time and the location. Such adjustments can increase the returns to training. 
The quality of training provided by external parties may even be inappropriate to the 
needs of smaller firms, because “training is provided by individuals or organizations 
who may lack an understanding of the particular problems facing small firms” (Storey, 
1994, page 292). This leads to the final hypothesis: 
H6.3: After correcting for HRM and selection effects, the elasticity of training is 
positively related with firm size.  
Scale effects may also exist regarding the costs of training (both opportunity costs and 
other costs), but these are excluded from this chapter.  
6.5  Research method  
6.5.1  Sample and data collection 
Detailed information is needed to estimate the returns to firm-provided training at the 
level of individual firms. For the years 1990 and 1993, such information is available for 
the Netherlands. For those two years, Statistics Netherlands has created a balanced 
panel by combining information from the Training Survey, the Wage and Employment 
Survey and the Production Survey. This dataset has first been discussed and analysed by 
 
50 Due to the large variation in training duration (Groot, 1999a), the number of training days is not 
a suitable indicator for the number of training courses. Chapter 6 
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Boon and Van der Eijken (1997, 1998). The following description is based on their 
study.  
Training Survey 
The Training Survey asks firms in the private sector with five or more employees to 
provide information on formal training, which is financed completely or partly by firms. 
The sample used for this study is a sub-sample, originating from firms that were active 
in training. These firms received a comprehensive questionnaire about training expendi-
ture, training participation, number of days worked by training staff, number of training 
days followed and the time devoted to the administration and coordination of firm-
provided training.  
Wage and Employment Survey 
From the Wage and Employment Survey information is available on number of days 
worked and wages for firms which have employees. This survey is based on a two-stage 
sample design. First, a stratified sample of firms is taken, and then each sampled firm 
takes a simple random sample of its employees. Sample information on the number of 
hours worked is then used to estimate the total number of hours worked.  
Double counting of training hours is avoided by adjusting the total hours worked for the 
amounts used in training. This implies that labour input is defined exclusive of the hours 
worked by (in-firm) trainers and of time spent in training. 
Production Survey 
In the annual Production Survey, firms in the manufacturing sector are asked for de-
tailed information on inputs and outputs. This information includes sales, gross output, 
gross value added (at market prices), wage bill, number of employees, costs of materi-
als, electricity consumption and capital consumption allowances (depreciation costs). 
Since 1987, all firms with 20 or more employees have been surveyed.  
The nominal variables in the data set are all deflated to 1990 guilders. Output and mate-
rials are deflated by applying 3-digit SIC
51 product and material price index numbers to 
all firms within the corresponding industry.  
Two different methods of measuring capital input are available. First, depreciation costs 
can be used as a proxy for capital input. Variations in the utilization of the capital stock 
can result in differences between the depreciation data and the desired measurement of 
the flow of capital services. A second measurement for capital input is the consumption 
of electricity. This variable is more likely to reflect fluctuations in the capital usage over 
time. 
Linking the surveys 
The cross-sectional data sets for 1990 and 1993 (with 428 and 643 firms resp.) are 
linked, which results in a balanced panel consisting of 173 firms. The firms belonging to 
 
51 SIC denotes Standard Industrial Classification of Statistics Netherlands. The 3-digit level allo-
cates industrial firms to 122 groups.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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the panel contribute 30% of total training expenditure and cover 17% of total employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector in 1993.  
The firms in the balanced panel have, on average, a larger workforce than the average 
Dutch manufacturing firm (see Table 6.3). In 1993, 95% of the firms in the panel has 
between 75 and 5000 employees, and the average number is about 700. Only 4% of the 
firms in the panel has on average less than 100 employees, and the smallest firm in our 
panel still has 40 employees in 1993. In contrast, firms with 20-100 employees account 
for more than 80% of all Dutch industrial firms with at least 20 employees (ENSR, 
1997). The larger average firm size of the panel reflects the fact that larger firms are 
more likely to provide training. Finally, the chemical industry is over represented in the 
balanced panel. 
Table 6.3 presents summary statistics of the panel and the production survey. The two 
years under review differ to some extent. Employment, gross output and value added 
decreased in the period 1990-1993. This is not specific for the balanced panel: the com-
plete production survey shows the same development. 
Table 6.3   Summary statistics for the balanced panel of linked data (Panel) and the Production 
Survey for manufacturing (PS), 1990-1993 
 Panel  d   PS  d 
 1990  1993    1990  1993 
Gross output a   298 252    46  41 
Value added a   96 91    13  11 
Number of employees   859 714    127  108 
Number of hours worked b   1522 1186       
Labour productivity c  106 108    101  102 
Number of firms  173 173    6154  6681 
source:   Boon and Van der Eijken (1997). 
a:   in million 1990 guilders. 
b:   in thousand working hours. 
c:   value added per employee in thousand 1990 guilders. 
d:   averages. 
6.5.2  The production function 
To test the hypotheses, we estimate a nested production function
52 (Figure 6.1). Gross 
production Q for firm i at year t is a function of materials M, capital C and efficiency 
labour L. Efficiency labour L is the outcome of a production process involving the 
amount of days worked LD and the stock of human capital HC. The human capital stock 
is determined by the average educational level AS
53 of the work force and firm-provided 
training. The impact of firm-provided training on human capital is modelled as a func-
 
52 Within an unnested production function, human capital is a production factor of its own, inde-
pendent of capital and labour. We prefer to treat human capital as a specific component of the 
production factor “labour”. This requires the use of a nested production function (Barret and 
O’Connell, 2001; Den Butter and Wollmer, 1992). 










tion of the number of training days (TD), and the human capital elasticity of training 
days depends on the HRM effect (TS/LD), the scale effect (LD) and the selection effect 
(TD/LD).  





Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, gross output of individual firms is modelled 
as:  
qi,t = α0 + α1⋅mi,t + α2⋅ci,t + α3⋅li,t + α4⋅Dt + u1i,t (6.1) 
where small letters represent the logs of the variables, Dt a year dummy (1993=1) and 
u1i,t a vector of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) residuals. The parameters α1, 
α2 and α3 denote the output elasticity’s of the respective inputs, and α0 is a constant 
term.  
Labour is modelled as: 
li,t = δ1⋅ldi,t + δ2⋅hci,t + u2i,t (6.2) 
where LDi,t is the total number of days worked, HCi,t the amount of human capital 
within the firm and u2i,t an i.i.d. disturbance term. The number of days worked is cor-
rected for the time spent in training. Training aims to increase the amount of human 
capital (HC), but at the same time reduces the available amount of labour days (LD). As 
a result, equation (6.2) separates the benefits of training from the opportunity costs.  
Substituting (6.2) in (6.1) gives the following expression: 
qi,t = α0 + α1⋅mi,t + α2⋅ci,t + α31⋅ldi,t + α32⋅hci,t + α4⋅Dt + εi,t  (6.3) 
where α31, α32 and εi,t are defined implicitly. With this specification we assume that in-
creases in the stock of human capital will increase the level of production, not the 
growth rate
54. For the empirical investigation, the distinction between level and growth 
effect is however not relevant: since we only have information on two different points in 
time, these effects cannot be distinguished from each other. 
 
54  See Cörvers (1997) for a discussion of level and growth effects of human capital on productivity.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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The human capital stock of a firm depends on the average educational level of the em-
ployees. It changes each year, due to changes in the composition of the work force and 
changes in the human capital of individual employees. We assume that changes in the 
composition of the work force (and the associated changes in the average educational 
level of the employees) only play a minor role, given the short time span of the avail-
able data
55. The stock of human capital of firm i in year t can then be defined as follows: 
HCi,t = (1-δ)⋅HCi,t-1 + THCi,t-1 (6.4) 
In this equation, δ represents the annual depreciation rate of human capital and THC the 
increase of human capital due to training of employees.  
The human capital increase resulting from firm-provided training depends on the num-
ber of training days:  
thci,t= γi,t⋅tdi,t + u3i,t  (6.5) 
where TD is the number of firm-provided training days and u3i,t an i.i.d. disturbance 
term. The human capital elasticity of training γi,t can be modelled as a function of the 
three firm-size effects. 
The Human Resource Management and selection effects 
Training support is defined as the number of days a firm spends on administrating and 
coordinating firm-provided training (carried out by a specific department or employee 
concerned with training programs). Training support per working day (TS/LD) is used 
as an indicator for the HRM effect. It represents the average amount of training support 
per full-time equivalent (fte)
56. The selection effect can be tested by including the ratio 
between training days and working days (TD/LD). Some statistics that are related to 
these indicators are presented in Table 6.4.  
The human capital elasticity of training γ can be modelled as a linear function of these 
indicators: 
γi,t =β1+β2⋅TS/LDi,t+ β3⋅TD/LDi,t + u4i,t, (6.6) 
where  u4i,t represents an i.i.d. disturbance term. According to the selection effect 
(H6.1a) β3<0 must hold. Hypothesis H6.1b states that TD/LDi,t and the number of em-
ployees are positively related. The HRM effect (H6.2a) implies that β2>0 and hypothe-
sis H6.2b states that TS/LDi,t and the number of employees are positively related. 
 
55 Also, effects of learning by doing are not taken into account. 
56 A full-time equivalent is defines as 220 working days (of 8 hours). Chapter 6 
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Table 6.4   Panel summary statistics on the HRM and selection effect, 1990-1993, by size class 
  1990   1993 
  Number of employees:    Number of employees: 
 40-150  150-500  >500    40-150  150-500  >500 
Number of employees a   127   283  3095    112  262  2501 
Training support / fte a   0.16   0.39  1.02      0.17   0.35   0.76 
Training days / fte
 a   2.5   2.6   4.2      2.7    3.4    4.1 
% of training held during 
working time a   31%   35%  56%      51%   43%    62% 
Number of firms     46    89    38      45
b   89   38 
a: averages. 
b:   within this size class, one firm reported a fraction of training days per working day of 95% in 
1993. This observation has been excluded from this table, and the firm is excluded from further 
analyses. 
 
The scale effect 
The presence of the scale effect can be investigated by introducing a size class dummy 
in equation (6.6): 
γi,t =β1(1+β1’DSC i,t)+ β2⋅TS/LDi,t (1+β2’DSC i,t) + β3⋅TD/LDi,t (1+β3’DSC i,t)+ u4i,t, (6.6’) 
where DSC =1 for large firms and zero otherwise. An F-test on the hypothesis that β1’ = 
β2’= β3’ = 0 can be used to investigate the scale effect (hypothesis H6.3).  
The next step is to substitute (6.6)
57 in (6.5):  
thci,t = β1⋅tdi,t + β2⋅TS/LDi,t⋅tdi,t + β3⋅TD/LDi,t⋅tdi,t + u3i,t + u4i,t⋅tdi,t (6.7) 
In theory, equations (6.4) and (6.7) can be used to construct a time series of the human 
capital stock HCi,t based on the investment thci,t, for every firm i and year t for which 
data are available
58. This would however result in a production function that is non-
linear in the parameters to be estimated. To avoid computational complications, this 
method has not been applied. Alternatively, the human capital increase from training 
THC can be used as an indicator for the stock of human capital: 
HCi,t = THCi,t (6.8) 
for both years, 1990 and 1993. Previous research shows that using (6.4) or (6.8) to rep-
resent human capital in a production function yields comparable results (Boon and Van 
der Eijken, 1997; Dearden et al., 2000). 
 
57 For notational convenience, the production function will be derived using (6.6) instead of (6.6’). 
58 Boon and Van der Eijken (1997) use this approach on training expenditures, and Hall and Mair-
esse (1995) on R&D investments.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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Finally, the production function is obtained by substituting (6.7) in (6.3), using (6.8): 
qi,t = α0 + α1⋅mi,t + α2⋅ci,t + α31⋅ldi,t + α32β1⋅tdi,t + α32β2 ⋅TS/LDi,t⋅tdi,t  
+ α32β3⋅TD/LDi,t⋅tdi,t + α4⋅Dt + ui,t, 
with ui,t = u1i,t + α32⋅u3i,t + α32⋅u4i,t⋅tdi,t (6.9) 
In this specification of the production function, the production elasticity of human capi-
tal (α32) is not identified
59. Consequently, it is not possible to test for constant returns to 
scale with respect to the firm production function (6.1).  
Estimation techniques 
The production function (6.9) can be estimated using ordinary least squares, under the 
assumption that the disturbance term ui,t is i.i.d. with mean zero and a constant variance. 
However, heterogeneity across firms can occur because of differences in technologies 
used, the average educational level
60, the type of output and other HRM measures aimed 
at improving performance. This heterogeneity between firms can be represented by a 
firm-specific effect θi. In symbols: 
ui,t = θi + ηi,t  (6.10) 
where ηi,t denotes the remaining disturbance, which is assumed to be i.i.d. following a 
standard normal distribution.  
Panel data estimators exploit this specification of the disturbance term. The fixed effects 
(FE) estimator assumes the firm-specific effects to be fixed parameters, which have to 
be estimated by including firm-specific dummies in the regression (with ηi,t replacing ui,t 
as the disturbance term). Because the sample covers two years, the fixed effects estima-
tor is identical to ordinary least squares (OLS) on the first differences of the production 
function (6.9). The random effects (RE) estimator assumes θi to be a random variable. If 
the firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, then the RE es-
timator is more efficient than the FE estimator is. It is furthermore preferred over the FE 
estimator, because the RE estimator delivers unconditional results whereas the results of 
the FE estimator are conditional on the specific firms in the sample (Hsiao, 1986). 
 
59 It is possible, however, to determine the production elasticity of training days d(qi,t)/d(tdi,t). This 
elasticity is derived in appendix 6.1. 
60 No information on the educational level is available. Any impact of this variable is therefore in-
cluded in the disturbance term. We assume that the average educational level within individual 
firms remains constant during the relatively short period under consideration (1990-1993),which 
implies that the average educational level is a firm-specific effect. Chapter 6 
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6.6 Results 
The hypotheses regarding the HRM, selection and scale effects are tested by estimating 
the production function (6.9). First, a correlation analysis is used to investigate hypothe-
ses H6.1b and H6.2b, which state that the number of employees is positively related 
with both training support per working day and training days per working day.  
The correlations given in Table 6.5 indicate that positive relations indeed exist, but in a 
non-linear way: both training support (per working day) and training days (per working 
day) are stronger correlated with the log of the number of employees than with the 
number of employees. Apparently, the correlations with firm size are stronger for 
smaller and medium-sized enterprises than for large enterprises. Furthermore, the corre-
lation is stronger for training support than for training days.  
Table 6.5   Correlations between number of employees and training support / training days  
  Number of employees  Log(number of employees) 
Training support / working day   0.14 (0.009)  0.32 (0.000) 
Training days / working day   0.07 (0.19)  0.17 (0.001) 
note: standard errors given between brackets. 
Next, we investigate the possibility of multicollinearity. This can be done by inspection 
of the correlations between the regressors. Because our dataset only covers two years, 
the fixed effect estimation is identical to OLS on first differences. So, rather than check-
ing the correlations between the levels of the regressors, the correlations between the 
first differences of these variables should be looked at. It turns out that the largest corre-
lation (between changes in td and changes in TD/LD⋅td) is only 0.55. We take this as a 
sign that there is no danger of multicollinearity.  
The production function (6.9) is estimated using both the fixed effects and the random 
effects estimator. The results are reported in Table 6.6 (explaining gross production) and 
Table 6.7 (explaining value added). Capital is measured by electricity usage; using de-
preciation costs invariably results in an insignificant elasticity of capital. The use of 
panel data estimation techniques is justified by the F-test for firm-specific effects: the 
hypothesis that no effects are present is rejected for the FE estimations. 
Hausman’s test statistic is used to test for a dependency between regressors and firm-
specific effects. According to this statistic, the RE estimator is to be preferred: the hy-
pothesis that the firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the regressors cannot be re-
jected. There are however reasons to doubt this conclusion. First, if depreciation costs 
are used to measure capital, Hausman’s test statistic does reject the no-correlation hy-
pothesis
61. Secondly, this test statistic is based on the assumption that the disturbance is 
homoscedastic. Goldfeld-Quandt test statistics, however, indicate that the disturbances 
are heteroscedastic. Finally, the error component α32⋅u4i,t⋅tdi,t in the production function 
(6.9) suggests that the firm-specific effects are correlated with the regressors. We there-
fore prefer the FE specification. For this specification, a heteroscedastic-robust estima-
tion has been performed. Both the standard and the robust estimates of the standard er-
 
61 For gross production, the value of the test statistic is 20.09, with a probability-value of 0.00. For 
value added, the test statistic equals 28.71 with a probabiliy value of 0.00.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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rors of the parameters are given in Table 6.6 and Table 6.7. Especially the standard er-
rors of the training-related variables benefit from this correction. 
Table 6.6  Estimation results of a Cobb-Douglas production function explaining log(gross pro-
duction) 





st. error e   Par. 
 
St. error 
Materials   0.76   0.030***   0.032***     0.78   0.012*** 
Capital
 a   0.047   0.022**   0.020**     0.021   0.008*** 
Labour   0.20   0.036***   0.035***     0.21   0.016*** 
Training days  -0.0042   0.01   0.008     0.0037   0.0083 
Training support per 
working day b   0.23   0.12*   0.083***     0.22   0.11** 
Training days per work-
ing day b   0.013   0.063   0.056     0.013   0.057 
Time-dummy  -0.017   0.0077**  -    -0.015   0.0073** 
            
Hausman
 c         6.70  (0.35) 
F-test for firm-specific 
effects
 c   5.15  (0.000)***        
F-test for scale effect
 c   1.10    (0.35)     0.47  (0.70) 
F-test for returns to 
training
 c   1.60    (0.19)     0.92  (0.43) 
Goldfeld-Quandt c,d   1.48  (0.01)*       1.50   (0.009)*** 
Jarque-Bera c 36.7    (0.00)***       
Adjusted R
2  0.9969     0.8788     0.9936   
N 344    172    344   
*:  significant at 10%. 
**:   significant at 5%. 
***:  significant at 1%. 
a:   capital measured by electricity consumption. 
b:   multiplied with log (training days). 
c:   p-value between brackets. If given in column “robust st. error”, the test statistic is calcu-
lated from the robust estimation results. 
d:   observations ordered by training days; 75 firms with smallest and largest values are com-
pared; similar conclusions are obtained if observations are ordered by gross production 
and labour. 
e:   heteroscedastic-consistent estimates, obtained by estimating the FE model as OLS on first 
differences. This causes the time-dummy to disappear from the regression equation, the 
number of observations is halved and the adjusted R2 is computed differently. 
note:  constant and parameters for three sector dummies are not reported. 
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Table  6.7  Estimation results of a Cobb-Douglas production function explaining log(value 
added) 










 a   0.23   0.086***   0.092**     0.11   0.026*** 
Labour   0.80   0.13***   0.13***     0.87   0.052*** 
Training days   0.014   0.038   0.033     0.055   0.031* 
Training support per 
working day b   0.73   0.47   0.31**     1.00   0.42** 
Training days per work-
ing day b   0.024   0.25   0.16    -0.059   0.21 
Time-dummy  -0.072   0.030**   -    -0.064   0.028** 
            
Hausman
 c         7.10  (0.21) 
F-test for firm-specific 
effects
 c   4.08  (0.000)***        
F-test for scale effect
 c   0.73    (0.53)     0.18  (0.91) 
F-test for returns to train-
ing
 c   1.37    (0.25)     0.70  (0.55) 
Goldfeld-Quandt c,d   2.19 (0.000)***       2.25   (0.000)*** 
Jarque-Bera c 363.7    (0.00)***     
Adjusted R
2   0.9505     0.3094     0.8982   
N 344    172    344   
*:  significant at 10%. 
**:   significant at 5%. 
***:  significant at 1%. 
a:   capital measured by electricity consumption. 
b:   multiplied with log (training days). 
c:   p-value between brackets. If given in column “robust st. error”, the test statistic is calcu-
lated from the robust estimation results. 
d:   observations ordered by training days; 75 firms with smallest and largest values are com-
pared; similar conclusions are obtained if observations are ordered by gross production 
and labour. 
e:   heteroscedastic-consistent estimates, obtained by estimating the FE model as OLS on first 
differences. This causes the time-dummy to disappear from the regression equation, the 
number of observations is halved and the adjusted R2 is computed differently. 
note:  constant and parameters for three sector dummies are not reported. 
 
Only support for HRM effect 
The estimation results indicate that a human resource management effect indeed exists. 
Both FE (robust) and RE report a significant impact of training support per working day 
on gross production and value added. What does this mean? Given training support, in-
creasing the number of training days will increase gross production and value added. 
But also, given the number of training days, an increase in training support will increase   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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performance. The more support employees receive, the more effective training is. The 
results even suggest that training has no effect at all, if it is not accompanied by training 
support: the parameter for training days does not significantly differ from zero. Because 
smaller firms provide on average less training support per working day than larger 
firms, smaller firms benefit less (cet. par.) from additional training. 
Contrary to the expectations of Dearden et al. (2000), we find no support for a selection 
effect: the benefits of training do not depend on the number of training days per em-
ployee. There is also no indication of a scale effect within our sample. To test for this 
effect, we have estimated an alternative specification of the production function, with 
the human capital elasticity defined by equation (6.6’) instead of (6.6). This enables the 
use of an F- test to test for the presence of a scale effect (H6.3), comparing 45 firms 
with less than 150 employees (1990) with 127 larger firms. We cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of no scale effect, for none of the four specifications. 
The benefits of training 
Without training support, training has no effect at all: the parameters of both training 
days and training days per working day are not significantly different from zero. With 
only an HRM effect present, the human capital elasticity of training equals β2⋅TS/LD, 
and the production elasticity of training
62 becomes α32β2⋅TS/LD. This elasticity can be 
used to estimate the impact of an increase of the number of training days with five days 
per employee. Using average numbers for TS/LD for different size classes, the esti-
mated effects are given in Table 6.8. The reported effects are very small. This is not 
surprising, once we realise that we estimate the effect of additional training days on to-
tal production and value added, and that full-time employees follow on average less 
than 5 training days per year (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.8  Estimated impact of an increase of 5 training days for different size classes 
Size class (number of employees)  Gross production  Value added 
  40-150    + 0.033%    + 0.11% 
150-500    + 0.055%    + 0.17% 
     >500    + 0.10%    + 0.32% 
According to these calculations, the benefits of an increase of the number of training 
days are 3 times as large for the average large firm than for the average small firm in 
our sample. 
Additional tests 
Some additional calculations have been made to establish how robust these conclusions 
are. First, the conclusions regarding the benefits of training do not depend on the choice 
of available capital measurements. Using a robust fixed effects estimator, the HRM ef-
fect is significant (at a 1% level) for both gross production and value added if capital is 
measured by depreciation costs.  
 
62 The opportunity costs of training, which are part of the production elasticity of training, are ex-
cluded here. The opportunity costs will be discussed in the next section. Chapter 6 
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Next, we have included the share of training days held externally and the fraction of 
training days held during working hours in the production function. Contrary to Lynch 
and Black (1995), we do not find an indication of any relevance of these variables for 
production levels.  
If training expenditures instead of training days are used, the parameter estimates are 
comparable. The significance of the training-related variables drops however; only the 
RE specification finds a significant effect of training on valued added (this result is 
comparable with Boon and Van der Eijken (1997), who use the same dataset).  
In addition to testing for the significance of the separate firm-size effects, we investigate 
the joint significance of all effects. To this end, an F- test is performed: the production 
function is estimated with and without the training-related variables, and the F-test sta-
tistic for returns to training is calculated using the residual sum of squares of these al-
ternative specifications. Despite the fact that the HRM effect significantly differs from 
zero, the F-test for returns to training cannot reject the hypothesis of no returns to train-
ing. A final test statistic suggests that the above results must be interpreted with some 
caution: the test statistics assume that the disturbances are normally distributed, but ac-
cording to the Jarque-Bera test this is not the case.  
6.7 Discussion 
Selection effect 
In the absence of a selection effect, the benefits of training do not decrease with the 
amount of training. Various explanations are possible for the lack of evidence for a se-
lection effect. First of all, there may indeed be no such relationship. For example, firms 
may select employees and training programs according to their expected effect on prof-
itability instead of productivity. This can result in a different ranking: training courses 
can have different costs per training day, and employees differ in their expected remain-
ing tenure.  
Another explanation is that firms have no adequate information on the qualities of their 
employees, of the available training courses, and of every match between employee and 
training course. This makes a correct ranking impossible. This problem is especially 
relevant considering the different types of training. It may be very difficult for an em-
ployer to compare the expected benefits of a welding course and a management training.  
According to Hocquet (1999), British and French firms use different criteria to select 
employees for training. In France, less efficient workers are more likely to be selected 
for training, while in the UK selection is independent of efficiency
63. This indicates that 
the importance, or even presence, of a selection effect can differ between countries.  
Finally, we have treated the HRM effect and selection effect independent from each 
other. The selection effect, however, requires firms to have certain information on em-
ployees and training courses. According to the HRM effect, gathering this information 
 
63 Relative efficiency is indicated by relative wage differences between employees who are identi-
cal in all other observable characteristics, such as school qualifications, seniority and experience.   The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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is an important part of training support. This suggests a combination of the selection ef-
fect and HRM effect. The elasticity of training, γi,t, may decline with the number of 
training days per employee (the selection effect), where the rate of decline increases 
with training support (HRM effect). This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. Following this ar-
gument, firm A will have a higher elasticity of training than firm B, despite the fact that 
firm A provides more training days, and the elasticity of training decreases with the 
amount of training days per employee. We have not corrected for this combined effect, 
which can explain the lack of empirical support for the selection effect.  






The estimation results provide no evidence of a direct firm-size effect. However, the 
available dataset only includes 11 firms with less than 100 employees, and none with 
less than 40. The rejection of the scale effect is therefore not valid for firms with less 
than 100 employees. It remains an open question whether the scale effect exists between 
firms with more and less than 100 employees, and within the (large) group of smaller 
firms. 
The opportunity costs of training: comparing costs and benefits 
Table 6.8 presents the estimated benefits of training: the increase in annual production 
and value added that results from an increase in labour productivity. These calculations 
do not take account of the reduction in days worked, which occurs if employees are off 
to follow a training during working hours. The associated loss of production constitutes 
the opportunity costs of training. If we assume that 50% of all training days is held dur-
ing working time (Table 6.4), then an increase of the number of training days with five 
days per employee results in a decrease of 2.5 working days per employee. This results 
in a 0.23% decrease of gross production and a 0.92% decrease of value added.  
How much time does it take to recover these opportunity costs? If we are willing to 
make some crude assumptions, we can calculate the break-even point where the oppor-
tunity costs are offset by the benefits. Assuming an annual human capital depreciation 
rate of 10% and a discount rate of 4%, small firms have a break-even point of 20 years 
for gross production, and the opportunity costs will never be fully compensated by an 
increased productivity. For firms with 150-500 employees, the break-even points are 6 





























and 9 years for production and value added, and for the large firms the break-even 
points are 3 and 4 years.  
We must be careful with any conclusions regarding the profitability of training invest-
ments. First, different assumptions regarding depreciation and discount rates lead to dif-
ferent outcomes. Next, we assume that a reduction of 2.5 working days per employee 
has equal (relative) effects for small and large firms. It is, however, likely that small 
firms suffer from diseconomies of scale. “If a firm has 4 employees and one attends a 
training course away from the firm, a quarter of the firm’s labour force is lost for that 
period. (...) No cash can create substitutes for a key employee who is part of an inte-
grated, experienced work team” (Curran et al., 1997). Thirdly, not all training costs are 
included.  
In addition, the research presented in this chapter does not include all determinants of 
the benefits of firm-provided training. The expected remaining tenure of trained em-
ployees is not taken into account, nor the time horizon of the employer. A relatively 
short time horizon reduces the total expected benefits. Finally, benefits of individual 
training courses show a large variation (Groot, 1994). Therefore, firms that provide less 
training to their employees are confronted with a higher uncertainty regarding the aver-
age returns to training. Given the limited financial resources of smaller firms, firms may 
choose not to take this risk. 
Some limitations of the dataset 
The panel used in this chapter only covers two years. This makes it impossible to con-
trol for the endogenous nature of training. This problem is common to most studies on 
the returns to training, with the exception of Dearden et al (2000). According to their re-
sults, treating training as an exogenous variable results in a downward bias. This would 
imply that our results are a lower boundary for the true impact of training on production.  
Another characteristic of our dataset is that it includes only firms who provide training 
on a regular basis. This introduces the risk of a sample selection bias. If the likelihood 
of providing training is positively correlated with the elasticity of training, we would 
overestimate the elasticity for the population of all firms; our results would then “only” 
hold for those firms that already provide training. 
The sample selection effect closely resembles the within-sample selection effect that is 
examined in this chapter. Where the sample selection effect assumes that the elasticity 
of training differs between firms that provide training and those that don’t, the within-
sample selection effect implies that the elasticity of training differs between firms that 
provide relatively much training with those that provide relatively less. As we have 
seen, we have found no support for the within-sample selection effect, despite the fact 
that the annual amount of training varies from nearly zero (0.05) to 28.5 training days 
per fte in our sample. We therefore argue that selection effects are less important than 
the HRM effect. Further research is of course needed to substantiate this suggestion, but 
for now, we assume that a sample selection bias is not likely to be very important.    The impact of firm-provided training on production 
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6.8 Conclusions 
According to Storey (1994, page 293), “considerable doubts over the effectiveness of 
small business training have to be registered”. This chapter confirms Storey’s doubts. 
We have identified three different firm-size effects on the returns to firm-provided train-
ing: the HRM effect, the selection effect and the scale effect. Empirical support is found 
for the HRM effect. According to this effect, a positive relationship exists between the 
amount of training support and the impact of firm-provided training on labour produc-
tivity. Firms that invest more time in setting up and managing their training activities 
enjoy higher benefits of training. On average, large firms provide relatively more train-
ing support to their employees than smaller firms. This results in an indirect firm-size 
effect. The importance of training support confirms the results of Gelderblom and De 
Koning (1996) and Lynch and Black (1995). These studies illustrate the need to take ac-
count of the complexity of the training process in order to measure the returns to train-
ing. 
The results presented in this chapter are obtained using data on Dutch manufacturing 
firms with 100-5000 employees providing training to their employees. Generalisation to 
smaller firms, other countries and to firms who do not provide training is not without 
difficulties. 
An important question is whether the HRM effect represents a causal relationship. The 
results by Dearden et al. (2000) suggest that treating training as an exogenous variable 
(as is the case in this chapter) results in an underestimation of the impact of training on 
production and value added. However, since their study uses information from a differ-
ent country at a different level of aggregation, it is not clear whether their result also ap-
plies to this chapter. 
Previous studies that estimate the elasticity of training (Bartel, 1994; Dearden et al., 
2000) indicate a positive effect of training on production. They are, however, not able to 
distinguish between the benefits and opportunity costs of training. Our estimations al-
low to separate these two effects. Tentative calculations suggest that the balance be-
tween benefits and opportunity costs is more favourable for large firms than for small 
firms. We must however be careful with any conclusions regarding the profitability and 
desirability of training investments for small firms.  
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Appendix 6.1: The production elasticity of training days 
In this appendix, we derive the production elasticity of training days, d(qi,t)/d(tdi,t), for 
production function (6.9). In doing so, we take account of the fact that changes in the 
number of training days result in changes in the number of days worked: we assume that  
TLDi,t = LDi,t + φ⋅TDi,t + TSi,t (6.1’) 
with TLD the total number of (labour) days available for a firm, and φ the fraction of 
firm-provided training that is followed during working hours. We assume that TLD is 
fixed. Given the importance of the HRM effect, which is measured by the amount of 
training support per working day TS/LD, we write TSi,t/LDi,t = RTSi,t and rewrite equa-
tion (6.1’) as 
t i
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equation (6.3’) can be rewritten as  
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. (6.8’) 
The first element of the right-hand side of equation (6.8’) defines the opportunity costs 
of training. The benefits of training, which are defined by the remaining terms of the 
right-hand side of equation (6.8’), represent the increase in total production and value 
added due to an increased productivity. Notice that an increase in the amount of training 
days per working day (TD/LD) not only decreases the benefits of training (in the pres-
ence of a selection effect, i.e. β3 <0), but also increases the opportunity costs of training. 
Training support per employee (RTS) has opposite effects, both on the benefits of train-
ing and on the opportunity costs.   
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Chapter 7: The effects of transaction costs and human 
capital on firm size  
7.1 Introduction 
Why do firms differ in size? From microeconomic theory, we know that economies of 
scale, resulting from technical and allocational efficiency, can explain cross-industry 
differences in average firm size. It does not, however, explain differences in firm size of 
firms that are operating in similar environments. Other theories have been developed to 
explain the vast heterogeneity in firm size. Three alternative approaches to explain firm 
size may be distinguished (You, 1995). According to the transaction cost approach (or 
institutional approach
64), firm size is determined by transaction cost efficiency (Becker 
and Murphy, 1992; Davis and Henrekson, 1999; Williamson, 1967). Within the indus-
trial organization approach, size distribution is explained by market power. Thirdly, the 
growth approach focuses on the dynamics of the size distribution of firms. This ap-
proach includes life-cycle models, evolutionary models on firm growth and studies on 
Gibrat’s law (Almus and Nerlinger 1999; Dutta and Prasad, 1996; Erikson and Pakes, 
1995; Sutton, 1997). 
Firm size is often measured by the size of the labour stock. Recently, the attention of 
economic research has focused on labour flows
65. Analysis of large longitudinal datasets 
at enterprise level provides insight into the specific characteristics of labour flows be-
tween enterprises and establishments, and their connection with labour market dynamics 
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990,1992; Davis et al., 1996). An important finding is that 
worker flows exceed job flows. For the Netherlands, Hamermesh et al. (1996) find that 
worker turnover is roughly three times as large as job turnover. The largest part of job 
turnover (job creation + job destruction) takes place within the same regions and 
branches of industry. This implies that job creation and job destruction are much more 
driven by idiosyncratic, firm-specific shocks than by demand and supply shocks at 
macro level.  
Differences in firm size are likely to affect worker turnover and internal labour flows. 
From that perspective, we examine the relationship between firm size and internal la-
bour flows. In doing so, we combine literature on labour flows with the standard neo-
classical and transaction cost approaches to explain firm size. For this purpose, we con-
struct an empirical simulation model that incorporates various mechanisms that may be 
regarded as underlying sources of firm heterogeneity. We investigate how this combina-
tion of theories can explain firm size differences. 
 
64  From a macroeconomic point of view, transaction costs include costs associated with existing in-
stitutions. Transaction cost theory then effectively becomes an institutional theory of the firm 
(You, 1995, page 448). 
65 Labour flows and migration patterns have been studied extensively at a macro level (Borjas, 
1994; Reichlin and Rustichini, 1998), but at a micro level, labour flows have only recently 
gained attention. Chapter 7 
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Although firm behaviour is described by profit maximization, building and solving an 
analytical model that incorporates all required sources of heterogeneity appears im-
possible. Therefore, we use a simulation model that is calibrated using the scarce em-
pirical evidence on internal labour flows (Van Gameren, 2000). Simulation models have 
been used previously, mostly involving Gibrat’s law. These simulation models are, 
however, of a different nature than the simulation model used in this chapter. Simula-
tion models on Gibrat’s law examine firm size distribution. These models focus on the 
growth processes of interacting firms, taking account of entry and exit and a dynamic 
market (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; McCloughan, 1995). Instead, this chapter looks into 
the internal labour flows within individual firms, to examine the equilibrium level of the 
size of individual firms in a static environment. 
The main theoretical perspective that is applied in this chapter is the transaction cost ap-
proach. The optimal size of individual firms in our model is determined by an equilib-
rium, where marginal internal costs are equal to marginal external costs. Following the 
Coase criterion, the internal costs are not only determined by production costs (wages), 
but also by internal transaction costs associated with coordination of labour in the hier-
archy of the firm. Our simulation exercises focus on changes in the internal transaction 
costs, which are implemented by parameter changes in the model. We leave the external 
(market) costs unaltered by assuming a completely elastic demand for the firm’s product 
and a fixed price. However, these transaction costs could, in principle, also be subject of 
a sensitivity analysis (see Den Butter and Van Gameren, 2000). 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section reviews what the literature 
on transaction costs, hierarchical models of the firm, equilibrium search theory and in-
ternal labour markets can teach us about the underlying sources of heterogeneity 
amongst enterprises. This gives us a hint on how to make this heterogeneity operational 
in the model. Section 7.3 discusses how these features are implemented in the simula-
tion model, and the calibration of the model. The following two sections discuss simula-
tion outcomes. Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2 Theoretical  background 
Transaction costs 
Adam Smith stated that firm size is determined by benefits and costs of specialization of 
labour, resulting in economies of scale. The degree of specialization would be limited 
mainly by the extent of the market
66. Coase (1937) examined whether this specialization 
should take place within one single firm, or between several enterprises. He introduced 
the idea of transaction costs, to explain which transactions should take place in the mar-
ket, and which transactions are more efficient within the framework of an enterprise. 
Transaction cost theory assumes that all transactions are costly due to bounded rational-
ity and opportunism. We adopt the concept of transaction costs to incorporate the cost 
of an enterprise’s internal organization in our simulation model. As mentioned in the in-
troduction this is the main mechanism that determines optimal firm size in our model. 
 
66  Assuming that employers want to maximize their profits.   The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
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Transaction cost theory generally discusses inter-firm relations, and in particular the 
make-or-buy decision (Klos and Nooteboom, 2001). However, our focus is on internal 
transactions, and, therefore, on internal transaction costs. All transactions require coor-
dination and cooperation from the individuals involved; hence, transaction costs can be 
classified into coordination and motivation costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Internal 
coordination consists of several steps (each resulting in internal coordination costs): ob-
taining information needed to determine an efficient plan for a transaction; using the 
knowledge available to determine the plan to be implemented; communicating the plan 
to those responsible for implementing it; and monitoring the plan. Motivation costs may 
arise due to information incompleteness, information asymmetries and imperfect com-
mitment (resulting in hold-up problems). Nooteboom (1993) and Garnsey (1998) argue 
that small businesses have a behavioural advantage over large enterprises, in that em-
ployees in smaller businesses are more motivated. This results in higher motivation 
costs (per employee) for larger enterprises. 
These transaction costs refer to costs of vertical transactions: transactions that involve 
different hierarchical levels within an enterprise. However, transactions may also take 
place within a certain level. Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that both horizontal coor-
dination and motivation costs per employee increase with the number of employees. 
Hierarchical models of the firm 
Williamson (1967) used a hierarchical model of an individual enterprise to examine de-
terminants of optimal firm size
67. This model delineates a price-taking enterprise with m 
administrative levels. Each employee may supervise s subordinates, i.e. the span of con-
trol equals s. Williamson also introduced a “compliance” or “loss of control” parameter 
that indicates the effective contribution of an employee to the objectives of his supervi-
sor. The compliance parameter is less than 1, reflecting that “only a fraction of the in-
tentions of the superior is effectively satisfied by a subordinate” (Williamson, 1967). 
Without loss of control, the enterprise would have an infinite number of levels; in effect, 
its size would be limited by the size of the market only. 
The loss-of-control parameter in this model may be interpreted as a measurement for 
vertical internal transaction costs. This interpretation becomes clear when we explore 
Williamson’s argument to introduce the loss of control. The intentions of the supervisor 
will never be fully satisfied because either the communication between supervisor and 
subordinate is imperfect, or because subordinates do not follow up on agreements made. 
The first explanation reflects (vertical) coordination costs, the second motivation costs. 
Williamson’s (1967) conclusion that the compliance parameter must be less than 1 for 
enterprises to become finite is, therefore, similar to the conclusion by Coase (1937) that 
firm size is finite due to positive (internal) transaction costs.  
Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that optimal firm size is related to the degree of spe-
cialization and coordination costs within hierarchical levels. In their model, individual 
production increases with team size. This is because larger teams allow for more spe-
cialization. The benefits of specialization are balanced with the increasing costs of co-
 
67  This model has later been augmented by Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Keren and Levhari 
(1979). Chapter 7 
124 
ordination between a larger number of more specialized workers. They find that under 
general conditions, team size is limited by coordination costs instead of market size. 
Equilibrium search and internal labour markets  
An objective for our simulation model is that it should outline the dynamic time path of 
the enterprise in response to various types of external shocks. Therefore, the actual firm 
size should continuously be adapted to its optimal size, taking account of adaptation 
costs (e.g. costs of hiring, firing and training). So as to outline this dynamic adjustment 
process, the model combines insights of modern equilibrium search models and the flow 
approach of the labour market (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998) with insights from in-
ternal labour market models (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). These theories also explicitly 
take worker heterogeneity into account. Our model also incorporates this feature, in or-
der to examine how and when differences in human capital may result in differences in 
firm size. 
7.3  Internal labour flows in a hierarchical model of the firm 
Our simulation model focuses on formalizing decisions of personnel managers on the 
allocation of employees over the jobs available. The model specifies hierarchical levels 
in line with Williamson (1967), and applies the theory developed by Becker and Mur-
phy (1992) to model benefits and costs of cooperation within teams/levels. This allows 
us to endogenize the span of control, which is exogenous in Williamson (1967). In this 
section, we outline the specification and calibration of the model
68. 
Independent decisions 
The key assumption in our hierarchical model is that each employee decides whether he 
or she spends time on the production of output or on supervising subordinates (or on a 
combination of both) independently from others in the enterprise. Under specific condi-
tions, this yields identical results as when all decisions are centralized. We consider this 
decision for each individual to be taken by the management of the business rather than 
by employees themselves. 
Profit maximization  
Optimisation starts with the highest-ranked person in the enterprise. He determines the 
optimal number of subordinates for his circumstances by maximization of his contribu-
tion to the business’s profits. The profit function in period t of each supervisor (occu-
pied at hierarchical level i) is specified as: 
∑
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− + + + − − − ⋅ ⋅ =
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68 This model is a variant of the model developed by Van Gameren (2000). We refer to his study 
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and is maximized with respect to the number of subordinates nt, given the currently 
available number of subordinates
*
1 − t n . Profit depends upon benefits and costs of em-
ploying subordinates. Benefits result from the production qj,i,t of individual employees, 
and costs are determined by wage costs (wj,i,t), supervision costs (fpj,i,t) and adjustment 
costs (AC). The function a(n) refers to the benefits and costs of cooperation. The final 
element of this production function is the output price level (pt), which is normalized to 
1. 
Benefits of specialization 
The benefits of specialization (i.e. hiring one or more subordinates) consist of the pro-
duction generated by the subordinates. We specify individual production functions, 
based on the quality of the employee:  
qj,i,t = γq,1· (γq,2)
i
· cj,i,t,           (7.2) 
where the relative quality measure cjit is defined in such a way as to represent the quality 
of the individual employee relative to the expected quality of external applicants at hier-
archical level i: 
cjit = qualjt / E(qAit) (7.3) 
where qualjt is the actual quality of subordinate j, and E(qAit) the expected quality of an 
external applicant.  
If more subordinates are recruited, the tasks that must be performed and coordinated by 
the supervisor may be divided over a larger group of subordinates. This results in spe-
cialization of the subordinates, which yields an increased individual productivity. A 
subordinate’s contribution to firm production is, therefore, modelled as a function of in-
dividual productivity qj,i,t and the number of subordinates within his team. This is in-
cluded as part of the cooperation function: 
a(n) = - α·n
2 +β·n + 1, (7.4) 
where β refers to the benefits of cooperation. 
Horizontal and vertical transaction costs 
Increasing the number of subordinates not only increases the benefits of specialization, 
but also increases horizontal transaction costs (both coordination and motivation). We 
assume that the horizontal transaction costs per subordinate rise with the number of 
subordinates (Becker and Murphy, 1992), which is represented by the parameter α in 
the cooperation function a(n). The parabolic nature of this function implies that individ-
ual productivity may benefit from cooperation with other subordinates (of the same su-
pervisor) at the same hierarchical level, as long as the number of subordinates does not 
become too large; hiring too many subordinates turns the cooperation into a negative 
factor when specialization is extended too far. 
The model also incorporates vertical transaction costs. These are the sum of foregone 
production and loss of control. Foregone production measures the time a supervisor has 
to spend on supervising and coordinating the subordinate; while coordinating, he cannot Chapter 7 
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contribute to production. The amount of coordination required by a subordinate depends 
negatively on his qualities:  
fpj,i,t = γfp,1· (γfp,2)
i
·(1/cj,i,t) (7.5) 
Loss of control measures the extent as to which, even after coordination, subordinates 
still will not be able/willing to produce the output required by their supervisor. The loss 
of control is represented by the parameter γq,2 in the production function. 
Wage costs 
Besides horizontal and vertical transaction costs, the costs of subordinates depend on 
their wages: 
wj,i,t = γw,1·(γw,2)
i · cj,i,t  (7.6) 
The wage function represents an input-based incentive structure: wages depend on indi-
vidual qualities rather than productivity (which depends on the presence of other em-
ployees within the team) and are independent of the qualities or productivity of other 
employees. Nevertheless, given the relationship between quality and productivity, the 
wage function allows for marginal productivity wages within hierarchical levels: wages 
per output are independent of the qualities of the employees. 
Comparisons with other employees are only made when internal promotions occur (this 
will be discussed later on). If employees get promoted (which is modelled as a decrease 
in hierarchical level i), their wages increase discrete rather than continuous, which is in 
line with tournament theories on incentive structures (Lazear, 2000). Whether this wage 
increase exceeds the productivity increase that is associated with promotion, depends 
upon the size of the parameters γw,2 and γq,2. 
Finite firm size 
Coase (1937) concluded that enterprises have a finite size due to positive transaction 
costs. This is also the case for our model: in the absence of any transaction costs, firm 
size is limited by the size of the market only (which is infinite, since we assume perfect 
competition). Transaction costs are necessary to ensure both a finite number of hierar-
chical levels and a finite team size. This effect is realized by modelling the production 
technology and transaction costs in such a way that the supply curve becomes upward 
sloping. 
Adjustment costs 
Until now, we discussed the costs and benefits of having subordinates. A major feature 
of our model is that it contains costs for changing the number of subordinates as well. 
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with n
int the number of potential internal candidates for the job (defined as the number 
of employees at the next lower level), and I(.) the indicator function. The adjustment 
costs include firing costs (fr), internal search costs (si) and external search costs (se), 
and are exogenous to the model.  
In the case of superfluous employees, the employees having the lowest qualities are 
fired. The firm must pay firing costs for each fired employee. If the enterprise has a staff 
shortage, it has to fill vacancies by searching for suitable employees. The enterprise 
searches, first, among the employees currently employed in other jobs at the business. 
We assume the supervisor has insight in the qualities of the employees in the next lower 
rank in the hierarchy (perfect information). Second, if the capacities required are not 
available within the enterprise, the supervisor may decide to recruit a new employee. 
This necessitates an external search procedure that bears a higher cost level. External 
applicants (i.e. their age Agejt and quality qAit) are drawn from a random distribution; 
the enterprise has no influence on the arrival of candidates. This mimics, in a way, in-
complete information. 
This process is captured by the following equations:  
qAit ~ UNIF(qlbit, qubit),  (7.8) 
   q l b it = γqlb,1·(γqprob,2)
i,  
   q u b it = γqub,1·(γqprob,2)
i,  
Agejt ~ UNIF(albit, aubit),   (7.9) 
   a l b it = γalb,1·(γaprob,2)
i,  
   a u b it = γaub,1·(γaprob,2)
i, 
The “baseline” minimum requirements that applicants have to meet are given by: 
mqit = γmq,1·(γmq,2)
i,   (7.10) 
For an internal applicant, the minimum requirements are higher that the baseline: 
mqi,t
int = (1+γRQIE) · mqi,t,  (7.11)  
while for an external applicant, the minimum requirements are below the baseline: 
mqi,t
ext = (1-γRQTR)·mqi,t,   (7.12) 
If an external candidate meets these minimum requirements, but fails to meet the base-
line requirements (7.10), the candidate must take a training course, at a certain cost. If 
neither the internal nor external applicants meet their minimum requirements, the job 
remains vacant. 
Operation of the simulation model 
Optimisation of the profits of the entrepreneur and his search for subordinates are the 
first two steps in the operation of the simulation model. The third step is that for each Chapter 7 
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filled job, i.e. for each subordinate, we repeat the optimisation and search procedure, by 
taking into account the central assumption: each employee takes independent decisions 
on whether he works on the production of output, on the supervision of subordinates, or 
a combination of both. The optimal number of subordinates is independent from the de-
cisions made at other ranks and in other branches in the hierarchy. Given that the num-
ber of employees is finite if internal transaction costs are (sufficiently) positive, the 
number of repetitions of steps 1 and 2 is finite. This makes it possible to delineate the 
enterprise by number of employees, organizational structure, generated output and 
number of unfilled vacancies (step 4 in Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1  Set-up of the simulation model 
Step Proces 
1  Determination of optimal number of subordinates (per supervisor, per time period) 
2  In the case of vacancies: search for employees 
- promotion of insiders (causes vacancy chains); 
- recruitment of outsiders (training might be necessary). 
In the case of superfluous workers: dismiss the least qualified subordinates  
(the result of this step might be that there remain unfilled vacancies) 
3  Perform steps 1 and 2 for each subordinate until reaching the rank where the (optimal) 
number of subordinates equals zero 
4  Determine the number of employees, production (optimal, actual), hiring, firing, (flows, 
cost) and organizational structure of the enterprise 
5  - random quits will occur; 
- there will be an increase in the experience of the employees who stay  
   (“learning by doing”); 
- repeat steps 1 to 4 for the following period. 
After steps 1 to 4, we obtain the hierarchical set-up of the enterprise at the onset of a pe-
riod. All workers in the hierarchy remain at their jobs for (at least) one period and pro-
duce output during this period. At this point, a number of functions specify the relations 
between successive periods. At the end of the period, a random number of employees 
decide to quit the company. Here, we may think of workers who find jobs elsewhere, or 
workers who have other reasons to leave the labour force. The probability that an indi-
vidual employee at hierarchical level i will remain with the firm is defined as (1-γQUIT)
i. 
A fraction of the employees will retire; we impose a mandatory retirement age γRETR. 
Furthermore, employees may get dismissed if their qualities do not meet minimum re-
quirements. This is possible only for employees who were recruited at the beginning of 
the period, and needed a training course to enhance their qualities. If, at the end of the 
year, their quality is still below the baseline minimum requirements, they will be dis-
missed. 
For each worker who does not quit or retire, the passing of time generates an increase in 
their human capital (“learning by doing”). This is implemented as an increase in their 
personal measure of quality. The effect depends on the tenure in the current job and has 
a random component: qualj,t+1 = qualjt·(1+2·(½)
tenJjt
· U), where tenJjt is the tenure in the 
current job and U a random factor drawn from a uniform distribution: U ~ UNIF(0, 
γGRWE). 
The result of quits, retirements and fires is the opening of vacancies at the old positions. 
Instead of immediately searching for candidates who may fill these vacancies (and the   The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
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unfilled vacancies remaining from the previous search process), we return to the optimi-
sation process (step 1) to determine whether it is optimal to search for employees to fill 
the vacancies, or whether it is best to close the vacancies altogether. The next steps in 
the modelling algorithm are conducted successively, as outlined above. 
Calibration of the model 
The parameters of the model are calibrated upon the scarcely available empirical evi-
dence. Our baseline calibration generates a benchmark representative firm whose flow 
characteristics (quits, fires, and internal and external worker flows) mimic the results 
found in a study by Hamermesh et al. (1996). In this chapter we present estimates of the 
annual worker flows in the Netherlands in 1990, drawn from a stratified sample of about 
1,000 enterprises with 10 or more employees
69. The selection of the model parameters, 
to generate our benchmark firm, is based on case studies on the internal economics of 
enterprises by Baker et al. (1994) and Van Gameren et al. (1999). Both case studies util-
ize personnel records of a large enterprise, and specify how the internal structure such 
as the span of control and the wage scales of the business are organized. The calibration 
of search costs is based on linear approximation of the quadratic adjustment cost func-
tion of Pfann and Verspagen (1989). Their results suggest that in the case of small ad-
justments, recruitment costs seem to be somewhat higher than the firing costs, while for 
more expansionary firms, hiring costs increase exponentially. We assume that external 
search is more expensive than internal search, which implies that the first option to fill 
vacancies is through internal moves. 
Simulation results with our calibrated model of a representative business are shown in 
Table 7.2. The flows are based on simulations over 50 periods (or years)
70, and repli-
cated 100 times to account for the random processes incorporated in the model. Aver-
ages are taken over the last 25 years since during the initial years, the business grows to 
its optimal size
71. The simulation results can be compared with the results of Hamer-
mesh et al. (1996) that are presented in the column “target size”. 
Table 7.2 indicates that average firm size hardly fluctuates between the various simula-
tions: the standard deviation of the number of employees is small. A closer inspection of 
the simulation results provides insights into the hierarchical structure. The employer 
hires four employees (say heads of units or plants). Each of these employees wants to 
hire five subordinates (say heads of branches), and is eventually able to keep these posi-
tions filled each period. These subordinates (20 in total) also want to hire five employ-
ees each, but they are not always able to keep these positions occupied (due to quits, re-
tirements or dismissals, and the absence of internal candidates). It is only at this lowest 
level that the simulated enterprises show any variation in number of employees. Appar-
ently, the differences in the human capital stock of the simulated enterprises is not large 
enough to change the optimal number of subordinates and levels between enterprises. 
 
69 Allaart et al. (2000) use a more recent data set for the Netherlands (concerning 1996), and find 
very similar worker flow estimates. 
70 In the model, a period is defined as a year.  
71 At the beginning of the first year, each firm has one employee (i.e. the employer). Chapter 7 
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The table shows that the random processes that hit the enterprise cause more variation in 
some of the labour flows than in the labour stock (the number of employees). Our cali-
brated benchmark model is able to reproduce the target values with respect to the inflow 
and outflow of employees reasonably well. Its distribution of total outflow over outflow 
from existing jobs (quits/retirements and direct fires
72) and outflow from destroyed jobs 
seems less successful. Jobs are being destroyed (the annual job destruction rate is 1.2%), 
but most employees whose jobs are destroyed can find employment elsewhere in the en-
terprise. It is, however, important to notice that the target sizes taken from Hamermesh 
et al. (1996) represent a growing business: total inflow (11.9%) exceeds total outflow 
(10.1%). Our calibrated benchmark model represents a business in equilibrium, with in-
flow and outflow being equal. Hamermesh et al. (1996) find that the dismissal rate (both 
direct fires and outflow from destroyed jobs) is lowest for enterprises with constant em-
ployment level, which suggests that the target size for outflow from a destroyed job is 
set too high. 
Table 7.2   Simulation results  
  Simulation results  Target size 
 





Number of employees in the firm  123  1.90  136 
Inflow      
Hire to a newly created job (%)  2.0  1.70  3.2 
Hire to an existing job (%)  7.8  3.39  8.7 
Outflow      
Quits/retirements (%)  7.6  2.97 
Direct fires (%)  1.9  1.53 
8.2 
Outflow from a destroyed job (%)  0.35  0.66  1.9 
Internal mobility      
To a newly-created job (%)  0.04  0.24  1.2 
To an existing job (by direct subordinate) (%)  0.2  0.51 
To an existing job (from other team) (%)  2.2  1.82 
2.2 
source:   target sizes are taken from Hamermesh et al. (1996), table 1, with the exception of the 
number of employees in the firm, which is taken from Van Gameren (2000), table 6.3. All 
percentages denote percentages of employment. The sample standard deviations are cal-
culated over the last 25 periods. 
Target values for internal flows are the most difficult to reproduce in the calibration 
procedure. Internal mobility towards new jobs is very low: once a business has stabi-
lized, new jobs are almost exclusively created at the lowest rank in the hierarchy (where 
vertical mobility is, by definition, not possible). Vacancies that arise at higher levels are 
mostly filled by internal mobility; external inflow occurs almost exclusively at the low-
est rank. 
 
72 Direct fires occur, when employees are fired because their qualities are insufficient. These em-
ployees directly leave the firm, whilst their jobs remain intact. Indirect fires occur when jobs are 
destroyed; these employees can apply for vacancies elsewhere in the firm.   The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
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7.4  Labour productivity, specialization and firm size  
The simulation model combines elements from various approaches to explaining firm 
size. Specific model parameters represent the microeconomic approach (wage costs, 
benefits of specialization), transaction cost approach (costs of specialization, loss of 
control and supervision), equilibrium search theory (search costs, requirements for can-
didates, quit rate) and human capital of individual employees (variation in qualities of 
external candidates, effects of learning by doing and training).  
The following two sections examine the relevance of these approaches by assessing 
their impact on firm size and labour flows. This section focuses on the microeconomic 
and transaction cost approaches, by studying the impact of changes in labour productiv-
ity and costs and benefits of specialization on firm size and labour flows. Four different 
indicators are used to characterise the size of the simulated firms
73: 
-  The average firm size of firms that survive for a certain number of years; the model 
allows for the possibility that enterprises do not survive after 50 years, therefore the 
average is calculated over all surviving enterprises. 
-  The survival rate; the fraction of all simulated firms that survive after 50 years. Firms 
may not survive either because the original owner cannot find a successor, or be-
cause at a certain point all employees leave the business (through quit or fire). Note 
that the survival of firms only depends on internal factors, and not on market dynam-
ics or the (re)actions of other firms. 
-  The within-standard deviation of firm size: a measure of the average standard devia-
tion within each firm, over all periods of time: it indicates how an individual firm 
differs in size over time. 
-  The between-standard deviation of firm size: a measure for the difference in average 
firm size between enterprises: it indicates how different firms differ in size at a cer-
tain time. 
Labour productivity and firm size 
Our first simulation examines the impact of changes in the average labour productivity. 
To be more exact, we manipulate γq,1, which represents the annual production of a new 
employee with average quality (without any loss of control). The calibration discussed 
in the previous section resulted in a business with an average labour productivity of 150 
units a year. Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between average labour productivity and 
firm size. If average labour productivity is too low and does not cover (transaction) 
costs, entrepreneurs don’t recruit any employees, and enterprises do not survive after 50 
years. At a certain threshold point
74, labour productivity becomes high enough to make 
it profitable to recruit employees, and a level is added to the firm. The survival rate of 
enterprises immediately shifts to nearly 100%. 
A further increase in firm size only occurs if productivity becomes high enough to add a 
third level to the firm, and later on a fourth level
75. Changes in average labour produc-
 
73 With the exception of the survival rate, all characteristics are calculated over the last 25 periods. 
74  γq,1 = 136. 



























tivity have no effect on the size of the teams. Additional profits from increased produc-
tivity are not large enough to justify the costs of increased horizontal and vertical coor-
dination that are associated with an expanding team size. 




note:  the dotted lines represent average firm size +/- 2 x the standard deviation of firm size. 
This changes however, if average productivity is increased further. A small increase at 
the next threshold point (from 155 to 156) now has two effects. An additional level is 
added to the firm, which increases average firm size. Moreover, firms now also differ in 
the sizes of their teams. Not only at the fifth level, but at all levels of the hierarchy. 
Variation in team size increases with hierarchical level. This results in a large variation 
in firm size. Beyond this threshold point, average firm size is determined by team size, 
and not so much by the number of hierarchical levels (for example: increasing the aver-
age production level from 155 to 160 raises average firm size, whilst the number of hi-
erarchical levels remains the same). 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the variance in firm size for enterprises with five hierarchical lev-
els, both within individual businesses over time (measured by the within-standard devia-
tion) and between enterprises (measured by the between-standard deviation). It shows 
the development of four different simulated firms: a firm with an average within-
deviation, the firm with the highest within-deviation, and the firms with - on average - 
the most and least employees. The number of employees often changes; variation in in-
flow (and internal mobility) far exceeds the variation in outflow rates. 
This intriguing change in the working of the model may be explained as follows. First 
of all, it is important to realize that this variation in firm size is entirely due to the het-
erogeneity in available human capital. This follows from the fact that all stochastic ele-
ments in the simulation model are related to the human capital of individual employees: 
qualities of new applicants, returns to training, effects of learning by doing and volun-
tary quits (voluntary quits result in a loss of human capital, and open an opportunity to 
gain new human capital). 
A supervisor will hire employees as long as marginal benefits of the additional produc-
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by definition equal to output price, which is normalized to 1. While marginal benefits 
are independent of the available human capital, marginal costs are not. The marginal 
costs consist of marginal wage costs and marginal transaction costs (supervision costs 
and adjustment costs). We assume marginal productivity wages: wages per output are 
independent of human capital. In contrast, supervision costs per unit of output are nega-
tively related to the amount of human capital: more human capital implies both higher 
production and lower supervision costs
76. 




In short: human capital influences marginal transaction costs of additional production 
and, therefore, the decision on how many employees to hire. With each additional level, 
transaction costs (which depend on human capital available) increase relative to wage 
costs
77, and the costs of managing the hierarchical firm become more important. This 
suggests that with large (5-leveled) firms, personnel management (hiring and selection 
of new employees and internal mobility of incumbent employees) and organizational 
changes may influence firm size. 
Specialization and firm size 
Firm size is determined by the number of workers within each team, as well as the 
number of hierarchical levels. Williamson (1967) modelled the number of workers 
within each team as an exogenous variable: the span of control. In his model, increasing 
the span of control resulted in an increase in the number of levels, so that the effect on 
firm size is twofold. 
 
76 The marginal adjustment costs of an additional unit of production are also negatively related to 
human capital, but less strong than marginal supervision costs. This is because adjustment costs 
are independent of human capital. A formal derivation of marginal costs and benefits is presented 
in the appendix to this chapter. 
77 This is a consequence of the calibration process, which resulted in γfp,2 > γw,2. Chapter 7 
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In our model, the span of control is instead endogenized by introducing the costs and 
benefits of specialization. The net contribution of an individual to the total production of 
its team is the difference between the benefits of specialization and the costs of horizon-
tal coordination. This combined effect is modelled as a parabolic function a(n), along 
the lines of Becker and Murphy (1992). Hence, we have an endogenous span of control 
determined by the efficiency-maximizing team size (defined as the number of employ-
ees for which a(n) reaches it maximum, and the average net contribution per employee 
is optimal). This efficiency-maximizing team size may be manipulated by simultane-
ously changing costs and benefits of specialization. 
Increasing the efficiency-maximizing team size from 1 to 7 employees increases the av-
erage firm size from 4 to more than 700 employees (see figure 7.3). This is exactly ac-
cording to the expectations of the traditional microeconomic approach: economies of 
scale (or specialization) have a positive impact on firm size. Contrary to Williamson 
(1967), we find that increases in the efficiency-maximizing team size have no effect on 
the number of hierarchical levels. 




note: the dotted lines represent the average firm size +/- 2 x the standard deviation of firm size. 
The efficiency-maximizing team size is independent of wage and transaction costs. As a 
result, the (simulated) profit-maximizing team size is not equal to the efficiency-
maximizing team size. In fact, the simulated team size differs between hierarchical lev-
els (since transaction costs differ between levels). With the exception of the highest 
level, the profit-maximizing team size is larger than the efficiency-maximizing team 
size. 
7.5  Different approaches to explaining firm size 
This section examines the effects of changes in several model parameters, for both a 



























s  The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
135 
Simulating small and large enterprises 
The small firm is simulated by selecting the value for average productivity. This yields 
an enterprise with three levels, with approximately 25 employees (see Table 7.3). The 
large enterprise is simulated by enhancing average productivity so that profit maximiza-
tion yields an enterprise with five levels. Adding a fifth level results in higher standard 
deviations of firm size, both within and between enterprises (see Table 7.4). Simulation 
experiments show that this effect does not only occur when average labour productivity 
is enhanced: changes in other parameters may also result in large enterprises with five 
levels and high within-/between-standard deviations. 
Table 7.3  Simulation results for a small benchmark firm 





Survival rate (%)  99     
Start up length (years)  4     
Number of levels   3  0  0 
Number of employees in the firm  24.5  0.72  0.16 
Inflow      
Hire to a newly created job (%)  1.8  0.67  0.11 
Hire to an existing job (%)  7.2  1.29  0.25 
Outflow      
Quits/retirements (%)  6.4  1.22  0.14 
Direct fires (%)  2.3  0.74  0.16 
Outflow from a destroyed job (%)  0.4  0.29  0.05 
Internal mobility       
To a newly-created job (%)  0  0.02  0.00 
To an existing job (by direct subordinate) (%)  0.6  0.40  0.01 
To an existing job (from other team) (%)  1.0  0.50  0.03 
The average rates of in- and outflow are comparable for small and large enterprises: in-
flow is 9% of total employment for small and 11% for large enterprises. The difference 
is caused by the difference in average quit rates between small and large enterprises 
(because the quit rate differs between hierarchical levels, large enterprises have ceteris 
paribus higher quit rates). The nature of the flows differs, however. For small busi-
nesses, the majority of inflow concerns existing jobs, whilst for large enterprises it is 
mostly inflow into newly created jobs. There are fewer fires in large than in small busi-
nesses. The outflow from destroyed jobs is very similar. 
The internal mobility is clearly higher for large enterprises as they have more opportuni-
ties for job movers than small businesses have. This is due to the larger pool of incum-
bent workers with sufficient qualifications. This result is in accordance with the findings 
of Hamermesh et al. (1996) and Hassink (1996). 
Allaart et al. (2000) have calculated worker flows for different size classes. This enables 
us to compare our simulation outcomes with some empirical information. Allaart et al. 
(2000) find that in- and outflow of workers vary less with size class than internal flows 
do. Particularly for enterprises with 20-49 employees they find that inflow equals 12.5% Chapter 7 
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of the number of employees, outflow 10.5% and internal flow 2.3%. For enterprises 
with more than 500 employees, these volumes are 12.6%, 11.1% and 6.9%, respec-
tively. These results are comparable with Hassink (1996), who finds internal labour 
flows of 2.4% for businesses with less than 100 employees, and 4.9% for enterprises 
with more than 100 employees. Our model reproduces the (small) difference in outflow 
between small and large enterprises rather well, but it underestimates internal mobility 
for small businesses, and overestimates internal mobility for large enterprises. 
Table 7.4   Simulation results for a large enterprise 





Survival rate  99%     
Startup length (years)  19     
Number of levels   5     
Number of employees in the firm  792  44.2  93.9 
Inflow      
Hire to a newly created job (%)  8.6  48.2  25.4 
Hire to an existing job (%)   2.4  15.7  16.0 
Outflow      
Quits/retirements (%)  9.3  9.3  8.5 
Direct fires (%)  0.9  5.0  1.0 
Outflow from a destroyed job (%)  0.6  13.1  2.7 
Internal mobility        
To a newly created job (%)  3.5  21.6  18.6 
To an existing job (by direct subordinate) (%)  0.1  0.8  0.3 
To an existing job (from other team) (%)  9.4  16.5  27.4 
Sensitivity analysis 
By way of sensitivity analysis, our final set of simulation experiments illustrates the in-
fluence of parameter changes on size of the labour stock and flows of our small and 
large benchmark firm. These parameter changes represent various options for changing 
the performance of the business. They may be associated with the various theoretical 
approaches to explain heterogeneity amongst enterprises, which are combined in the 
model. The aim of these simulations is to give some indication, both in the case of a 
small business and of a large enterprise, of the relative impact (on firm size) of various 
ways in which enterprises may adapt their production process, internal organization and 
personnel management. 
Tables 7.5 and 7.7 show the effect on the characteristics of the size and labour flows of 
the simulated firms
78, when the parameter changes represent an increase in the perform-
ance of the business. Tables 7.6 and 7.8 show the effect of opposite changes in these 
model parameters. As the response of our model to various shocks and parameter 
 
78 Since our model represents firms in equilibrium, outflow and inflow rates are virtually identical. 
We therefore only present the inflow rates in our tables.   The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
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changes is highly non-linear, mainly as a consequence of ratchet effects (change of 
number of levels), it appears that in some cases, small businesses react less strongly to 
changes than large enterprises do. Therefore, we have conducted our simulation ex-
periments with larger parameter changes for the small business (tables 7.5 and 7.6) than 
for the large enterprise










Table 7.5   Changing parameter values to stimulate performance of small businesses 
    Wages  Specialization  Vertical transaction costs 
 
bench 
mark wagc  wagl  benefits costs 
loss of 
control fgpc  fgpl 
   -5%  -2.5%  +2.5%  -5%  -1%  -10%  -2.5% 
Survival    99%  100%  99% 100%  99% 100%  100%  100% 
Size  (nr.  empl)  24.5  24.5 122.9 123.8 151.0 122.7 122.9 122.8 
    Within st.dev.  0.7  0.7  1.8  2.3  4.8  1.7  1.5  1.5 
    Between st.dev.  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.7  6.1  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Inflow  9.0%  9.0%  9.8% 9.7% 9.5% 9.8% 9.8% 9.9% 




costs Search  requirements 
Quit 
rate   Human capital 
     reqc  reql  rqie    pdfu  grwe 
   -10%  -35% -25%  -50% -2%pt  +30%  +75% 
Survival    99%  100%  100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Size  (nr.  empl)  24.5  122.1 24.5 24.4  24.5 24.6 24.5 24.6 
    Within st.dev.  0.7  1.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7 
    Between st.dev.  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Inflow  9.0%  9.7%  7.1% 6.8%  9.2% 5.8% 7.7% 8.5% 
Internal  mobility    1.6%  2.6%  3.3% 3.7%  1.6% 1.6% 2.3% 1.8% 
 
79 For example: for large firms, the parameter on the effects of learning by doing and training 
(grwe) was changed with +/- 10% (tables 7 and 8). For small firms, this change had no effect. 
Instead, tables 5 and 6 report the effects of changes of +/- 75%. Chapter 7 
138 
Table 7.6   Changing parameter values to hamper performance of small businesses 
    Wages  Specialization  Vertical transaction costs 
 
bench 
mark wagc  wagl benefits costs 
loss of 
control fgpc  fgpl 
   +5%  +2.5%  -2.5%  +5%  +1%  +10%  +2.5% 
Survival    99%  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  99% 
Size  (nr.  empl)  24.5  4.8 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.9  24.4 
        Within  st.dev.  0.7  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 
        Between  st.dev.  0.2  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Inflow  9.0%  9.5% 9.2% 8.6% 9.8% 9.8% 9.1% 9.2% 




costs  Search requirements  Quit rate  Human capital 
     reqc  reql  rqie    pdfu  grwe 
   +10%  +35%  +25%  +50%  +3%  pt  -30%  -75% 
Survival   99%  100%  6%  49%  69%  99%  68%  57% 
Size (nr. empl)  24.5  4.8  23.4  3.8  24.4  24.0  23.6  24.2 
    Within st.dev.  0.7  0.4  1.2  1.4  0.8  1.0  1.1  0.9 
    Between st.dev.  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2 
Inflow 9.0%  9.9%  13.0%  31.3%  9.3%  18.3%  15.6%  12.4% 
Internal mobility  1.6%  1.5%  1.6%  3.7%  1.4%  2.4%  2.1%  5.0% 
 
Table 7.7   Changing parameter values to stimulate performance of large enterprises 
    Wages  Specialization  Vertical transaction costs 
 
bench 
mark wagc  wagl  benefits  costs 
loss of 
control fgpc  fgpl 
    -2.5% -2.5% +2.5% -2.5% -0.5%  -5%  -2.5% 
Size (nr. empl)  792  884.6  1020.8  1176.3  1171.6  849.7  837.9  848.6 
    Within st.dev.  44.2  44.7  47.3  30.9  29.1  44.9  44.5  40.8 
    Between st.dev.  93.9  112.5  115.3 1.9  40.5 59.9 99.1  97.2 
Inflow  11.0%  10.7%  10.6% 10.6% 10.5% 10.9% 10.9%  10.8% 
Internal mobility  13.0%  14.2%  12.0%  7.9%  7.6%  14.7%  14.3%  14.5% 




costs  Search requirements  Quit rate  Human capital 
     reqc  reql  rqie    pdfu  grwe 
   -5%  -10%  -10%  -10%  -2%  pt  +10%  +10% 
Size (nr. empl)  792  849.6  801.0  817.7  796.5  910.8  809  845 
    Within st.dev.  44.2  42.9  44.0  46.5  43.4  43.0  44.5  47.0 
    Between st.dev.  93.9  107.0  97.7  108.6  86.2  34.3  72.0  42.1 
Inflow 11.0%  10.8%  10.7%  10.0%  10.9%  4.2%  10.6%  11.0% 
Internal mobility  13.0%  15.7%  14.1%  14.6%  13.7%  12.2%  14.4%  17.5% 
 
Table 7.8   Changing parameter values to hamper performance of large enterprises 
    Wages  Specialization  Vertical transaction costs 
 
bench 
mark wagc  wagl  benefits  costs 
loss of 
control fgpc  fgpl 
    +2.5%  +2.5% -2.5% +2.5% +0.5%  +5% +2.5% 
Size  (nr.  empl)  792 709.8  122.7 122.2 609.8 123.6 779.5  123.3 
    Within st.dev.  44.2  34.3  1.6  1.6  4.2  2.2  43.1  2.1 
    Between st.dev.  93.9  95.7  0.3 0.4 0.7 0.5  88.7  0.6 
Inflow  11.0%  10.8%  9.9%  9.8% 10.5% 9.9% 10.9%  9.8% 




costs  Search requirements  Quit rate  Human capital 
     reqc  reql  rqie    pdfu  grwe 
   +5%  +10%  +10%  +10%  +3%  pt  -10%  -10% 
Size (nr. empl)  792  123.8  800.3  736.4  806.5  622.7  758.9  666.1 
    Within st.dev.  44.2  2.1  38.8  32  43.6  15  37.9  26.6 
    Between st.dev.  93.9  0.5  82.4  100  79.8  19.1  101.9  83.1 
Inflow 11.0%  9.8%  11.1%  13.2%  10.8%  24.6%  11.2%  10.7% 
Internal mobility  13.0%  2.4%  13.7%  9.4%  13.8%  7.3%  11.7%  6.3% 
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These simulation exercises lead to the following conclusions with respect to differences 
between small and large enterprises: 
-  Small businesses react less strongly to changes in their (internal and external) envi-
ronment than large enterprises do. 
-  Large enterprises always survive the 50-year period of our simulations (therefore, the 
survival rate has not been reported in tables 7.7 and 7.8). For small businesses, this is 
not the case. 
-  Variation in firm size is always due to variation in team size (at all levels), never in 
number of levels. The number of hierarchical levels is determined by model parame-
ters representing the production and management of the business, and not by the sto-
chastics of the internal and external labour markets. 
-  As long as enterprises have no more than four levels, firm size shows very little 
variation over the simulations. In contrast, there is much more variation in businesses 
with five levels. This variation is ultimately caused by the variation in human capital 
of individual employees. Apparently, the factors that cause enterprises to become so 
large that their organization consists of five hierarchical levels, also enhance the rela-
tionship between optimal firm size and human capital of their (incumbent) employ-
ees. 
With respect to the technicalities of the production process (wage costs, costs and bene-
fits of specialization), the following conclusions emerge from the simulation experi-
ments: 
-  Changes in the respective parameter values have a clear effect on the number of em-
ployees. For small businesses, the number of employees changes because a hierar-
chical level is added or removed. For large enterprises, levels may be removed, but a 
sixth level is never added to the firm. 
-  The benchmark model of the large enterprise shows a substantial variation of average 
size between firms, which is caused by the heterogeneity of the labour force. 
Changes in the benefits and costs of specialization may, however, make the hetero-
geneity of employees become irrelevant again (as is the case for the small busi-
nesses). Enhancing the benefits of horizontal coordination by 2.5% results in a 48% 
increase of average firm size, while the between-firm standard deviation reduces al-
most to nil (Table 7.7). A 2.5% increase of the costs of horizontal coordination lead 
to a 23% decrease of average size (without removing a hierarchical level), and again 
the between-firm standard deviation becomes very small (Table 7.8). 
With respect to the features of equilibrium search theory (search costs, requirements for 
candidates, quits) that are incorporated in the model, the simulation experiments of this 
sensitivity analysis give rise to the following conclusions: 
-  Search/adjustment costs have a substantial influence on the equilibrium size of the 
firm: increasing costs have a negative effect on the number of employees, both for 
small and for large enterprises. 
-  Factors that determine the quality requirements for internal and external candidates 
have a different effect on small and large enterprises: for small businesses, they in-
fluence the survival rate (and the size of the inflow), and for large enterprises, they 
influence the number of employees.   The effects of transaction costs and human capital on firm size 
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-  The observed variation in firm size for the large enterprises depends strongly on the 
quit rate: if employees do not quit the company (except when retiring), the between-
firm standard deviation is reduced from 93.9 to 19.1. 
-  An increase in the quit rate leads to a rise in direct dismissals. The underlying 
mechanism is that an increase in quit rate results in a rise of external recruitments. 
With a constant fraction of new employees being dismissed after a year (because 
their qualities turned out to be insufficient), an increase in external recruitments leads 
to a rise in outflow by direct fires. 
Finally, with respect to human capital of individual employees (variation in qualities of 
external candidates, effects of learning by doing and company-provided training), the 
following conclusions are in order. 
-  Decreasing the available quality and/or lowering the effects of learning by doing and 
the returns to training has a negative effect on the survival rates of small businesses 
and on the average size of large enterprises. 
-  For small businesses, the quality of individual employees is negatively related with 
inflow (and outflow): if the average quality is higher and/or training becomes more 
effective, then in- and outflow rates decline. For large enterprises, the quality of in-
dividual employees has no effect on inflow rates. 
-  The relations with internal mobility are less clear for small businesses than for large 
enterprises. For large enterprises, there is a positive relationship with internal mobil-
ity. With small businesses, both increases and decreases in the relevant model pa-
rameters seem to have a positive effect on internal mobility rates. 
7.6 Conclusions 
By using a calibrated simulation model, this chapter provides a quantitative view on the 
importance of various determinants of firm size. Although the model has a neo-classical 
background in the sense that optimal firm size is determined by profit maximization, it 
combines a number of other approaches from economic literature which aim at explain-
ing firm heterogeneity and variations in firm size. In this respect, our model pays ample 
attention to the various forms of transaction costs and derives the optimal size of the 
firm from the criterion that in equilibrium marginal internal costs are equal to marginal 
external costs. Moreover, the model describes the interaction between external and in-
ternal labour flows; and in doing so, it shows how the performance of the firm and, 
therefore, its size is influenced by aspects of human capital and personnel management, 
such as hiring costs, firing costs, search costs, wage policy, training, job matching and 
setting requirements for worker qualification. In fact, our modelling exercise fully ap-
preciates the observation by Conlisk (1996, page 675) that “a central insight is that the 
existence, size, structure and workings of organizations are critically shaped by a need 
to economize on various transaction costs”. Our model is capable of reproducing all 
these insights, and the experiments with the model show the relative effectiveness of 
such economizing. 
The sophistication of the model does not only enable us to explain size differences be-
tween enterprises of different sectors (which had already been explained by microeco-
nomic theory) but, also, to explain why enterprises operating in similar environments 
may differ in size. The model shows that there are two sources for such size differences 
of firms operating in similar environments. The first source is differences in transaction Chapter 7 
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costs that may lead, as theory predicts, to size differences between firms that operate 
otherwise in the same circumstances. Our simulation experiments also show that the 
elasticity of transaction costs - i.e. the difference in firm size evoked by a 1% difference 
in transaction costs - depends on firm size itself. 
The second source of size differences between firms of the same sector is heterogeneity 
of labour supply and the reaction of personnel management on such heterogeneity. Even 
when transaction costs are the same for similar firms, their sizes may differ due to the 
qualities of incumbent workers. The impact of this effect appears again to be different in 
small businesses and large enterprises. The relative influence that labour heterogeneity 
has on firm size depends crucially on the ratio between transaction costs and wage 
costs. In our calibrated model, small businesses with a relatively flat organization and 
few hierarchical levels face relatively few transaction costs, but transaction costs gain 
importance when the number of hierarchical levels rises and intra-firm bureaucracy in-
creases. Therefore, the impact of labour heterogeneity (and the scope for HRM) on firm 
size is more severe in large enterprises than in small businesses. Within small firms, la-
bour heterogeneity has a different kind of impact: differences in qualities of individual 
employees have no impact on the number of employees (given that the firm survives), 
but on the continuity and survival of the firm instead.  
Transaction cost may be categorized into coordination costs and costs of motivation. 
Coordination costs are indicators for the quality of management and for how well struc-
tured the organization of the enterprise is. In smaller businesses, where the owner is 
both entrepreneur and manager, coordination costs also relate to entrepreneurial quali-
ties. The model simulations show that the success and survival probabilities of new 
businesses depend heavily on these entrepreneurial qualities. Marlow and Patton (1993, 
page 59) report that “it is emerging that effective management of employees is also a 
critical element in SME survival”. Our simulation results support their finding.  
The specification and calibration of our model needed a number of assumptions. The 
model would therefore benefit from future research into these assumptions. For exam-
ple, the specification of the wage equation is based on the assumption of marginal pro-
ductivity wages within hierarchical levels, and elements from tournament theory 
(Lazear, 2000) between hierarchical levels. Insights from personnel economics, with its 
studies on the rationale of various incentive structures (Lazear, 1989, 2000), can be used 
to determine under which circumstances the current specification of the wage equation 
is optimal, and which alternative specifications would be feasible.  
In addition, our model needed a number of assumptions on both the shape and parame-
ter values of the production process and the transaction costs associated with company 
management. Although we have exploited as much as possible existing empirical evi-
dence for specifying and calibrating the model, it is obvious that considerable part of the 
information that is crucial for the working of the model, is still lacking. E.g. much more 
empirical data are needed in order to come to a more robust specification of the rela-
tionship between the span of control, vertical and horizontal transaction costs and opti-
mal team size. The sensitivity analysis of the previous section indicates that these data, 
and data on human capital and costs associated with hiring, firing, quitting and training, 
are essential for a better understanding of the reasons why profit-maximizing businesses 
differ in size. Collecting these data in individual case studies of enterprises seems an 
important scope for future research. Our modelling exercise provides a framework for 
the collection of these data.  
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Appendix 7.1: The calibrated simulation model 
This appendix contains some basic characteristics of the calibrated simulation model. 
First, the calibrated model parameters of the baseline simulation are provided. Next, the 
marginal costs and benefits of hiring additional subordinates are derived. For the special 
case where all employees have the same average quality, we examine under which con-
ditions a positive and finite team size (the profit-maximizing number of subordinates) is 
guaranteed. 
Specification 
The benchmark representative firm is based upon the following calibration: 
Production:     γq,1 = 150, γq,2 = 0.85  
Supervision costs:  γfp,1 = 37.5, γfp,2 = 1 
Cooperation:  α = 0.05625, β = 0.45 
Wage:  γw,1 = 175, γw,2 = 0.75 
Price:   pt = 1 
External search costs:  seit = 50 
Firing costs:  frit = 0.5 seit  
Internal search costs:  siit = 0.66 seit  
Quality of applicant:  γqlb,1 = 3, γqub,1 = 11.6, γqprob,2 = 0.87  
Age of applicant:  γalb,1 = 40, γaub,1 = 80, γaprob,2 = 0.80 
Minimum requirements:  γmq,1 = 10, γmq,2 = 0.75, γRQIE = 0.10, γRQTR = 0.20. 
Quit rate:   γQUIT = 0.02  
Retirement:   γRETR = 60  
Learning by doing:   γGRWE= 0.20 
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Marginal costs and benefits 
The optimal number of subordinates may be determined by comparing the marginal 
costs (mc) and benefits (mb) of hiring an additional subordinate. The marginal costs for 
a (potential) supervisor of hiring an (additional) subordinate are the sum of additional 
coordination costs, supervision costs, wage costs and adjustment costs. For a supervisor 
at hierarchical level (i-1) who currently employs N subordinates (N≥0), the marginal 
costs mci-1,N+1 of hiring an additional subordinate are
80: 
The marginal benefits of hiring an additional subordinate are the sum of the benefits 
from the additional employee, and the changes in the benefits of the incumbent N em-
ployees. These changes are caused by changes in the benefits of cooperation if an addi-
tional employee would be hired: 
If an employee decides to become (or stay) a supervisor, then the profit-maximizing 
number of subordinates N* is given by the conditions mci-1,N* < mb i-1,N* and mci-1,N*+1 > 
mb i-1,N*+1. The unique solution N* may be found by finding the solution to mci-1,N+1 = 
mb i-1,N+1 (and rounding off the solution)
81: 
 
80  The time index t is removed from all equations, since it has no relevance for the calculations pre-
sented here. 
81 In addition, the first derivative of the marginal costs with respect to the number of subordinates 
must exceed the first derivative of the marginal benefits. 
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Team size in firms with homogeneous employees 
In the special case where all employees have the same, average quality (cj,i = 1 ∀ j,i), 
the equations for marginal costs and benefits become less complicated. The marginal 
costs equation may be simplified to: 
with ϕk>0 for k=1,2.  
The values of these parameters depend on the hierarchical level i (for notational conven-
ience, the hierarchical level index i has been left out). Both the first-order and second-
order derivative with respect to N are positive, so the marginal costs are a strict convex 
function of the number of incumbent subordinates. 
The marginal benefits may be rewritten as: 
with θk>0 for k=1,2.  
The marginal benefits are now increasing linearly with the number of incumbent subor-
dinates (again, the hierarchical level index i has been left out). 
A necessary condition for a finite team size is that mci-1,N > mb i-1,N for N → ∞. This 
condition is always met (given that all model parameters are strictly positive): 
Whether or not an employee becomes a supervisor, depends on other criteria. A suffi-
cient condition is that mci-1,1 / mb i-1,1<1: the benefits of hiring the first subordinate ex-
ceed the costs. For the calibrated model, this condition is met for the first three levels of 
the firm. This implicates that the baseline firm should consist of at least four levels. As 
discussed in the main text, this is the actual number of levels for the baseline simulation. 
For the small business, this condition is met for the first level only, and for the large en-
terprise for the first three levels. 
Both the small and the large enterprise have one level more than the minimum implied 
by the condition mci-1,1 / mb i-1,1<1. Apparently, even if this condition doesn’t hold, it 
may still be profitable to hire several employees. This is because marginal costs are a 
2 1
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 1 , 1
) ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( 2
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
θ θ
γ γ β γ βγ
γ γ β γ γ β β
+ ⋅ =
⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =















2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,
2
2 , 1 ,
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,
2 , 1 , 2 , 1 ,
2
1 , 1
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( 3 ) ( 3
) ( ) (
) ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( ) 2 (
ϕ ϕ ϕ
γ γ γ γ
γ αγ γ γ α γ γ α
γ γ γ γ
γ γ α γ γ α α α
+ ⋅ + ⋅ =
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +























q q N i










, 1 > + =
+
=



















Number of subordinates (N) 
convex function of N, and marginal benefits a linear function (see Figure 7.4 for an ex-
ample). Necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for this solution are: 










∂ − − , 1 , 1 , for N=0.  
This second inequality is equivalent with ϕ1 / θ1 < 1⇔ α/β < 2/3. This condition is met 
in our calibrated model. 




If the conditions that guarantee a finite number of subordinates are met, then team size 
is implicitly defined by the following equation: 
Marginal benefits per unit of production only depend on the benefits of cooperation and 
the number of incumbent workers, and are independent of the hierarchical level i. In 
contrast, marginal costs per unit of production differ between hierarchical levels. In our 
calibrated version of the model, the relative share of the supervision costs increases with 
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Summary in Dutch 
Inleiding 
Mensen vormen de motor van elke economie. Op macro-economisch niveau wordt 
menselijk kapitaal als de belangrijkste motor voor economische groei beschouwt, terwijl 
het op bedrijfsniveau als belangrijke bron voor concurrentievoordelen geldt. Recente 
technologische ontwikkelingen op het gebied van informatie- en communicatietechno-
logieën (ICT) hebben het belang van menselijk kapitaal alleen maar doen toenemen. 
Door het toenemende belang van de kennis en vaardigheden van werknemers, neemt 
ook het belang van een goed management van deze werknemers toe. Dit verklaart de 
toenemende stroom aan publicaties over HRM (Human Resource Management).  
Tegelijkertijd is gedurende de afgelopen decennia het aandeel en het belang van het 
midden- en kleinbedrijf (MKB) in de meeste westerse economieën toegenomen. Dit is 
gepaard gegaan met een groeiend aantal publicaties over MKB en ondernemerschap.  
Ondanks deze combinatie van ontwikkelingen staat onderzoek naar HRM binnen het 
MKB nog in de kinderschoenen. Onze huidige kennis op dit terrein gaat niet veel verder 
dan dat kleine bedrijven gemiddeld genomen minder aandacht aan HRM besteden dan 
grote bedrijven. Dit suggereert dat een toenemend aandeel van het MKB een negatieve 
invloed zou kunnen hebben op de beschikbare hoeveelheid menselijk kapitaal op ma-
cro-economisch niveau, en daarmee zand zou kunnen strooien in de motor van de eco-
nomische vooruitgang. Op dit moment is onze kennis echter onvoldoende om vast te 
kunnen stellen of dit een reële bedreiging is. Het doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om 
ons inzicht in HRM binnen het MKB te vergroten. 
Naast HRM wordt ook vaak de term personeelsbeleid gebruikt. Dat personeelsbeleid 
niet simpelweg de Nederlandse vertaling van “human resource management” is, blijkt 
wel uit het feit dat ook in de Engelstalige literatuur een onderscheid gemaakt wordt tus-
sen “personnel management” en “human resource management” (wat geen Nederlandse 
vertaling heeft). In normatieve zin zijn  de verschillen tussen beide begrippen beperkt, 
maar binnen HRM wordt een (nog) groter belang aan de rol van werknemers toegekend 
dan binnen personeelsbeleid.  
Eerder onderzoek  
Onderzoek naar HRM kan in drie categorieën verdeeld worden: het kan zich richten op 
kenmerken van het gevoerde beleid, op determinanten ervan, of op gevolgen ervan. On-
derzoek naar HRM binnen het MKB behoort vooral tot de eerste categorie. Het overgro-
te deel bestaat uit beschrijvend onderzoek naar kenmerken van het gevoerde beleid. 
Soms staan hierbij specifieke aspecten van HRM centraal, maar meestal worden meer-
dere aspecten van HRM in kaart gebracht. Hierbij wordt met name gekeken naar presta-
tieverhogende HRM maatregelen (high performance HRM practices). Dit zijn maatrege-
len waarvan gebleken is, dat ze voor grote bedrijven een positieve invloed op diverse 
prestatiemaatstaven (zoals productiviteit en uitstroom) hebben. Voorbeelden van derge-
lijke maatregelen zijn het testen van sollicitanten, aandacht voor bedrijfsopleidingen en 
prestatiebeloning. Er bestaat echter nog geen precieze afbakening van het begrip “pres-
tatieverhogende HRM maatregelen”. Ook is het effect van deze maatregelen binnen 
kleine en middelgrote bedrijven onbekend.  Summary in Dutch 
150 
Eerder onderzoek naar HRM binnen het MKB bevestigt het beeld dat kleinere bedrijven 
in het algemeen minder prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen toepassen dan grotere 
bedrijven. Uit deze bevindingen mag echter niet geconcludeerd worden dat de mate 
waarin dergelijke maatregelen worden toegepast, verklaard wordt door het aantal werk-
nemers van een bedrijf. De samenhang tussen bedrijfsgrootte en HRM kan ook ver-
klaard worden door de afhankelijkheid van HRM van andere, met bedrijfsgrootte sa-
menhangende, factoren waar meestal geen rekening mee wordt gehouden.  
Het aantal werknemers van een bedrijf is slechts een van de vele dimensies waarlangs 
bedrijven vergeleken kunnen worden. Er kunnen twee soorten organisationele dimensies 
onderscheiden worden: contextuele en structurele dimensies. Contextuele dimensies ka-
rakteriseren de organisatie als geheel, en hebben betrekking op het aantal werknemers, 
doelstellingen en strategie, de bedrijfsomgeving, bedrijfscultuur en de gehanteerde 
technologieën. Structurele dimensies hebben betrekking op interne bedrijfskenmerken, 
zoals formalisatie, specialisatie, standaardisatie en centralisatie. Veel dimensies zijn on-
derling aan elkaar gerelateerd. Zo geldt bijvoorbeeld dat kleine bedrijven meestal min-
der geformaliseerd, gespecialiseerd en gestandaardiseerd zijn dan grote bedrijven. In 
veel onderzoek ontbreken gegevens over deze dimensies, en wordt het aantal werkne-
mers als controlevariabele gebruikt om hiervoor te corrigeren. 
Onderzoeksvragen 
Onderzoek naar HRM binnen het MKB draaide tot op heden vooral om het beschrijven 
van kenmerken van het gevoerde beleid. Dit proefschrift richt zich met name op de twee 
andere categorieën. Hoofdstukken drie t/m vijf richten zich op determinanten van HRM, 
en hoofdstukken zes en zeven op gevolgen van HRM. In deze hoofdstukken worden de 
volgende onderzoeksvragen beantwoord: 
-  in welke mate wordt het gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen binnen 
het MKB verklaard door verschillen in organisationele context (hoofdstukken drie 
en vier)?  
-  welke factoren verklaren of kleine en middelgrote bedrijven al dan niet preventieve 
maatregelen nemen om ziekteverzuim te beperken (hoofdstuk vijf)?  
-  is de invloed van bedrijfsopleidingen verschillend voor kleine en grote bedrijven 
(hoofdstuk zes)?  
-  in welke mate kunnen verschillen in de resultaten van HRM een verklaring bieden 
voor verschillen in bedrijfsgrootte (hoofdstuk zeven)? 
De onderzoeksvragen gaan in op mogelijke verbanden tussen bedrijfsgrootte en andere 
organisationele dimensies, om op deze manier een verklaring te kunnen geven voor ge-
constateerde verschillen tussen kleinere en grotere bedrijven. Door de keuze van vier 
onderling onafhankelijke onderzoeksvragen wordt bereikt dat dit proefschrift bij kan 
dragen aan een verbreding van de huidige kennis over HRM binnen kleine en middel-
grote bedrijven. In het vervolg van deze samenvatting zullen deze vier onderzoeksvra-
gen worden uitgewerkt, waarna de belangrijkste antwoorden op deze vragen kort wor-
den samengevat. Deze samenvatting eindigt met enkele slotoverwegingen. 
Organisationele context en HRM in kleine bedrijven 
De eerste onderzoeksvraag richt zich op de rol van bedrijfsgrootte en andere contextuele 
dimensies als determinanten van de mate waarin prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen   Samenvatting 
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worden toegepast. Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden zijn twee verschillende 
onderzoeken uitgevoerd. In het eerste, exploratieve, onderzoek is een theoretisch kader 
ontwikkeld dat de invloed van verschillende contextuele variabelen op de aandacht voor 
prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen weergeeft. Uit interviews met enkele onderne-
mers uit kleine bedrijven is de potentie van dit theoretisch kader gebleken. In het ver-
volgonderzoek (waarover straks meer) is dit kader verder onderzocht.  
Dit theoretisch kader combineert inzichten uit verschillende theoretische stromingen, 
waaronder de “resource-based perspective”, de “behavioural perspective”, institutionele 
economie en transactiekostentheorie. Deze stromingen suggereren verschillende manie-
ren waarop contextuele dimensies (waaronder het aantal werknemers) een drietal inter-
mediaire variabelen beïnvloeden: verwachtingen en eisen van externe belanghebbenden 
(stakeholders) met betrekking tot het gevoerde HRM, de beschikbaarheid van benodig-
de middelen (zowel geld als kennis), en het nut dat de ondernemer toekent aan HRM. 
Deze intermediaire variabelen kunnen vervolgens invloed uitoefenen op de toepassing 
van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen. 
In het eerste onderzoek zijn, naast bedrijfsgrootte, de volgende contextuele variabelen 
opgenomen: de aanwezigheid van een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (CAO), de 
groeioriëntatie (of een bedrijf al dan niet expliciet groei nastreeft), en of een bedrijf ge-
associeerd is met een ander, groter bedrijf. Een dergelijke associatie kan betrekking 
hebben op een franchiseorganisatie, een inkooporganisatie, een dealerschap, of een er-
kend toeleverancierschap voor grote bedrijven.  
Een eerste empirische toetsing van dit theoretisch kader is uitgevoerd op basis van semi-
gestructureerde interviews met ondernemers van kleine bedrijven over hun HRM. Het 
voordeel van dergelijke interviews is dat ze informatie leveren over de specifieke om-
standigheden en kenmerken van elk bedrijf. Een belangrijk nadeel is dat vergelijkbare 
informatie slechts voor een beperkt aantal variabelen beschikbaar is. Voor dit onderzoek 
is vergelijkbare informatie beschikbaar voor drie specifieke prestatieverhogende HRM 
maatregelen: het gebruik van schriftelijke taakomschrijvingen, het regelmatig houden 
van beoordelingsgesprekken, en de aanwezigheid van bedrijfsopleidingen. Informatie 
over intermediaire variabelen is niet verzameld, zodat de geformuleerde hypothesen een 
direct verband leggen tussen contextuele variabelen en het gebruik van deze geselec-
teerde maatregelen.  
De resultaten van het onderzoek suggereren dat niet alle contextuele variabelen even be-
langrijk zijn. Zoals voorspeld, gaat een toenemende bedrijfsgrootte gepaard met een 
toenemend gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen. Met name neemt de 
kans op regelmatig gehouden beoordelingsgesprekken en op bedrijfsopleidingen toe. 
Ook het al dan niet geassocieerd zijn met een groter bedrijf is van invloed, zij het alleen 
op de aanwezigheid van bedrijfsopleidingen. Bedrijven met een duidelijke groeioriënta-
tie lijken vaker bedrijfsopleidingen aan te bieden en regelmatig beoordelingsgesprekken 
te houden, maar dit verband is niet al te sterk. Of bedrijven al dan niet onder een CAO 
vallen lijkt niet van invloed te zijn op de in dit onderzoek betrokken voorbeelden van 
prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen.  
Prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen in het MKB  
Om dit theoretisch kader verder te onderzoeken, is een tweede onderzoek uitgevoerd. 
Het kader is hierbij op enkele punten uitgebreid. Zo kunnen de intermediaire variabelen Summary in Dutch 
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niet alleen een directe invloed hebben op de toepassing van prestatieverhogende HRM 
maatregelen, maar ook indirect, via de aanwezigheid van een afdeling en/of medewer-
ker die zich specifiek met HRM bezighoudt (zeg maar, de HRM-afdeling). De interme-
diaire variabelen kunnen de kans verhogen dat een HRM-afdeling aanwezig is; de aan-
wezigheid van een HRM-afdeling wordt vervolgens verondersteld een positieve invloed 
op de toepassing van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen te hebben.  
Daarnaast zijn enkele nieuwe contextuele variabelen aan het kader toegevoegd: de aan-
wezigheid van een ondernemingsplan, of een bedrijf al dan niet exporteert, of een be-
drijf is aangesloten bij een franchiseorganisatie, of het eigendom van het bedrijf in han-
den is van leden van één familie, en de vakbondsgraad (het percentage werknemers dat 
lid is van een vakbond). Bedrijfsgrootte, de aanwezigheid van een ondernemingsplan, 
exporteren en het lidmaatschap van een franchiseorganisatie worden allemaal veronder-
steld een positieve invloed te hebben op de aanwezigheid van een HRM-afdeling en/of 
op de formaliteit van het gevoerde HRM. Voor familiebedrijven daarentegen wordt ver-
ondersteld dat de kans dat een HRM-afdeling aanwezig is lager is, evenals het gebruik 
van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen. 
Om deze hypothesen te toetsen, worden de resultaten van een schriftelijke enquête over 
HRM gebruikt. Deze enquête is voorgelegd aan Nederlandse bedrijven met 20 tot 200 
werknemers uit 6 verschillende sectoren, en uiteindelijk door 695 bedrijven beantwoord. 
De enquête bevat vele vragen over verschillende aspecten van HRM, zoals werving, se-
lectie, scholing, beoordeling en beloning. Voor elk van deze 5 categorieën is een aparte 
schaal geconstrueerd die de mate weergeeft waarin prestatieverhogende HRM maatre-
gelen worden toegepast. Vervolgens is op basis van deze 5 schalen een extra schaal ge-
definieerd die het gemiddelde gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen over 
alle onderzochte categorieën weergeeft.  
De empirische analyse voor dit onderzoek bestaat uit twee delen. In het eerste deel 
wordt de invloed van de verschillende contextuele variabelen op de aanwezigheid van 
een HRM-afdeling onderzocht. Volgens de berekeningen komen HRM-afdelingen 
vooral voor bij grote bedrijven met een schriftelijk ondernemingsplan. Familiebedrijven 
hebben juist minder vaak een HRM-afdeling dan overige bedrijven (ook na correctie 
voor de overige contextuele variabelen). Exporteren, het lidmaatschap van een franchi-
seorganisatie en de vakbondsgraad zijn niet van invloed op de kans dat een bedrijf een 
HRM-afdeling heeft.  
In het tweede deel van de empirische analyses staan prestatieverhogende HRM maatre-
gelen centraal. Voor elk van de gedefinieerde schalen wordt een lineaire regressieverge-
lijking geschat, om te achterhalen welke contextuele variabelen van invloed zijn. Ook 
wordt hierbij rekening gehouden met de aanwezigheid van een HRM-afdeling. Als al-
leen naar bedrijfsgrootte wordt gekeken, blijkt wederom dat de mate waarin prestatie-
verhogende HRM maatregelen worden gebruikt toeneemt met het aantal werknemers. 
Dit grootteklasse-effect wordt voor ongeveer de helft verklaard door de overige contex-
tuele variabelen in het model. Na correctie voor bedrijfsgrootte blijkt dat bedrijven met 
een HRM-afdeling meer aandacht aan prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen besteden 
dan bedrijven zonder een HRM-afdeling. Familiebedrijven worden gekenmerkt door 
een relatief beperkt gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen. Bedrijven die 
exporteren passen met name meer prestatieverhogende maatregelen toe met betrekking 
tot werving en selectie, en aansluiting bij een franchiseorganisatie stimuleert het gebruik 
van prestatieverhogende maatregelen op het gebied van bedrijfsopleidingen.   Samenvatting 
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Deze resultaten bevestigen eerder onderzoek volgens welke kleine bedrijven minder 
prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen uitvoeren dan grote bedrijven. Een nieuwe be-
vinding is dat bedrijven die meer aandacht aan strategieontwikkeling lijken te besteden 
(wat wordt aangegeven door de aanwezigheid van een schriftelijk ondernemingsplan) 
ook eerder een HRM-afdeling hebben en meer oog hebben voor prestatieverhogende 
HRM maatregelen. Belangrijker dan de aanwezigheid van een schriftelijk onderne-
mingsplan is de vraag of er sprake is van een familiebedrijf of niet. De relatieve infor-
maliteit van het HRM van familiebedrijven suggereert dat eigenaren en/of directeuren 
van familiebedrijven wellicht andere doelstellingen en/of instellingen hebben dan ma-
nagers van overige bedrijven. Onderzoek naar familiebedrijven wijst uit dat dergelijke 
verschillen inderdaad bestaan: eigenaren van familiebedrijven hebben een relatief sterke 
wens om volledige controle over hun bedrijf te houden. Formalisering van HRM lijkt 
gezien te worden als een bedreiging voor deze controle, wat de lage belangstelling voor 
prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen kan verklaren. 
Verzuimpreventie 
De tweede onderzoeksvraag richt zich op verzuimpreventie. De aanwezigheid van 
werknemers, en dus ook het verzuim, hangt zowel af van de mogelijkheid om aanwezig 
te zijn, als van hun motivatie om aanwezig te zijn. Onderzoek naar (ziekte)verzuim 
vindt zowel vanuit een psychologische als vanuit een economische invalshoek plaats, en 
in beide gevallen gaat de meeste aandacht uit naar de motivatie van werknemers om 
aanwezig te zijn. Vooral binnen de economische literatuur wordt (ziekte)verzuim vaak 
gezien als een bewuste keuze van werknemers die niet tevreden zijn met het contractu-
eel afgesproken aantal te werken uren. In hun pogingen om het verzuim zo laag moge-
lijk te houden, kunnen bedrijven zich echter ook richten op de mogelijkheid van werk-
nemers om aanwezig te zijn; dat wil zeggen, hun gezondheidssituatie. De gezondheids-
situatie hangt onder andere af van de werkomstandigheden binnen bedrijven. Preventief 
arbobeleid, gericht op het verbeteren van de werkomstandigheden, kan een positieve in-
vloed hebben op de mogelijkheid om aanwezig te zijn, en langs deze weg het ziektever-
zuim doen dalen. 
Gezien de verschillen in ziekteverzuim tussen kleine en grote bedrijven, lijkt deze in-
valshoek met name voor kleine en middelgrote bedrijven van belang. Kleine bedrijven 
hebben gemiddeld genomen een lager ziekteverzuim dan grote bedrijven, maar tegelij-
kertijd is de kans op een bedrijfsongeval hoger voor deze groep bedrijven. Dit sugge-
reert dat de motivatie van werknemers, als verklarende factor voor het ziekteverzuim, 
voor grotere bedrijven een belangrijkere rol speelt dan voor kleinere bedrijven. Het on-
derzoek naar verzuimpreventie binnen het MKB richt zich daarom op preventief arbo-
beleid, en met name op determinanten voor de keuze om al dan niet de werkomstandig-
heden te verbeteren.  
Als uitgangspunt wordt verondersteld, dat bedrijven werkomstandigheden zullen verbe-
teren als de verwachte opbrengsten hiervan hoger zijn dan de verwachte kosten. De 
verwachte opbrengsten hangen af van het verwachte effect van de verbeterde werkom-
standigheden op het ziekteverzuim. Het lijkt aannemelijk dat de verwachtingen die een 
ondernemer heeft over het effect van dergelijke maatregelen afhangen van de door die 
ondernemer veronderstelde samenhang tussen werkomstandigheden en ziekteverzuim 
binnen een bedrijf. De belangrijkste hypothese voor dit onderzoek is dan ook, dat be-
drijven die veronderstellen dat er een samenhang bestaat tussen werkomstandigheden en 
ziekteverzuim, eerder geneigd zijn werkomstandigheden binnen hun bedrijf te verbete-Summary in Dutch 
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ren. Andere hypothesen gaan nader in op deze veronderstelling: welke factoren bepalen 
of een bedrijf daadwerkelijk een dergelijke samenhang veronderstelt?  
Om deze hypothesen te testen, wordt gebruik gemaakt van de resultaten van een telefo-
nische enquête. Voor deze enquête zijn Nederlandse bedrijven met maximaal 200 werk-
nemers uit 6 verschillende sectoren gebeld; resultaten zijn beschikbaar voor 579 bedrij-
ven. Volgens deze resultaten heeft 37% van het Nederlandse MKB ten tijde van de en-
quête preventieve maatregelen genomen om de werkomstandigheden te verbeteren. Te-
gelijkertijd veronderstelt slechts 18% een samenhang tussen werkomstandigheden en 
ziekteverzuim in het bedrijf. Hieruit blijkt dat het veronderstellen van samenhang geen 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde is voor het verbeteren van de werkomstandigheden. Een mo-
gelijke verklaring hiervoor is de verplichte status van verschillende maatregelen (zoals 
het dragen van helmen op bouwterreinen). Een andere mogelijkheid is dat respondenten 
van mening zijn dat er tegenwoordig geen samenhang tussen werkomstandigheden en 
ziekteverzuim meer bestaat, als gevolg van verbeteringen van de werkomstandigheden 
in het verleden. 
Dit resultaat neemt niet weg, dat het veronderstellen van samenhang een positieve in-
vloed kan hebben op de beslissing om preventieve maatregelen te nemen. Verder onder-
zoek toont aan dat bedrijven die een hogere inschatting maken van de (zwaarte van de) 
geestelijke en/of lichamelijke werkomstandigheden binnen hun bedrijf, eerder een sa-
menhang veronderstellen tussen werkomstandigheden en ziekteverzuim. Een dergelijke 
samenhang wordt ook eerder onderkend als er lichamelijke of geestelijke klachten wor-
den geuit of als het ziekteverzuim hoger ligt. Na correctie voor deze factoren wordt ook 
een grootteklasse-effect gevonden: grote bedrijven veronderstellen eerder een dergelijke 
samenhang dan kleine bedrijven.  
De belangrijkste hypothese van dit onderzoek wordt echter verworpen: bedrijven die 
een samenhang veronderstellen tussen werkomstandigheden en ziekteverzuim zijn niet 
eerder geneigd om (hierdoor) preventieve maatregelen te nemen. De kans dat werkom-
standigheden verbeterd worden, neemt met name toe als de lichamelijke belasting voor 
werknemers groter lijkt te zijn en als een Risico Inventarisatie en Evaluatie heeft plaats-
gevonden
82. Ten slotte blijkt dat de kans dat preventieve maatregelen genomen worden 
toeneemt met de bedrijfsgrootte.  
De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek suggereren dat, in ieder geval ten tijde van de telefoni-
sche enquête (1995), de meeste kleine bedrijven geen bewust beleid hebben om het 
ziekteverzuim terug te dringen door de werkomstandigheden te verbeteren. Dit kan het 
gevolg zijn van het relatief lage ziekteverzuim bij de meeste kleine bedrijven, maar kan 
ook samenhangen met de beperkte tijd en kennis van ondernemers op dit terrein. Grote 
bedrijven besteden meer aandacht aan het verbeteren van werkomstandigheden, ook als 
rekening gehouden wordt met verschillen in ziekteverzuim en het al dan niet veronder-
stellen van een samenhang tussen werkomstandigheden en ziekteverzuim. Wellicht 
komt dit, omdat (het verzuimbeleid van) grote bedrijven meer in de publieke belangstel-
ling staan dan kleine bedrijven. Maar ook verschillen in wetgeving en in beschikbare 
tijd, kennis en ervaring van betrokken managers kunnen een rol spelen.  
 
82 Ten tijde van het onderzoek was een Risico Inventarisatie en Evaluatie reeds wettelijk verplicht, 
maar waren veel bedrijven nog niet van deze verplichting op de hoogte.    Samenvatting 
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De opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen  
Het is een bekend feit dat de aandacht voor bedrijfsopleidingen toeneemt met de be-
drijfsgrootte. Over de relatie tussen bedrijfsgrootte en de opbrengsten van bedrijfsoplei-
dingen is echter maar weinig bekend. De derde onderzoeksvraag richt zich op het on-
derzoeken van deze relatie.  
Bedrijfsopleidingen kunnen twee tegengestelde effecten op de productie (of toegevoeg-
de waarde) van bedrijven hebben. Enerzijds worden bedrijfsopleidingen geacht de pro-
ductiviteit van individuele werknemers te verhogen, en zodoende de productiviteit op 
bedrijfsniveau. Werknemers die (onder werktijd) een opleiding volgen, kunnen op dat 
moment echter niet werken: bedrijfsopleidingen gaan gepaard met een verlies aan pro-
ductieve uren. De meeste empirische onderzoeken naar het effect van bedrijfsopleidin-
gen op bedrijfsprestaties kunnen deze twee effecten niet van elkaar onderscheiden. Dit 
komt omdat er meestal geen informatie beschikbaar is over de tijd die met bedrijfsop-
leidingen gemoeid is. Voor dit onderzoek zijn dergelijke gegevens wel beschikbaar, 
waardoor het mogelijk is het positieve effect van bedrijfsopleidingen op productiviteit te 
scheiden van het negatieve effect op het aantal productieve uren.  
Er zijn verschillende argumenten volgens welke een grootteklasse-effect zou kunnen 
bestaan. Deze argumenten hangen samen met de organisatie van bedrijfsopleidingen: 
hoeveel en welke bedrijfsopleidingen worden gegeven, welke werknemers volgen deze 
opleidingen, en hoe worden deze werknemers begeleid? In dit onderzoek wordt nader 
ingegaan op drie mogelijke effecten van bedrijfsgrootte op de invloed van bedrijfsoplei-
dingen: het selectie-effect, het HRM-effect en het schaaleffect. Het selectie-effect gaat 
uit van afnemende meeropbrengsten: naarmate er reeds meer bedrijfsopleidingen wor-
den aangeboden, nemen de opbrengsten van nieuwe bedrijfsopleidingen af. Dit selectie-
effect resulteert in een indirect grootteklasse-effect: omdat grote bedrijven gemiddeld 
genomen meer bedrijfsopleidingen verzorgen dan kleine bedrijven, hangen de gemid-
delde opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen negatief samen met bedrijfsgrootte.  
Ook het HRM-effect is een indirect grootteklasse-effect. Het HRM-effect stelt dat de 
opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen beïnvloed worden door de trainingsbegeleiding, 
gedefinieerd als de tijd die bedrijven besteden aan het managen en coördineren van be-
drijfsopleidingen. Trainingsbegeleiding vormt een investering in de kwaliteit van het 
opleidingsbeleid: meer trainingsbegeleiding verhoogt de opbrengsten van bedrijfsoplei-
dingen. Als kleine bedrijven minder in trainingsbegeleiding investeren dan grote bedrij-
ven, zullen de opbrengsten van die opleidingen hierdoor lager uitvallen voor kleinere 
bedrijven.  
Het derde effect is het schaaleffect. Volgens dit (directe) grootteklasse-effect kunnen 
grote bedrijven van schaalvoordelen profiteren: naarmate meerdere werknemers bepaal-
de opleidingen volgen, wordt het makkelijker om deze opleidingen af te stemmen op de 
specifieke wensen en behoeften van het desbetreffende bedrijf. Door een betere af-
stemming van vorm en inhoud van een cursus op de wensen van een bedrijf zullen de 
opbrengsten van die opleiding toenemen.  
Om vast te stellen of er empirische ondersteuning is voor deze drie effecten, zijn bere-
keningen uitgevoerd op basis van een panel met gegevens over 173 Nederlandse bedrij-
ven voor de jaren 1990 en 1993. Deze bedrijven zijn in drie grootteklassen ingedeeld: 
40-150 werknemers, 150-500 werknemers en 500 of meer werknemers. Specifieke pa-Summary in Dutch 
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neldata schattingsmethoden (de zogenaamde fixed effects en random effects schatters) 
zijn gebruikt om een productiefunctie te schatten, waarbij het aantal trainingsdagen als 
een aparte productiefactor wordt gezien.  
De schattingsresultaten vinden alleen ondersteuning voor het HRM-effect. De opbreng-
sten van bedrijfsopleidingen zijn hierdoor gemiddeld genomen voor kleinere bedrijven 
lager dan voor grotere bedrijven. Voor bedrijven die niet of nauwelijks aan trainingsbe-
geleiding doen, hebben bedrijfsopleidingen zelfs geen enkel positief effect op bedrijfs-
prestaties. Deze opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen kunnen vergeleken worden met 
het negatieve effect dat optreedt door het verlies aan productieve uren. Hiertoe zijn en-
kele voorzichtige berekeningen uitgevoerd om een eerste indicatie te krijgen van het 
break-even punt, waar het (eenmalige) verlies aan productieve uren juist tenietgedaan 
wordt door de (structureel) gestegen productiviteit. Voor bedrijven met 500 of meer 
werknemers zou dit break-even punt tussen 3 en 4 jaar liggen, maar voor bedrijven met 
minder dan 150 werknemers zou dit punt pas na meer dan 20 jaar optreden. Deze bere-
keningen zijn echter met te veel onzekerheden omgeven, om hier harde conclusies uit te 
kunnen trekken over winstgevendheid en wenselijkheid van investeringen in bedrijfsop-
leidingen.  
De invloed van transactiekosten en menselijk kapitaal op bedrijfsgrootte  
In de voorafgaande drie onderzoeksvragen heeft bedrijfsgrootte de rol van exogene va-
riabele gespeeld, en is de relatie onderzocht tussen het aantal werknemers, kenmerken 
van HRM en de effectiviteit van (een specifiek onderdeel van) HRM. Een effectief 
HRM wordt verondersteld de instroom van personeel te bevorderen, de doorstroom te 
optimaliseren, en de uitstroom te beperken. Langs deze weg is HRM uiteindelijk van 
invloed op bedrijfsprestaties, waaronder continuïteit, marktaandeel, winst en groei. Dit 
laatste suggereert dat het aantal werknemers van een bedrijf niet alleen een mogelijke 
determinant is van HRM, maar ook mede het gevolg kan zijn van de effectiviteit van het 
gevoerde HRM. Deze mogelijke relatie staat centraal in de laatste onderzoeksvraag.  
Er bestaan verschillende theorieën om bestaande verschillen in bedrijfsgrootte te verkla-
ren. Verschillen in productietechnieken hangen samen met verschillende schaalvoorde-
len, waarmee verschillen in optimale bedrijfsgrootte tussen sectoren en landen verklaard 
kunnen worden. De transactiekostentheorie wordt gebruikt om de (transactie)kosten van 
interne organisaties te onderzoeken. Verschillende verhoudingen tussen interne en ex-
terne transactiekosten kunnen volgens deze theorie leiden tot verschillen in optimale 
bedrijfsomvang. Deze benadering is bij uitstek geschikt om verschillen in bedrijfsgroot-
te te verklaren tussen bedrijven die in vergelijkbare omgevingen opereren, zeker als 
hierbij rekening gehouden wordt met het feit dat individuele werknemers over verschil-
lende kennis en vaardigheden beschikken. 
Voor de laatste onderzoeksvraag wordt onderzocht wat het relatieve belang van elk van 
deze factoren is als verklarende factor voor verschillen in bedrijfsgrootte. Hiertoe wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van een simulatiemodel. Dit model geeft het besluitvormingsproces 
weer van een winstmaximaliserende ondernemer, over het aantal werknemers dat hij in 
dienst wil nemen. Deze beslissing hangt af van de kosten en opbrengsten van het wer-
ven, selecteren, inzetten en monitoren van werknemers, en van de kosten en opbreng-
sten van samenwerking tussen werknemers. Werknemers beschikken in dit model over 
individuele kwaliteiten. De kwaliteit van elke nieuwe werknemer is gemodelleerd als 
een stochastisch proces; hetzelfde geldt voor de uitstroomkans van zittende werkne-  Samenvatting 
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mers. Door deze stochastiek geldt dat als bij gegeven parameterwaarden meerdere simu-
laties uitgevoerd worden, de uitkomsten van deze simulaties kunnen verschillen. Om 
hiermee rekening te houden worden alle modelsimulaties (voor een specifieke keuze 
van parameterwaarden) 100 keer uitgevoerd. 
De parameters van dit model zijn zo gekalibreerd, dat de modelsimulaties een represen-
tatief bedrijf genereren met meerdere hiërarchische lagen. De arbeidsstromen binnen dit 
representatieve bedrijf (instroom, interne promoties, en uitstroom) komen overeen met 
resultaten van empirisch onderzoek.  
In eerste instantie wordt dit model gebruikt om na te gaan in welke mate overlevings-
kans en bedrijfsgrootte van dit representatieve bedrijf bepaald worden door de gemid-
delde arbeidsproductiviteit en specialisatie. De uitkomsten van deze simulaties worden 
gebruikt om een representatief klein bedrijf (met gemiddeld 25 werknemers, verdeeld 
over drie hiërarchische lagen) en een representatief groot bedrijf (met gemiddeld 790 
werknemers, verdeeld over vijf hiërarchische lagen) te definiëren. Vervolgens worden 
voor deze twee representatieve bedrijven diverse simulaties uitgevoerd, om na te gaan 
hoe de bedrijfskenmerken afhangen van alle modelparameters (en daarmee van de kos-
ten en opbrengsten van het werven, selecteren, inzetten en monitoren van werknemers, 
en de kosten en opbrengsten van samenwerking tussen werknemers).  
De modelsimulaties identificeren twee verschillende oorzaken die kunnen verklaren 
waarom winstmaximaliserende bedrijven die in vergelijkbare omgevingen opereren van 
omvang kunnen verschillen. De eerste oorzaak is dat de kosten van interne transacties 
tussen bedrijven kunnen variëren. Dit effect is reeds eerder beschreven, maar totnogtoe 
zijn hierbij geen schaaleffecten onderscheiden. De modelsimulaties tonen aan dat 
schaaleffecten kunnen optreden: de omvang van het representatieve kleine bedrijf rea-
geert minder sterk op veranderingen in interne transactiekosten dan de omvang van het 
representatieve grote bedrijf. 
De tweede oorzaak is heterogeniteit in het aanbod van arbeid, en de manier waarop be-
drijven hiermee omgaan. Het belang van deze heterogeniteit kan bepaald worden, door 
te kijken naar de spreiding in de resultaten van modelsimulaties bij gegeven parameter-
waarden. Immers, als alle parameterwaarden gelijk gehouden worden, dan kunnen ver-
schillen in stand- en stroomcijfers tussen individuele modelsimulaties alleen verklaard 
worden door de variaties in de kwaliteiten en kwalificaties van individuele werknemers 
(aangezien dit het enige onderdeel van het simulatiemodel is dat aan stochastiek onder-
hevig is). 
Deze variaties kunnen gezien worden als maatstaf voor de effectiviteit van het gevoerde 
HRM in de verschillende bedrijven; een relatief hoge instroom duidt op een relatief ef-
fectief wervings- en selectiebeleid, en een relatief lage uitstroom duidt op bedrijven die 
hun medewerkers goed aan het bedrijf kunnen binden. Het model is niet in staat om vast 
te stellen hoe het optimale HRM eruitziet, maar kan wel vaststellen in welke mate ver-
schillen in de effectiviteit van HRM doorwerken in interne arbeidsstromen, en uiteinde-
lijk bedrijfsomvang.  
Ook dit effect pakt verschillend uit voor kleine en grote bedrijven. Voor het simulatie-
model geldt dat de relatieve invloed van de specifieke individuele capaciteiten van me-
dewerkers op bedrijfsgrootte afhangt van de verhouding tussen de transactiekosten en 
de loonkosten. Dit komt door de veronderstelling van marginale productiviteitslonen, Summary in Dutch 
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waardoor de loonkosten per eenheid product onafhankelijk zijn van de productiviteit 
van individuele medewerkers. Transactiekosten per eenheid product, daarentegen, ne-
men af als individuele medewerkers over meer kwaliteiten beschikken. Het gesimuleer-
de representatieve kleine bedrijf heeft relatief weinig hiërarchische lagen, waardoor in-
terne transactiekosten geen grote rol spelen. Het relatieve belang van transactiekosten 
(t.o.v. loonkosten) neemt toe, naarmate een bedrijf meerdere hiërarchische lagen telt en 
de interne bureaucratie toeneemt. Het resultaat hiervan is dat de invloed van de speci-
fieke kwaliteiten en vaardigheden van individuele medewerkers op bedrijfsomvang gro-
ter is voor grote bedrijven dan voor kleine bedrijven. Bij kleine bedrijven heeft het 
HRM weinig tot geen invloed op de bedrijfsgrootte, maar wel op de overlevingskans. 
Conclusies 
In dit proefschrift zijn vier verschillende onderzoeksvragen onderzocht, om op deze 
manier ons inzicht in determinanten en gevolgen van HRM binnen het midden- en 
kleinbedrijf te vergroten. In het laatste deel van deze samenvatting worden de belang-
rijkste antwoorden op deze onderzoeksvragen nogmaals samengevat. 
In welke mate wordt het gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen binnen het 
MKB verklaard door verschillen in organisationele context? Een belangrijke contextue-
le variabele is de grootte van een bedrijf: het gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM 
maatregelen neemt toe naarmate bedrijven groter worden. Deze samenhang tussen be-
drijfsomvang en HRM wordt vaak gezien als een indicator voor het belang van (niet 
gemeten) structurele dimensies, zoals centralisatie, standaardisatie en specialisatie. Ons 
onderzoek wijst echter uit dat het gevonden grootteklasse-effect voor ruwweg de helft 
verklaard kan worden door overige contextuele dimensies. Als er rekening gehouden 
wordt met deze dimensies, dan wordt de relevantie van bedrijfsomvang substantieel 
kleiner, en zelfs insignificant als het gaat om de beoordeling en beloning. Familiebedrij-
ven en bedrijven zonder een ondernemingsplan blijken minder aandacht te besteden aan 
prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen. Deze bedrijven hebben ook minder vaak een 
specifieke personeelsfunctionaris of HRM-afdeling. De aanwezigheid van een dergelij-
ke functionaris of afdeling heeft een positieve invloed op de toepassing van prestatie-
verhogende HRM maatregelen. Familie-eigendom, de aanwezigheid van een onderne-
mingsplan en het aantal werknemers hebben zodoende zowel een directe als een indirec-
te invloed op het gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen.  
De tweede onderzoeksvraag luidt, welke factoren verklaren of MKB-bedrijven al dan 
niet preventieve maatregelen nemen om ziekteverzuim te beperken. De resultaten van 
ons onderzoek wijzen uit dat de kans op preventieve maatregelen toeneemt als de li-
chamelijke belasting voor werknemers (in de ogen van de werkgever) groter lijkt te zijn, 
als een Risico Inventarisatie en Evaluatie heeft plaatsgevonden, en als er meer werkne-
mers in dienst zijn: de kans dat preventieve maatregelen genomen worden neemt toe 
met de bedrijfsgrootte. Deze kans is onafhankelijk van het actuele ziekteverzuim en van 
de veronderstelde geestelijke werkdruk. Ten slotte geldt dat de kans op preventieve 
maatregelen ook los staat van de mening van werkgevers of er een samenhang bestaat 
tussen werkomstandigheden en ziekteverzuim binnen hun bedrijf. 
De derde onderzoeksvraag richt zich op de opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen. Zijn 
deze opbrengsten verschillend voor kleine en grote bedrijven? Onze resultaten suggere-
ren dat dit inderdaad het geval is. Voor zowel kleine als grote bedrijven geldt dat be-
drijfsopleidingen de productiviteit van werknemers verhogen. De omvang van dit effect   Samenvatting 
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hangt af van de mate van trainingsbegeleiding: naarmate bedrijven meer tijd investeren 
in het managen en coördineren van bedrijfsopleidingen, nemen de opbrengsten van een 
extra trainingsdag toe. Gemiddeld genomen besteden kleine bedrijven minder aandacht 
aan trainingsbegeleiding van hun werknemers dan grote bedrijven. Hierdoor zijn ook de 
opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen voor kleine bedrijven in het algemeen lager dan 
voor grote bedrijven.  
Kan bedrijfsgrootte niet alleen bepalend zijn voor het gevoerde HRM, maar er ook van 
afhangen? Dit is de kern van de laatste onderzoeksvraag. Exercities met een simulatie-
model wijzen uit dat dit inderdaad het geval kan zijn. Een belangrijk kenmerk van dit 
model is de heterogeniteit van het aanbod van arbeid, en van de ontwikkeling van indi-
viduele medewerkers binnen bedrijven. Verschillen in niveau en groeivoet van de 
kwaliteiten van medewerkers kunnen geïnterpreteerd worden als verschillen in de 
effectiviteit van het gevoerde (maar niet expliciet gemodelleerde) HRM. Met behulp 
van dit model kan onderzocht worden in welke mate verschillen in de effectiviteit van 
het gevoerde HRM doorwerken in de instroom, doorstroom, ontwikkeling en uitstroom 
van personeel, en uiteindelijk in de bedrijfsomvang.  
Modelsimulaties wijzen uit dat verschillen in de effectiviteit van HRM inderdaad van 
invloed kunnen zijn op bedrijfsomvang. Deze invloed wordt met name gevonden bij 
grote bedrijven met meerdere hiërarchische lagen. Bij kleine bedrijven heeft het HRM 
weinig tot geen invloed op de bedrijfsgrootte, maar wel op de overlevingskans. Voor de 
gesimuleerde bedrijven geldt dan ook dat de invloed van de heterogeniteit (en van de ef-
fectiviteit van het gevoerde HRM) voor grote bedrijven anders is dan voor kleine be-
drijven.  
Tot slot  
Voor ieder bedrijf met werknemers in dienst is het aansturen van deze werknemers een 
fundamenteel onderdeel van de bedrijfsvoering, ongeacht of het nu een klein of groot 
bedrijf is. Werknemers moeten geworven en ingezet worden, en wel op een efficiënte 
manier. Dit is niet alleen een uitdaging voor grote bedrijven, maar net zozeer voor klei-
ne bedrijven. Zo geeft bijvoorbeeld meer dan 20% van alle Europese bedrijven met 1-9 
werknemers in dienst te kennen, dat het werven van personeel met gewenste kwalifica-
ties het belangrijkste probleem is geweest waarmee ze gedurende eind jaren negentig 
geconfronteerd werden. Voor de categorie van Europese bedrijven met 10-49 werkne-
mers in dienst geldt dit zelfs voor 30%. 
Van onderzoek naar HRM onder grote bedrijven weten we dat een toenemend gebruik 
van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen in het algemeen samengaat met betere be-
drijfsprestaties. Dergelijk onderzoek heeft nog niet onder kleine bedrijven plaatsgevon-
den, maar de resultaten van het simulatiemodel suggereren dat HRM ook voor kleine 
bedrijven van belang kan zijn: zoals onderzoekers al eerder hebben gesuggereerd, kan 
het gevoerde HRM bepalend zijn voor de overlevingskansen van kleine bedrijven. Aan-
gezien het simulatiemodel geen expliciet gemodelleerde HRM maatregelen bevat, kun-
nen we geen uitspraken doen over hoe een optimaal HRM eruit zou moeten zien, of in 
welke mate hierbij prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen ingeschakeld moeten wor-
den. Het is denkbaar dat voor kleine bedrijven een relatief informele benadering van 
HRM effectiever is dan een meer formele aanpak, gezien de informele wijze waarop 
veel kleine bedrijven geleid worden. Dit kan erop duiden dat voor kleine bedrijven het Summary in Dutch 
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gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen een minder sterke invloed op be-
drijfsprestaties heeft dan voor grote bedrijven. 
Dit lijkt echter niet op te gaan voor bedrijfsopleidingen. Althans, niet volgens de resul-
taten van ons onderzoek naar de opbrengsten van bedrijfsopleidingen. Deze resultaten 
suggereren dat voor zover het bedrijfsopleidingen betreft, ook kleine en middelgrote be-
drijven zouden profiteren van een meer formele organisatie van bedrijfsopleidingen. 
Tenminste, voor zover deze formele organisatie samenhangt met een behoorlijke mate 
van trainingsbegeleiding. Bedrijfsopleidingen kunnen de prestatie van kleine en middel-
grote bedrijven verbeteren, als er tenminste voldoende aandacht aan trainingsbegelei-
ding wordt besteed. Veel kleine en middelgrote bedrijven met een beperkt budget voor 
bedrijfsopleidingen zouden er goed aan doen om een groter deel van dit budget voor 
trainingsbegeleiding te reserveren, en een kleiner deel daadwerkelijk aan trainingen te 
besteden. Casestudies onder kleine Britse bedrijven die het Investors in People pro-
gramma volgen, bevestigen dat ook kleine bedrijven profiteren van een meer formele 
aanpak van bedrijfsopleidingen. 
De antwoorden op de derde en de vierde onderzoeksvraag suggereren dus dat HRM wel 
degelijk van invloed kan zijn op prestaties van kleine en middelgrote bedrijven. Dit 
komt overeen met de resultaten van eerder onderzoek. Deze onderzoeken kunnen gezien 
worden als de eerste studies naar de invloed van HRM op bedrijfsprestaties van bedrij-
ven uit het MKB. Gezien de relevantie van HRM, is het belangrijk om te weten hoe be-
drijven tot hun keuzen voor specifieke HRM maatregelen komen. Welke verbanden be-
staan er tussen contextuele en structurele dimensies en de specifieke uitwerking van 
HRM in het MKB? 
Er is al vaker vastgesteld dat het HRM van kleine bedrijven minder uitgewerkt is dan 
dat bij grote bedrijven. Met de eerste onderzoeksvraag is nagegaan, in welke mate het 
verschil in gebruik van prestatieverhogende HRM maatregelen verklaard kan worden 
door verschillen in contextuele dimensies. Volgens de resultaten kan ongeveer de helft 
van dit grootteklasse-effect verklaard worden door enkele contextuele variabelen. Met 
name de eigendomsverhoudingen blijken een belangrijke rol spelen. Bedrijven waarvan 
leiding en eigendom grotendeels in handen zijn van één familie worden gekenmerkt 
door een relatief informeel HRM, waarbij relatief weinig aandacht bestaat voor presta-
tieverhogende HRM maatregelen. Daarnaast geldt dat veel afhangt van de vraag of een 
bedrijf een specifieke personeelsfunctionaris of -afdeling heeft.  
Er blijkt binnen bedrijven een behoorlijk verschil te bestaan in het gebruik van presta-
tieverhogende HRM maatregelen op verschillende gebieden van HRM (zoals werving, 
selectie, beoordeling, beloning en scholing). De correlaties tussen de schalen die in 
hoofdstuk 4 zijn besproken, lopen uiteen van 0.33 tot 0.52. Deze verschillen illustreren 
het belang van onderzoek naar specifieke gebieden van HRM, waartoe ook de hoofd-
stukken over verzuimpreventie en bedrijfsopleidingen in dit proefschrift gerekend kun-
nen worden.  
We moeten nog steeds veel leren over hoe (en waarom) bedrijven daadwerkelijk hun 
personeel aansturen, en hoe ze hierin verbeteringen kunnen aanbrengen. In dit proef-
schrift hebben we ons specifiek gericht op overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen kleine 
en grote bedrijven, en tussen kleine bedrijven onderling. Het aantal werknemers op zich 
kan vaak geen verklaring bieden voor de geconstateerde verschillen; in veel onderzoe-
ken wordt het gebruikt als controlevariabele om te corrigeren voor de invloed van ande-  Samenvatting 
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re contextuele en/of structurele variabelen waarvan de gegevens ontbreken. In dit proef-
schrift hebben we hierin verandering gebracht, door grootteklasseverschillen te verkla-
ren op basis van verschillen in andere dimensies dan alleen bedrijfsgrootte.  
Dit neemt echter niet weg, dat in een aantal gevallen het aantal werknemers wel degelijk 
verschillen tussen kleine en grote bedrijven kan verklaren. Vooral voor kleine bedrijven, 
waar wervings- en selectiebeslissingen maar één of twee keer per jaar (of zelfs minder) 
genomen hoeven te worden, en waar uitstroom erg beperkt is, geldt dat er weinig ruimte 
is om specifieke kennis en ervaring over HRM op te bouwen. HRM zal bij deze bedrij-
ven in sterke mate bepaald worden door de sociale vaardigheden van de ondernemer, en 
minder door de toepassing van specifieke HRM maatregelen. Onderzoek naar HRM valt 
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